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This research examines the financial assistance given by parents to their adult children and the extent to 
which it is influenced by social policy. In recent years these intergenerational financial transfers have 
been the subject of much research and a great deal has been learnt about when and why parents make 
the decision to provide financial assistance (Cox, 1987; Kohli, 1999; Albertini & Kohli, 2012). 
Furthermore, there has been considerable research on apparent differences in such financial assistance 
across countries and the extent to which this is attributable to differences in the social policies of these 
countries (Albertini, Kohli, & Vogel, 2007; Schenk, Dykstra, & Maas, 2010; Brandt & Deindl, 2013).  
The aim of this research is to further this understanding by considering transfers from different 
perspectives, first by considering the receipt of transfers rather than the giving of transfers and then by 
exploring the transfer decision in the context of multi-child families. Through these approaches and by 
using new data sources and analytical methods, the research estimates the association between social 
policy and intergenerational financial transfers. Furthermore, it was the specific aim of this research to 
consider whether such an association would explain cross-national variation in transfer behaviour and 
the importance of social policies relative to other determinants of transfer behaviour.  
To achieve these aims a variety of quantitative methods were used to model the giving and receiving of 
transfers using data from the Survey for Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and the 
European Union’s Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The analysis of this latter 
dataset represents an important contribution in itself as it allows for the exploration of the receipt of 
transfers in a comparative perspective for the first time. To incorporate the complex and rich nature of 
these two datasets, multilevel models are used to model households over time and children within 
families.  
The results of these analyses suggest that there is a small association between certain policies and 
parents providing financial assistance to their adult children. Those in receipt of larger public pensions 
are marginally more likely to provide financial assistance to their adult children than those with smaller 
public pensions. As for adult children themselves, those receiving financial assistance from the state in 
the form of child benefit, housing benefits, social exclusion benefits and educational benefits are 
fractionally more likely to receive from their parents as well. The estimated coefficients and maximum 
effect size of such social policies are very small compared to time invariant factors which include the 
parent’s financial resources and the number of siblings the child has. In addition, the cross-national 
variation in transfer behaviour identified within the analyses is considerably smaller than in previous 
research. The research concludes that social policies are of less importance with regards to transfer 
behaviour than previous research has suggested. Whilst the research identifies a clear association 
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between social policies and transfer behaviour, it is relatively weak compared to other factors. 
However the research stops short of concluding that social policies do not matter, instead suggesting 
that future research should critically assess the importance of intergenerational transfers in determining 
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1.1. The Bank of Mum & Dad 
This thesis aims to understand the relationship between social policy and the financial assistance offered 
by parents to their adult children. These financial transfers and their association with social policies 
were chosen as the subject of this study due to the belief that they are only somewhat understood 
despite the existence of a mature and extensive research community. This research community has so 
far established that financial assistance from parents can be decisive at various moments in time 
(Leopold & Schneider, 2010). It is also widely noted that such financial assistance is not only 
widespread but is a key driver of inequalities in opportunity and upward mobility (Albertini & Radl, 
2012; Mulder & Smits, 2013).  
Yet the findings of the research presented in this thesis, as well as empirical findings from the existing 
literature, challenge some of these views and suggest that there is little evidence of them being sizeable 
enough to have such a deterministic effect (Kohli, 1999). No study has identified a majority of 
individuals giving or receiving such transfers and they are rarely of a size that would significantly impact 
an individual’s standard of living, relative to other means of finance. Yet when I have presented these 
findings at various conferences, to academic journals, or even to family or friends the findings have 
been consistently challenged on the basis that the percentage of people receiving or making transfers is 
not as high as anticipated.  There is a certainty that people hold which says that family matters. 
This belief is often supported by the theoretical literature on intergenerational relationships which 
assert that theories of the nuclear family and the individualisation of society were wrong. Social change 
in the latter half of the twentieth century led to the theorisation of diverse family forms and dynamic 
roles and relationships that changed over time (Puur, Sakkeus, Schenk, & Poldma, 2010). This shift in 
focus from conventional to unconventional family forms has brought about a keen interest in 
relationships beyond the household unit. For example, over the past 50 years there has been a large 
increase in the number of divorces (González-Val & Marcén, 2012). A single mother may well rely 
upon parents, not only for financial support but for support of all kinds in the absence of a partner 
(Attias-Donfut & Arber, 2000).  
Furthermore, transitions in the labour market have become more complex with high staff turnovers 
and an increase in the average number of jobs an individual has in a life time and complex transitions to 
adulthood (Quintini & Manfredi, 2009). It has therefore been suggested that given such insecurity, 
unconventional means of support intervene (Lennartson, 2010). This occurs either by an individual 
staying at home for longer or by the parents providing financial top ups to non-cohabiting children. 
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Furthermore this discussion of the importance of the family during turbulent transitions has intensified 
since the financial crisis of 2008. 
These theoretical interpretations of social change and their consequences for intergenerational 
relations, and particularly the demands placed upon the Bank of Mum and Dad, formalise people’s 
intuition. Coupled with the wider theoretical discourse regarding societal ageing and the welfare state, 
there has been a growing assertion within social theory that intergenerational relations matter and, 
particularly at a time of economic crisis, the bank of Mum and Dad is a key social institution worth 
investigating.  
Yet there is a disconnect between common knowledge and the empirical evidence presented in this 
thesis. This gap can be reconciled if it is found that either the data collection process was flawed or 
accepted that the commonly held belief that parents are a key source of financial support is wrong. 
Regardless of which of these is taken as true, the question of whether and when individuals give and 
receive such transfers remains an interesting one for the social sciences. Yet, the conclusions of this 
thesis suggest that accepted wisdom is wrong and that intergenerational transfers are not a considerable 
means of financial support. 
1.2. Ageing Societies in Europe 
The importance of older generations as a means of financial assistance to younger generations is a 
debate that takes place in the context of rapid societal ageing. European Societies are getting older. 
Longer lives and low fertility mean that the balance between the generations within society is shifting 
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. By the middle of this century 1 in 4 Europeans 
will be over the age of 65 when in 1950 it was just 1 in 16 (Eurostat, 2013). The implications of this 
have been considered and discussed extensively in a wide variety of areas and disciplines. In the field of 
Social Policy this discussion touches upon some of the core principles of the welfare state.  
For the past century the welfare state has bound generations together. Through a variety of 
instruments, European Welfare states have redistributed income across the life course. Combined, 
pensions and healthcare are considerably larger than any other aspect of the welfare state in terms of 
expenditure. An ageing society is therefore a challenge to the 20th century’s conception of the welfare 
state and intergenerational debates are therefore a key concern in the field of social policy. The future 
of welfare state research will inevitably be heavily focused on issues relating to this ageing of society. 
In Europe, a shared history has led not only to a shared welfare state tradition but also to something of 
a shared demography and this makes Europe an interesting arena for scientific research. Yet within 
these shared characteristics there are important variations. It is these variations, not only in policy, but 
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demography, history, culture and economics that the analysis seeks to exploit to understand the role of 
policy in influencing transfer behaviour. 
But the rationale for a comparative approach is due to the potential of a shared future as well as 
divergence between countries. The economic crisis has shown how European societies are 
interdependent in a number of ways. Policy decisions that affect individual’s lives are increasingly made 
in Brussels as much as in Rome, Berlin or Madrid. The monetary, political and social community that 
the European Union represents necessitates an understanding of societal ageing across Europe. To 
inform policy debates on and answer the key questions regarding societal ageing it is necessary to 
conduct comparative research of European Countries.  
One of the key questions posed is the effect societal ageing will have on intergenerational solidarity. 
With a relative increase in the number of older people and fewer of working age, there are questions 
about the willingness and ability of younger generations to provide for the large cohorts of the so called 
baby boomer generations. This debate has evolved to take on emotive tones and divisive rhetoric. In 
this context there is an understandable desire to reassert the value of intergenerational solidarity and 
the role of older generations in supporting younger generations and society more generally. 
Intergenerational rhetoric often neglects to mention that older generations encompass all classes, all 
ethnic groups and every decile of the income distribution. Older generations within society are varied. 
This variety is in no small part attributable to the diversity of older generations themselves. Even in 
terms of age, the characteristic on which they are defined, they can range from 50 to over 100. As well 
as diverse identities, the roles they play cover all aspects of society. They work, they volunteer, they 
provide childcare to their grandchildren, they look after those who are infirm who are often their own 
parents or spouses and they contribute to society in innumerable ways. This thesis deals with just one 
of these contributions in that it only looks at financial assistance provided by older generations but 
many of the questions posed here, and indeed many of the answers, are applicable across this broad 
spectrum of intergenerational relations. The intergenerational debate that will inevitably evolve 
alongside the changing demographic landscape, requires a better understanding of intergenerational 
interdependencies and relationships both on the macro and micro level. It is the aim of this thesis to 
contribute to this understanding via the analysis of intergenerational financial assistance.  
By employing a comparative approach and advanced quantitative methods, this thesis draws a picture of 
intergenerational solidarity that does not fit with traditional views of intergenerational dependencies. 
What is revealed are dynamics that are largely driven by the circumstances of the parent and do not 
offer strong support for the notion of solidarity and altruism. That is not to say that older generations 
are selfish, simply that altruism does not appear to be the primary motivation of intergenerational 
support. The implications for the wider debate on intergenerational solidarity in a time of ageing are 
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therefore considerable in so much as they stress the importance of public intergenerational support 
relative to private forms. 
1.3. Methodological Contributions 
In addition to the substantive and theoretical rationales for this research project, there are also a 
number of technical aspects that contribute a great deal to the need for the results of this research 
project. The research within this thesis is based on two large scale datasets that cover a number of 
European countries. Neither of these datasets existed 10 years ago and both have contributed 
significantly to the empirical knowledge base across the social and medical sciences. The collection of 
data on such a scale is of course due to the expanding use of digital technologies to capture, store, 
disseminate and analyse data. This makes quantitative analysis of data an interesting and challenging 
research method and over the duration of this project there have been a number of advances in 
methodological techniques, some of which have been incorporated within this project. 
The analysis of such large scale datasets is a promising and fruitful area for researchers and this formed 
part of the justification for adopting them here. One of the innovations that this research project looked 
to take advantage of was Multilevel Modelling. Broadly speaking this statistical modelling technique 
allows the researcher to distinguish between individual and contextual level effects. In this research it is 
used to distinguish between two different types of contextual effects or characteristics. Firstly it is used 
to distinguish between whether a household receives a transfer because of their specific circumstances 
at a given time or whether it is due to a time invariant contextual factor. In this instance, the lower 
level consists of observations which are then nested within a household at the higher level. It is then 
used later to understand whether a child receives a transfer because of characteristics unique to them or 
whether it’s due to the type of family they are from. Here the lower level consists of individuals who 
are part of families which represent the higher level. 
These techniques are relatively new, not because the maths is particularly difficult, but because they are 
computationally demanding. The software that made this analysis possible did not exist at the beginning 
of this project. Given this new questions were addressed in the use of such techniques and many of 
these remain unresolved. Yet the reward from meeting such challenges is vast. The analysis in this 
thesis draws on data from every member state within the European Union. Given the social, economic 
and cultural diversity across the continent it is therefore possible to understand processes within 
different settings. It needs to be made clear to what extent variations in social behaviour are due to 
institutional and structural differences and the extent to which pan European policies and measures 
should reflect this. The methodological techniques used here contribute towards this debate. For 
example, it is standard practice within the literature to infer the impact of policy from differences 
5 
 
between countries. This practice is questioned given that these differences could be due to other factors 
such as cultural, economic, historic or even geographic reasons. This thesis proposes more direct 
measures of policy that might help both researchers and policy makers consider the role and impact of 
policy in a more appropriate way. 
1.4. Overview 
In order to fully explore the extent to which intergenerational transfers from parents to their adult 
children in Europe are affected by social policy, the thesis is laid out as follows. Chapter 2 outlines 
existing evidence and previous research findings regarding intergenerational transfers. From this, 
several areas in which existing research is underdeveloped are identified. These are then taken forward 
in chapter 3 where a theoretical framework is developed out of the existing literature so as to address 
the gaps in knowledge that exist. This is then followed by an elaboration of the research strategy used 
in the analysis. Chapter 4 then discusses and outlines the data and methods that are used to answer the 
questions that were identified in chapters 2 & 3.  
Chapter 5 begins the analysis of intergenerational transfers by asking whether higher public pension 
benefits affect the propensity of parents to give financial transfers to their children. The analysis 
demonstrates that there is a positive association between high pensions and an increased propensity to 
transfer, suggesting that high pensions may explain a small proportion of the observed cross national 
variation. Chapter 6 then adopts a new approach to transfer analysis with a dataset that has previously 
not been used for this. This chapter looks at whether the poorest households are more likely to receive 
financial assistance than richer households. The findings suggest that they are but that the effect is far 
smaller than the undefined latent tendency to receive transfers, suggesting that parental context and 
other time invariant factors are far more important. The analysis is then extended in chapter 7 to assess 
whether households receive more or less support when they are also receiving public financial 
assistance in the form of a variety of social policies. The findings suggest that households who receive 
more financial assistance from the state are marginally more likely to receive financial assistance from 
elsewhere. However the overwhelming conclusion is that, as in chapter 6, the recipient household’s 
circumstances are relatively unimportant in determining transfer behaviour when compared with time 
invariant factors. 
Given this chapter 8 explores what, in addition to income and wealth could be, leading to differences in 
transfer behaviour between families. It is evident from the findings of this chapter that the number of 
siblings is an important factor in determining whether a child receives financial support from their 
parents. This effect is larger than income and explains a larger proportion of the variance. This finding 
is then elaborated upon in chapter 9, the conclusion, which suggests that policies affect transfers only in 
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the extent to which they support the parent’s capacity to make transfers. This effect is also placed in a 
wider context and a fuller picture of the role of policy in transfer behaviour is given. Through this 






2. Theories & Evidence of Transfer Behaviour 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the existing evidence and theories relating to intergenerational 
transfers. Before this, it is necessary to reflect on the subject of study. Summarising this literature is a 
difficult task for a number of reasons. Firstly, intergenerational transfers sit on the intersection 
between many established disciplines. The study of intergenerational transfers involves economic, 
financial, psychological, social and demographic concepts and as this overview demonstrates, 
knowledge with this literature requires the consideration of the conceptual and theoretical 
compatibilities of these fields.  
Secondly, intergenerational transfers attract considerable interest from outside of the research 
community. The intergenerational transfer literature is related to many contemporary debates and 
research agendas such as social mobility and demographic change.  As a consequence, parallel 
literatures occur which use and contribute to the same core literature. North American literature is 
primarily concerned with wealth accumulation and upward mobility given the historical context of 
those countries (Behrman & Taubman, 1976), European studies focus on demographic aspects given 
the challenges faced by rapidly ageing populations in post-industrial societies (Brandt, Haberkern, & 
Szydlik, 2009). Both draw from and contribute to related theoretical and empirical frameworks. 
The result is a complex and interrelated body of literatures that contribute to a number of social 
debates. Whilst this is appealing in that the field has a practical contribution, it is important to be aware 
that this also means that the topic can be politically sensitive and emotionally charged. Regardless of 
empirical evidence, there can be an understandable tendency amongst those outside of academic 
research to enter the debate with a preconceived notion that intergenerational transfers matter and that 
they are a linchpin of society and a link between generations. This could be exacerbated as researchers 
in the field of intergenerational transfers might be understandably reticent to downplay the significance 
of their own work and as result the literature can risk being inflated because of this.  
In conducting a review of the existing evidence and theories, the key principle is therefore as 
reflexivity. One theme that tends to run through the studies of intergenerational transfers is an 
assertion that intergenerational transfers are important in various respects (Zissimopoulos & Smith, 
2010; Albertini & Kohli, 2012; Brandt & Deindl, 2013; Schenk, Dykstra, & Maas, 2010; Villanueva, 
2005; Albertini & Radl, 2012; Mudrazija, 2013). As with many other fields of research, the limitations 
and null findings are less publicised and reported than significant and positive findings. There are very 
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few instances where intergenerational transfers were described as inconsequential or limited in scope 
(Cox & Rank, 1992). The conclusion of this overview is that the study of transfers comes with some 
limitations. Intergenerational transfers research is a very narrow perspective of intergenerational 
relations and its treatment of demographic effects and its consideration of policy effects could be 
developed further. 
Intergenerational transfers are an area of study which has sparked interest and attract attention from 
across the social sciences. It contributes to a number of contemporary social debates and is a fertile area 
for future research. Yet, in this context it is necessary to consider the underlying motivations for the 
research and approach the literature with a very critical eye. The chapter is structured with this in 
mind. Firstly, the necessary task of outlining the exact nature of a transfer is addressed through the 
work of McDaniel (1997). Having established what a transfer is, an overview of existing research is 
given. This starts with the roots of the financial transfer literature in the economics departments of the 
United States, from where much of the early research was conducted. This is then contrasted with 
more contemporary research from European researchers who take a more sociological approach.  
Section 2.3 then begins with a closer look at comparative social policy research which forms the focus 
of this thesis. The existing evidence of a policy effect is considered and a critical consideration of the 
analytical strategies is offered. Then intergenerational transfers are considered in the context of social 
policy. Firstly, the interaction between intergenerational transfer and family policy is considered and 
this is followed by a look at intergenerational transfers in the context of debates on intergenerational 
justice which forms the substantive motivation for this thesis. 
The attention then turns to identifying the limitations of the field in section 2.4. Demographic issues 
are discussed and their relative absence in the existing literature is considered. Then, intergenerational 
transfers are located within the wider context of the family. Considerable research in this area enables 
clear limitations to intergenerational transfer research to be drawn. In adopting this critical approach of 





2.2. A Guide to Intergenerational Transfers 
2.2.1. What is an Intergenerational Transfer? 
The term ‘intergenerational transfer’ is the technical shorthand of something familiar to many. In this 
thesis it is used to describe financial payments from parents to their adult children1 or what is 
colloquially known in the United Kingdom as ‘The Bank of Mum and Dad’ (Osborne, 2012). Broadly it 
refers to financial assistance given by an asset and income rich generation to an asset and income poor 
generation. This is an emotive topic and how it is understood risks being driven by personal experience 
rather than the technical descriptions offered here. Given this, the review of existing research, the 
analysis and the thesis as a whole need to be preceded by a clear and unambiguous definition of what is 
actually under discussion. That is the task of this section. 
Susan McDaniel suggests that there are three characteristics that need to be considered when discussing 
intergenerational transfers (McDaniel, 1997). First, the direction must be established. Does the 
payment go up or down the generations? Upward transfers (child to parent) operate on a different 
dynamic to those going downwards (parent to child). Upwards support is usually directed toward 
individuals on the margins of society who form a minority in their cohort in that they are worse off than 
their children (Lee, Lee, & Mason, 2006). Recipients are often the oldest old, physically frail and 
financially vulnerable. Donors are individuals within the family that are at or near the peak of the 
earning capacity. By contrast, downward transfers, as will be shown later, are far more common 
(Kohli, 1999). They reflect the extent to which the asset rich older generations provide financial 
assistance to the asset poor younger generations. This financial imbalance, associated with demographic 
changes, is where the substantive political and social interest lies (Willets, 2010) 
This aspect can be expanded to ask how far it goes up or down. Transfers can be over multiple 
generations, skipping out a parental, middle generation. A considerable and growing literature exists 
on the concept of grand-parenting (Aassve, Arpino, & Goisis, 2012; Jappens & Van Bavel, 2012; Coall, 
Meier, Hertwig, Wanke, & Hopflinger, 2009), yet this is not the topic of this research. 
Grandparenting research is primarily concerned with the changing nature of the role given the longer 
and healthier lives enjoyed by many. Despite such longer lives the primary care giver and provider is 
still the parent and support for grandchildren tends to flow through the parental, middle generation 
                                                          
1 The term adult child generally refers to an individual who is over 18 and has a living parent. In some of the literature this is 
restricted to only those who are no longer cohabiting with their parents but when this is the case within this thesis it is stated 
explicitly. The term can therefore refer to an 18 who is just finishing high school or a 75 year old whose 100 year old mother is 
in a nursing home. This diversity is important to consider in reference to parent-child relationships. 
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(Kohli & Kunemund, 2003). This research therefore limits itself to the study of downward transfers 
across one generation. 
McDaniel’s second dimension differentiates between public and private transfers. This distinguishes 
between those payments made through the tax and benefits systems and those done within the family 
under one’s own discretion. This may seem an easy distinction but publically mandated transfers such 
as child support payments or financial obligations suggest that this distinction is not quite as clear as it 
would appear (Saraceno & Keck, 2009). Financial assistance can be mandated by a judge in a number of 
European countries and legal obligations to individuals vary across the continent. The distinction 
between public and private is of substantive interest in the context of the sustainability of the welfare 
state. The initial research on intergenerational transfers in the field of social policy stems from this 
interest (Kohli, 1999; Kunemund & Rein, 1999). Whilst this analysis considers the role of private 
intergenerational transfers in the context of public intergenerational financial transfers, the thesis 
primarily concerns itself with private transfers including those which are mandated. 
The third element to be considered is what McDaniel calls the transfer’s content. This refers to 
whether the payment is strictly monetary or whether it takes the form of a good (e.g. a car, a house, 
childcare) or a service (e.g. babysitting or care giving). Accounting for in-kind transfers can be difficult. 
Most measures of intergenerational transfers monetise in-kind payments when the parent is providing a 
good or service to an individual directly from the market but not otherwise (SHARE, 2011).  
For example, if a parent pays the rent of a child’s flat directly to the landlord then this is commonly 
considered an intergenerational transfer and the amount is recorded. If the parent provides a room in 
their house for the child, this is not counted. Likewise, if a parent buys their child a second hand car 
this is an intergenerational transfer but not if the parent was the previous owner. This is a crude and 
sometimes clumsy distinction especially when considering co-residence (Albertini & Radl, 2012). Yet, 
its use here and in the wider literature is because of the contrasting financial positions of the parent and 
child. In-kind payments can occur without reference to financial means of any sort and therefore cannot 
be said to explicitly reflect these contrasting financial positions.  
A final dimension should be considered on top of McDaniel’s suggestions. Gale and Scholz (1994) 
suggest that there is an essential difference in the way inter-vivos transfers and bequests are discussed. 
They argue that there are very different processes involved in bequests and transfers given that in a 
bequest the decision and the action are disjointed because a bequest can be made decades before the 
actual transfer and recording of it occurs.  
This suggests that the two must be separated, at least in analytical terms, as they represent two very 
different types of decision. This is supported by a number of empirical studies examining the 
relationship between inter-vivos transfers and bequests (McGarry, 1997; Villanueva, 2005; Nordblom 
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& Ohlsson, 2011). This distinction is commonly taken into account within theoretical frameworks on 
these issues and this is to be the case here. Only transfers made whilst both the parent and child are still 
alive will be considered within this analysis.  
This research project therefore focuses on downward (parent-child), private, financial, inter-vivos, 
intergenerational transfers. This may seem a narrow focus but, as this review will demonstrate, there 
exists a sizeable literature and compelling evidence of a considerable impact on the lives of individuals. 
Most importantly, the study of these financial payments is closely related to the broader debates within 
the intergenerational relations literature, societal ageing and the perceived inequality in wealth and 
income between generations in European countries. As demonstrated, it is this interest which has led 
to this focus within this research project. 
2.2.2. An American Economic Heritage 
The literature on intergenerational financial transfers can be organised in a number of ways; 
geographically, chronologically, thematically etc. Yet the resulting narratives are often the same given 
that there is a considerable overlap between these perspectives of the literature. The study of 
intergenerational financial transfers has its roots in the economic literature in the United States and 
focused on the motivations of such transfers. Over time European researchers became increasingly 
interested in the subject but from a demographic perspective given the challenges faced by that 
continent. In East Asia, a community of researchers in the area has developed but with a firm focus on 
family studies and values given the tradition of filial piety and low levels of economic and welfare state 
development. Yet despite the physical and philosophical distance between these literatures they remain 
interdependent and inform one another (Szydlik, 2008). 
The study of financial transfers within the family has long been of substantive interest and yet restrained 
by the availability of data. The potential implications for social mobility, inequality, life-course studies 
and a general understanding of the family has long been anticipated but the measurement of such a 
personal and conceptually complex issue has been difficult. Section 2.2.1 of this chapter detailed the 
conceptual intricacies and common parlance that have taken decades to develop. Chapter 4 of this 
thesis will cover the complex sampling and methodological instruments necessary for studying 
relationships which hampered research beforehand. 
Given these practical constraints, the first empirical literature on transfers did not emerge until the 
1970s (Blinder, 1976; Cheal, 1983; Loury, 1981). These analyses were focused on the basic economic 
dynamics of transfer giving. These early roots in economics are due in part to the metric of the 
dependent variable which is financial. More importantly however, economic departments were better 
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placed than other fields of the social sciences with regards to investment in the survey methodology and 
computer apparatus necessary to undertake large scale quantitative analysis of financial data.  
This expansion occurred in the context of a renewed interest in family economics which itself was in 
part driven by the increasing availability of large scale household data. Becker’s ‘A Treatise on the Family’ 
(1991), represented a culmination of attempts to economically conceptualise the late 20th century 
family in a rational choice economic framework. Within it the family was described using rational 
choice, utility maximisation. According to Becker, the family exists as a mutually beneficial agreement. 
Intergenerational transfers therefore remained an anathema within this framework given that there 
appeared to be little or no motivation for giving except the cultural understanding that you ‘pay it 
forward’. 
Why would a parent give money to their adult children? Two theoretical solutions to this emerged 
within frameworks such as Becker’s and these two approaches define the literature to this day: altruism 
and exchange. The theory of altruism for intergenerational transfers stated that parents gave money to 
their children because their ‘happiness’ or ‘utility’ was dependent on their child’s ‘happiness’ or 
‘utility’ (Cox, 1987). This lies in contrast to theories of exchange. These suggested that transfers were 
made in expectation that the child would provide in later life (Cigno, 1992). In most theories this is 
interpreted as care giving but could also be taken to mean that the child simply pays the money back.  
These theoretical frameworks are simple but have led to a number of testable empirical hypotheses and 
the intergenerational literature has been primarily concerned with gathering evidence for and against 
these. It was immediately evident that a strong interpretation of altruism was not feasible. If parents 
were as concerned about their child’s utility as they were their own, high levels of redistribution would 
have been observed (Altoni, Hayashi, & Kotlikoff, 1992; Chang, 2011). This was not the case and so 
tempered interpretations of altruism and the role of the extended family were adopted (Altonji, 
Hayashi, & Kotlikoff, 1997).  
Yet evidence was still forthcoming which supported a loose interpretation of altruism. This argued that 
a parent cared about a child and so gave them financial support. However the effect of the child’s utility 
on the parent was weighted so that ultimately the parent showed a greater concern for themselves 
rather than their child. Any negative correlation between receiving financial assistance and the child’s 
material circumstances would support this and thus the evidence requirements were far less stringent 
than a strict interpretation of altruism. Such evidence has been consistently found in empirical data 
(Cox & Rank, 1992; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995; McGarry, 1997). Explanations for this ‘tempered 
altruism’ have most commonly been attributed to transaction costs and liquidity constraints 
(Feigenbaum & Li, 2012) 
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The economic literature in the United States continues to assert that such transfers have substantive 
implications. This assertion is based on the observation that transfers account for approximately 20% of 
wealth accumulation in the life course (Gale & Scholz, 1994), that transfers can be induced through tax 
systems and removing liquidity constraints (Poterba, 2001) and the observation of transfer peaks at 
times of maximum financial strain for the child (Cox & Way, 2011; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010). 
Even so, the evidence for a strictly altruistic understanding of transfers is limited and alternative 
narratives of transfers have been explored using data from the US. These include sibling and 
reconstituted family dynamics (Berry, 2008; Fursternberg, Hoffman, & Shrestha, 1995), under 
reporting and spousal cooperation (Laitner & Sonnega, 2010) and exchange based models (Norton & 
Van Houtven, 2006). Yet these alternative considerations have however been more fully explored 
elsewhere and it is to these we now turn. 
2.2.3. Europe and a Sociological Perspective 
Intergenerational transfers migrated onto the European research agenda in the late 1990s. As in the 
United States this was partly due to advances in analytical capacity and data availability. In the American 
Economic literature policies were reduced to a financial transfer. The immediate contrast within the 
European literature was the broader conceptualisation of policies to include aspects such as care 
(Kunemund & Rein, 1999) and the focus on issues of intergenerational justice (Kohli, 1999). This focus 
on public private interaction brought the transfer literature into the broader comparative debate on 
welfare regimes in the field of social policy and this is the subject of section 2.4.1. Before this the wider 
literature on intergenerational transfers in Europe will be considered.  
The literature in Europe is also generally more concerned with social issues than the American 
literature which is driven by the theoretical model of altruism. This is partly due to the nature of the 
data that is available. For example, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) has provided much of the 
data for the American literature in the past twenty years and focuses on financial variables. Its European 
counterpart, the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), was initiated by the 
National Institute for Ageing in the United States which runs the HRS. Nevertheless SHARE provides a 
vast number of social, health and demographic factors that are not in the HRS. SHARE even includes a 
life history analysis detailing dramatic events in the individual’s life course as well as detailed 
longitudinal records of an individual’s grip strength. 
The sociological approach of European research is also reflected in attempts to draw up a more holistic 
framework for analysis than the simplistic and reductive models of economics. These ranged from 
frameworks that tried to place transfers in the context of a number of acts of intergenerational 
solidarity (Bengston, Giarrusso, Mabry, & Silverstein, 2002) to those that tried to reconcile the micro 
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and macro elements of the intergenerational debate (Szydlik, 2008). Other approaches used a more 
inductive approach by inferring a framework from a large number of qualitative and quantitative studies 
(Attias-Donfut, Ogg, & Wolff, 2005).  These frameworks are not independent but largely 
interdependent, all sharing an aim of placing transfer behaviour within a wider context than that of 
economic modelling of household decision making. They are covered in more detail in section 4.2. 
European data and their measurement of sociological concepts does tend to orientate research toward a 
more sociological and cultural approach than in the United States. This increased number of covariates 
has allowed for the development of a broader sociological understanding of transfers. In their study, 
Kohli and Kunemund (2003) assert that the conceptualisation of transfers as driven by a single 
motivation such as altruism is ‘misguided’. Using data from the German Aging Survey, their key 
conclusion is that relationships and exchange differ between families, particularly along cultural, class 
and gender lines. For example they identify a very distinct gender difference in transfer behaviour.  
This, they argue, is primarily due to women within families still being considered the primary care 
givers. Men on the other hand are considerably more likely to receive financial assistance. Albertini and 
Radl (2012) put forward a value based argument in their analysis that goes further in challenging the 
economic framework. They find that parents from higher socio-economic groups, measured using 
educational levels and employment classifications, make transfers more regularly than those in lower 
groups and that this effect is apparent independent of income. The conclusion is therefore who you are 
and not how much money you have is what matters. 
Leopold and Schneider (2010) utilise the detailed data in the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 
to suggest that financial transfers are given in response to certain events such as marriages but not in 
response to others, such as divorce. They argue that the distinction is due to a perception on the part of 
the parent that a marriage or child birth are events which are part of constructing a life where as a 
divorce is not. This also implies a value based perspective missing from the altruistic model of 
economics. The clear distinction between the European and American traditions is their sensitivity to 
these considerations. Altruism is an attempt to model and explain transfer behaviour but much of the 
European empirical evidence appears to refute its parsimony and sociological neutrality.  
The European agenda’s focus therefore tends to explore intergenerational transfers as part of wider 
social dynamics. Suggestions that those in receipt of transfers are more likely to go to university 
(Nordblom & Ohlsson, 2011; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010), live healthier lives and experience social 
advancements (Scodellaro, Khlat, & Jusot, 2012) and have generally better material circumstances 
(Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein, 2001) imply that cultural, class and gender differentials in transfers are 
translated into sociological outcomes for recipient generations. This is a substantively appealing 
conclusion and one that has motivated the increased interest in the topic of intergenerational transfers, 
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this thesis included. Generally, this thesis looks to explore the distinction between the two literatures 
and the extent to which they stand in contradiction. To do this altruistic and sociological theories of 
transfers are considered and tested. They are evaluated by the extent to which they explain transfer 




2.3. The Policy Effect 
In the introduction to this chapter it was suggested that the European transfer literature had a greater 
focus on the role of policy given a stronger welfare state tradition. This section explores the 
comparative social policy literature which adopted the exploration of intergenerational transfer 
behaviour and the theoretical framework for analysing intergenerational transfers. Section 2.3.1 
considers empirical evidence of a policy effect and whether this evidence is solely based on cross 
national comparisons and fixed effects. An adequate analytical strategy can then be considered in 
chapter 3. The literature on family policy will then be considered in section 2.3.2 as it has offered the 
most comprehensive analytical framework for assessing how policy might explain variations in transfer 
behaviour across Europe. The implications of policy effects for debates on Intergenerational Justice will 
then be discussed in 2.3.3 as this debate has played a prominent role in framing the agenda on 
intergenerational transfers in recent years.  
2.3.1. Social Policy and Intergenerational Transfers 
In addition to the pragmatic agenda focused on social outcomes, research on intergenerational transfers 
has also heavily focused on the role of policy. In the past two decades two key questions on the social 
research agenda have driven the analysis of intergenerational transfer behaviour in Europe; “to what 
extent will society be affected by demographic change?” and “to what extent does welfare state 
difference account for differences in social outcomes?” (Kohli, 1999). 
These two questions were of course a concern to American researchers but to a far lesser extent. In 
Europe the concern is with the rapidly ageing population and shift in generational balance given that 
societal ageing is more dramatic and extensive there (Kohli, 1999). This shifted the focus of research 
from one of wealth accumulation and social mobility to one of intergenerational justice and solidarity. 
Due to this, the research in Europe has been far more concerned with issues of generational equity 
(Szydlik, 2008). This is expanded on in section 2.3.3. The second question that is more prominent in 
European research is the role of social policy in affecting social outcomes. Social policy is not as 
prevalent in the United States’ intergenerational literature to the same extent as in Europe. This is 
partly due to the distinct welfare state traditions as well as policy considerations being subsumed into 
the economic tradition (Weir, Orloff, & Skocpol, 1988). Yet the links between policy and 
intergenerational transfers are evident in the literature of other regions (such as the US and East Asia), 
disciplines (such as economics and demography) and time frames (1960s-2010s) which are concerned 
with the interaction between public and private welfare provision. For example, McDaniel provided a 
detailed framework for analysing the interaction between financial transfers and policy in response to 
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the North American literature of the early 1990’s (McDaniel, 1997). A number of authors have also 
clearly identified a very prominent effect of policy on family ties in East Asia (Frankenberg, Lillard, & 
Willis, 2002; Ogawa, Mason, Chawla, & Matsukura, 2010). Even in early European research focused 
on a micro, single country approach to assessing policy effects (Kohli, 1999; Kunemund & Rein, 1999; 
Kunemund, Motel-Klingebiel, & Kohli, 2005).  
Yet the establishment of the European Union (EU) in 1992 brought welfare state comparisons to the 
forefront of the research agenda in Europe. The creation of a common currency, common market and 
unified political space begged questions about welfare state diversity in Europe and the EU continues to 
seek explanations for diversity in social outcomes (European Commision, 2010). This places emphasis 
on comparative social policy within the European intergenerational transfer literature. 
Existing Evidence 
The intergenerational transfers debate in Europe over the last decade has been primarily focused on the 
extent to which observed cross national differences can be attributed to social policy variation across 
Europe. The basis for these comparisons was the launch of SHARE, a comparative dataset including 
countries representing all corners of Europe. The first comparative analysis of transfer behaviour using 
this data modelled the comparative element of the data using a country fixed effect (Attias-Donfut, 
Ogg, & Wolff, 2005). This approach looks at the differences in transfer behaviour between countries, 
after individual level characteristics have been taken into account.  
The authors of this study noted that this limited their ability to disentangle complex institutional, 
cultural and economic effects. Nevertheless they inferred a North-South divide in transfer behaviour 
based on the notion that the welfare state in the South of Europe was insufficient and left many in 
poverty, necessitating larger financial transfers from the extended family to support them. This 
narrative would however have been captured by the individual level measures of income and poverty. 
This is the first analysis to assert that policy leads to differences in transfer behaviour across Europe and 
the findings are used to explicitly infer that the social policies in the south fail in providing sufficient 
means of employment and support to younger generations. What’s more, this conclusion is reached 
despite the fact that none of the fixed effects were significantly different from 0 at a 95% confidence 
level. 
This study was extended in later analysis by Albertini, Kohli and Vogel (2007) who looked to solidify 
these inferences into a regime typology similar to that in the wider social policy literature (Esping 
Andersen, 1990; Arts & Gelissen, 2002). Instead of including country fixed effects they used a regime 
effect which grouped country observations into three groups; Scandinavian (Sweden and Denmark), 
Central (Austria, Germany, France, Switzerland, Netherlands and Belgium) and Southern (Italy, Spain 
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and Greece). Their results suggested that pervasive but small amounts of financial support were 
observed in Scandinavia and less pervasive but larger financial transfers occurred in Southern Europe. 
Central Europe showed behaviour somewhere between the two. 
Yet these results were not robust to sensitivity analysis. The percentage of households making a transfer 
in Italy and Greece for example was higher than in France, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The 
southern figures were almost entirely driven by the extremely low levels recorded in Spain. Similarly 
Germany showed levels similar to those of Denmark and Sweden but this significant outlier was 
counter balanced by the lower levels in the aforementioned ‘Central’ countries. Even given these 
empirical ambiguities it is the inferences that have driven the subsequent debate regarding transfer 
behaviour. This is because the study inferred that the observed differences in intergenerational transfers 
were attributable to policy differences. 
This conclusion has been extended but not significantly altered by a number of other studies. These 
studies looked at the extent and intensity of network support in Mediterranean and Non-Mediterranean 
countries (Litwin, 2009), the extent to which transfers encouraged upward care giving across the 
SHARE sample (Leopold & Raab, 2011) and the extent to which more general patterns of exchange 
differed across countries in Europe (Brandt, Haberkern, & Szydlik, 2009). The conclusions of such 
studies however infer a policy effect from differences in aggregated transfer behaviour between 
countries. 
In response to this Schenk, Dykstra and Maas (2010) deconstructed the fixed effects for 
intergenerational transfer behaviour. This involved estimating the difference in the transfer rate after 
individual characteristics had been taken into consideration. They then examined the extent to which 
these estimates correlated with macro level indicators such as GDP and levels of welfare state 
expenditure. Their results suggested that there was a clear and strong compositional effect on estimates 
as they were very different from the descriptive statistics on transfer behaviour across countries. That is 
to say that the observed differences in transfer behaviour between countries changed dramatically when 
individual level characteristics were considered. They also could find no relationship between the 
estimated fixed effects and welfare state indicators.  
Brandt and Deindl (2013) conducted similar analysis and found a subsequent correlation between 
welfare state indicators and the intercepts and coefficients from an individual level model using a 
number of indicators of transfer behaviour including financial and time transfers. Even still, the limited 
number of countries at the country level prevented them from controlling for other country level 
processes such as culture, demography, economics and other macro level factors. This means that there 
is little empirical evidence to suggest that it is policy differences themselves that are driving these 
differences. It is very possible that it is cultural, economic and demographic covariates. 
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In part response to the criticisms of a fixed effects approach, Albertini and Kohli (2012) then extended 
the analysis to assess how the behavioural dynamics differed across ‘transfer regimes’. Statistically this 
simply meant running an individual level model for each regime. Albertini and Kohli argue that this 
allows them to explore how different factors affect transfer behaviour in each regime. For example, 
this enables them to identify that the effect of a child’s material circumstance on the probability of them 
receiving financial assistance is different in Northern and Southern Europe.  In Southern Europe the 
child’s material circumstances only increase the likelihood that they will live with their parents. In 
Scandinavian countries in contrast, financial assistance is responsive to the material circumstances of the 
child. In and of itself this is a very interesting finding that does much to detail differences in 
intergenerational relations in Europe. 
However, they argue that this is due to poor welfare state provisions for younger adults in Southern 
European countries. As with the fixed effect approach, such attribution of the effect is premature as the 
dynamics between countries may differ for a wide variety of reasons other than the nature of the 
welfare state and social policy arrangements. The tendency here is common place in intergenerational 
research and social policy more generally given the reasons outlined above. Observed comparative 
differences are attributed to policy variations with limited empirical grounding. The research 
conducted in these papers is of interest to the study of transfers more generally but its use in 
understanding how transfers are affected by policy is very limited (Hox, 2010). 
Therefore, in spite of the commonly held belief that there is a close relationship between 
intergenerational transfers and social policy, little has been accurately specified or identified in the 
literature in the past decade of research. All of the researchers mentioned have referred to an 
interaction between private and public provision of financial assistance. This is perhaps driven by a 
deeper conviction within social policy that the family and the welfare state are interdependent actors 
with families’ behaviour determined by the behaviour of the welfare state (Lewis, 1992; Saraceno C. , 
2000). Nevertheless, the existing research has not yet fully captured the extent to which policy affects 
transfer behaviour. 
2.3.2. Intergenerational Transfers and Family Policy 
Comparative analysis of social policies and their interaction with family arrangements is extensive and 
comprehensive (Brandt & Deindl, 2013; Mudrazija, 2013). Social policies implicitly and explicitly 
demarcate caring and welfare responsibilities between the state and the family and research tends to be 
focused on circumstances where conflicts or contradictions arise (Szydlik, 2008). Originally this 
concerned gendered aspects of the welfare state and the degree to which the state assumed the 
prominence of the man over his wife (Lewis, 1992; Orloff A. S., 1993). The attention soon expanded 
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to broader aspects of welfare provision and care services (Anttonen & Sipilä, 1996; Randall, 2000). 
Throughout these studies the concept of autonomy of individuals was prominent. This referred to the 
ability of individuals to act without dependence on the family or market. From this perspective policies 
were to be understood by the degree to which they enabled individuals to live independently.   
Further distinctions elaborate on policy variation by distinguishing between familialisation and 
defamilialisation (Leitner, 2003). Familialisation refers to policies that actively support an individual in 
a care role. Defamilialisation refers to policies that seek to enable an individual to leave a care role. An 
example would be the provision of parental leave as a familial policy and childcare provision as a de-
familial policy. In the former the individual is supported but they are still expected to provide care, in 
the latter they are given the means to leave the care role. This distinction was developed in response to 
the empirical observation of differing care arrangements across European Welfare states that were not 
captured by the extent of welfare provision but instead by its form (Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
Saraceno and Keck (2009) attempted to explore this in an intergenerational context by combining the 
de-commodifying and de-familialisation literature on the welfare state to offer a typology in the 
comparative social policy tradition (Esping Andersen, 1990; Orloff A. , 2006; Hantrais, 2004). In 
keeping with this tradition they assume that various ‘welfare regimes’ operate under particular 
assumptions which are referred to in the literature as a policy mix. The report therefore summarises 
logics of policy intervention evident throughout the continent and contests that there are no explicit 
typologies to be found (Lewis, 1992; Saraceno C. , 2000; Anttonen, Baldock, & Sipilä, 2003; Daly & 
Rake, 2003) 
The report by Saraceno and Keck (2009) concludes by suggesting that an understanding of transfers 
should be undertaken through the wider dialogue on ‘crowding out’ by discussing the extent to which 
these policy mixes crowd in and crowd out transfer behaviour (Blome & Keck W: Alber, 2008; 
Fukuyama, 1999; Kunemund & Rein, 1999). Whilst stopping short of analysis, this framework 
produces precise hypotheses to be tested. From the intergenerational literature, it would appear that 
extensive elderly support promotes the giving of transfers (Kohli, 1999). In the crowding out literature it 
has been argued that social spending can also deter family support (Fukuyama, 1999). 
The issue encountered by Saraceno and Keck (2009) is similar to that encountered by anyone 
conducting comparative social policy analysis in that it is hard to measure an abstract notion such as the 
welfare state (Clasen & Siegel, 2007). Aspects of policies can be measured by case load or expenditure 
levels or differing structures of eligibility criteria. The complex and abstract terms of defamilialisation 
and decommodification reflect this. But Saraceno and Keck and other intergenerational researchers 
have the problem exacerbated because their analysis refers to the mediation between generations. They 
have to consider the measurement of policy twice; once in the context of the parent and once in the 
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context of the child. Given that such clustering and abstraction is designed to clarify, it is unsurprising 
that the authors declined to put forward a feasible description of intergenerational regimes. 
The tentative conclusion that was offered suggested that countries with high support for the elderly but 
little support for the young will have the highest level of transfers. From a micro perspective this is to 
suggest that transfers are shaped by a capacity to give and a demand to receive. Whilst this theory has 
only been tentatively suggested and the typologies remain relatively fluid what empirical research exists 
does show embryonic evidence of such a push and pull factor (Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010; Kohli, 
1999). Nevertheless, questions remain. For example, what is meant by a younger generation? In this 
thesis the oldest child is 87. They are younger, not young.  
It is exceptionally difficult therefore to operate in terms of a typology of welfare states within 
intergenerational research. This has curbed the use of typological approaches to understanding the 
policy effect on transfer behaviour and makes the empirical estimates offered in the previous section, 
theoretically ambiguous and an area of potential development. Given this potential, alternative 
strategies of understanding the effect of policy on transfer behaviour would be exceptionally useful. 
Such an approach is offered in chapters 3 & 4. 
2.3.3. Pension Overshooting and Intergenerational Justice 
Parallel to a family policy approach to the analysis of transfers, a second policy debate has garnered a 
considerable amount of attention given its wider implications (Kohli, 1999). This debate centres on 
issues of intergenerational justice and the extent to which downward, private, intergenerational 
transfers mitigate large, upward, public transfers. This was cited as the primary interest of initial social 
policy studies in the area and continues to be an area of substantive interest to both researchers and 
non-researchers alike (Kohli, 1999; Kunemund & Rein, 1999).  
The debate is grounded in the observation that individuals in later life have excess income (Demery & 
Duck, 2006 ). This is due to significant drops in consumption post retirement and results in what has 
been dubbed ‘pension overshooting’ (Börsch-Supan, 1992). In life course studies, this label of excess is 
due to the fact that these generations die without consuming their lifetime savings which violates a 
strict understanding of utility maximisation across the life course. This excess income is then 
considered as the primary driver of intergenerational transfers against the traditional life cycle model of 
transfers (Blinder, 1976). Some authors have labelled this process as ‘crowding in’. This is because the 
pension overshooting is attributed to public pensions which are larger than the requirements of the 
recipients and therefore stimulate increased private intergenerational exchange and support 
(Kunemund & Rein, 1999). 
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Intergenerational transfers are broadly perceived as part of the intergenerational justice debate. This is 
due to the potential role that wealth transfers play in helping younger generations buy homes, complete 
education and start a family (Osborne, 2012). The observation of downward financial transfers has 
been regarded by some as offsetting upward public transfers to some degree (Kohli, 1999).  It is 
therefore of considerable interest as to whether such a ‘pension overshooting’ effect is evident. If 
welfare state policies are transferring money to older generations some of whom then pass it on to their 
extended family, it raises questions about the legitimacy of the existing welfare system and its efficiency 
if one adopts a strict understanding of life course consumption. 
To an extent, this hypothesis describes older persons as an income rich generation which is subsidised 
by the working population (Sinn & Uebelmesser, 2002). In many ways this is a gross 
oversimplification. Firstly the over 65s in Europe are among the most economically vulnerable (Zaidi, 
Grech, & Fuchs, 2006). Within this large group there are considerable levels of inequality and poverty. 
Intergenerational transfers, national account techniques and even government descriptions of welfare 
state payments, treat age groups as a homogenous block despite obvious diversity. The use of 
normative language and references to justice therefore seem improper given that not all older persons 
can be accurately described as ‘greedy geezers’ (Street & Cossman, 2006). 
It should also be noted that attitudes towards pension provision and their legitimacy remains high (Van 
Oorschot, 2006) and little evidence exists of intergenerational conflict with regards to social policies 
(Emery, 2012). If intergenerational justice is an issue with regards to the distribution of financial 
resources amongst the population, it is not a salient one amongst the general population as even the 
very young see the provision of upward public transfers as a cornerstone of the welfare state. This 
suggests that any discussion of intergenerational justice should not be framed in terms of conflict but in 
terms of a broader socio-economic debate about intergenerational relations and the role of the 
extended family as a financial resource for younger generations. Given this, to understand the 
relationship between public provisions and private transfers it is necessary to be sensitive to the 
heterogeneous population of parents. 
The sensitivity to the heterogeneity of the population is particularly pertinent given that analyses that 
have examined ‘crowding in’ have used cross-sectional data. In these analyses the inferences made only 
suggest that those in receipt of large pensions are more likely to provide financial assistance. They 
ignore the potentially spurious effect that would exist if pensioners, the retired or older people 
generally are more likely to make transfers. In addition, these coefficient estimates are largely 
descriptive in that they rarely use longitudinal data or causal analysis techniques. They instead tend to 
use comparative and descriptive techniques designed to report associations rather than identify a 
particular effect. Those in receipt of higher pensions have usually worked longer and generally earned 
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more. They may have different values, social networks or family ties that are not included in the 
analyses.  
The existing debate can be reductive in considering the relationship between generations and the 
complex dynamics which exist. The analytical methods used in the existing literature are not able to 
provide conclusive and definitive verdict on complex social dynamics. This thesis aims to contribute to 
debates of intergenerational justice by considering alternative methods of modelling the relationship 
between social macro behaviour and its relation to micro level, private behaviour. The aim is therefore 
to provide a more appropriate empirical contribution to debates on intergenerational justice. 
2.4. A Family Affair 
Section 2.2 detailed the intergenerational literature and how it has evolved over the last two decades. 
There is now an understanding as to the basic parameters and patterns of intergenerational transfers 
and research has progressed to focus more concisely on what drives transfer behaviour (Berry, 2008; 
Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010; Leopold & Schneider, 2010; Leopold & Raab, 2011). This builds on the 
earlier economic and sociological literature. This progression stimulates new questions regarding the 
way in which transfers are discussed and requires a broader debate of the structural determinants of 
such transfers as well as these micro level stimulants (Szydlik, 2008). 
The process of systematically evaluating structural determinants of intergenerational transfers has been 
started by a number of research communities as detailed in section 2.3, but what exists remains largely 
speculative, underdeveloped and untested (Saraceno & Keck, 2009; Puur, Sakkeus, Schenk, & Poldma, 
2010; Albertini & Kohli, 2012; Brandt & Deindl, 2013). This section will look to explore this further 
and attempt to underline what other social theories have to say about intergenerational transfers and 
how they can be tested. This will be done by looking at how demographics and the family are 
theoretically tied to the literature on intergenerational transfers. 
2.4.1. Demographics in Europe 
Despite the intergenerational nature of the transfer literature and the demographic motives for interest 
in it, there has been little reference to demographics in existing research (for a recent exception see 
Mudrazija, 2013). This section considers the potential benefits of using demographic concepts and 




In Europe, the traditional theories of family diversity suggest that Mediterranean countries have a more 
family centred society whereas the countries of the North have a more atomized, individualistic 
society. The cause of this has been attributed to a number of factors. David Rehner argues that the 
underlying reason for the split is the divergent economic practices of Northern and Southern Europe in 
the middle ages (Reher, 1998). Others attribute the differences to the legacy of the Roman Empire 
(Goody, 1983), the reformation (Hajnal, 1965) and the extent of industrialisation (Hajnal, 1982). 
Regardless of the origins, a general consensus exists within the literature as to the manifestation of 
these differences (Hantrais, 2004). 
Some demographers have attempted to quantify such diversity through distinctions made between the 
structure of cohabitation (e.g. when young adults leave home, the number of generations under one 
roof, implications of marriage etc.) and the various authority structures (e.g. methods of distributing 
wealth, who holds authority, who owns the property etc.) (Duranton, Rodríguez-Pose, & Sandall, 
2007; Todd, 1990). This creates a two dimensional spectrum of family forms which has then be used to 
classify families into four groups; absolute nuclear, egalitarian nuclear, stem family, communitarian 
family. 
In an ‘Absolute Nuclear Family’ children leave the parental home early and generations are materially 
independent with a wealth distribution system that is concentrated in just one child. An ‘Egalitarian 
Nuclear Family’ on the other hand spreads wealth evenly between the independent children’s 
households. In a ‘Stem Family’, the children leave home only upon marriage with the eldest son 
remaining within the household with his spouse in order to maintain the family household. In 
a ‘Communitarian Family’ this practice is not limited to the eldest son and all children share in the 
inheritance (Duranton, Rodríguez-Pose, & Sandall, 2007). As can be seen from Figure 2.1, when the 




Figure 2.1 – Different Family Forms in the European Union 
Source: (Todd, 1990) 
This geographical and cultural divide gives a more complex backdrop to our discussion on 
intergenerational transfers. The differentiation made by Todd here is between families where bequests 
are made to a single individual (normally the eldest son) and whether this is made in kind or simply 
through bequest. Given that transfers are used to define family types, one could reasonably expect 
there to be a link between downward intergenerational transfer behaviour and family form. What 
emerges is a proto-theory of intergenerational transfers that competes against that of rational choice 
and economic theories. 
The complexity of this picture is exacerbated when we consider contemporary shifts such as the second 
demographic transition. A number of commentators have suggested that family forms have had a large 
impact on how the second demographic transition has developed (Hantrais, 2004; Esping-Andersen, 
2009; Gierveld, Dykstra, & Schenk, 2009). These arguments have suggested that the fertility rate is 
directly related to the independence an individual has throughout their transition to adulthood. The 
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delayed independence found in ‘Stem Family’ regimes leads to delayed births and a decrease in the 
tempo and quantum of fertility rates (Bongaarts & Feeney, 1998; Kohler, Billari, & Ortega, 2002). 
This delayed fertility, coupled with increasing life expectancy, leads over time to dramatic shifts in the 
age composition of society in a process referred to as societal ageing. That is to say that when payments 
are made in kind through cohabitation, independence and subsequent fertility are delayed. In this 
regard, transfers reflect a distinct difference between nuclear households who make financial payments 
and stem families who use in-kind payments such as cohabitation (Albertini, Kohli, & Vogel, 2007). 
Such shifts will inevitably determine individual level behaviour in that family structures are 
fundamentally altered (Magnus, 2008; Puur, Sakkeus, Schenk, & Poldma, 2010). This is certainly the 
case in intergenerational transfers where the shift reflects an increase in suppliers relative to the 
number of consumers. Despite much work being conducted on establishing whether transfers vary 
across countries, the amount of research on variance by family form in this context is far more limited 
which is surprising given the links. The Scandinavian countries identified as having higher rates of 
transfers are also those where children leave home the earliest and where the fertility rate is highest. 
The further south you go, the less this becomes the case. Given this, family form and structure could 
not only offer an alternative explanation for cross country variance in transfer behaviour but are also a 
necessary element of any economic or rationale choice perspective given that it would appear to 
interact with the decision to give.  
The interaction of life courses 
A demographic perspective to intergenerational transfers reveals further variations which have not been 
explored in existing research on intergenerational transfers. Firstly, the time of coexistence between 
adult child and parent has increased and secondly there has been significant variation in the way in 
which intergenerational life courses interact (Puur, Sakkeus, Schenk, & Poldma, 2010). The period of 
coexistence between generations is largely determined by three factors; fertility, life expectancy and 
the age of the mother at birth. This interplay can be seen from Figure 2.2 which shows how 




Figure 2.2 – Generations and the Life-Course: A diagram of overlapping generations 
Source: (Golini, 2005) 
Some evidence has been established regarding the importance of life course events but little has been 
done to explore the wider impact of a family structure’s on transfer behaviour (Shapiro & Corey 
Remle, 2010; Leopold & Schneider, 2010; Berry, 2008; Norton & Van Houtven, 2006). This is related 
to existing studies tending to adopt a single country approach to analysis and look to explain differing 
transfer patterns through various life course events and circumstances. 
As an example, Leopold and Schneider find that transfers increase during key family transitions for the 
child such as marriage, divorce and birth of a child (Leopold & Schneider, 2010). Yet this analysis is 
restricted to Germany in a limited timeframe and therefore can offer limited insight into how this is 
related to social constructions of the family or differing experiences of societal ageing or the life course. 
The societal ageing and family literature suggest that patterns of transfers should be markedly different 
in countries that have distinct demographics and unique experiences of the societal ageing 
phenomenon. After all, the average age of a parent when their child finishes education varies 
considerably across and within countries (Gustafsson, 2001). 
It has also been suggested that higher social mobility can be observed amongst those families who tend 
to have relatively fewer children (Van Bavel, 2005). This might be because those with fewer children 






















































Great Grandmother Grandmother Mother Daughter
Leave School Age at first Birth Retired
28 
 
concentrated leading to greater chances of success. More recent studies have utilised more 
comprehensive and time variant data which allows for the effect of number of siblings (and timing of 
births) to be better isolated and monitored (Skirbekk, 2008; Coall, Meier, Hertwig, Wanke, & 
Hopflinger, 2009). This research has shown that family size in particular can affect familial behaviour.  
The shape of the family tree 
In addition to altering the period and nature of coexistence between generations, societal ageing also 
increases the average number of grandparents and parents that people have over the life course. For 
example, Golini (2005) estimates that for 100 fifteen year olds there are 293 grandparents out of a 
possible 400 using data from Italy in 1998, with the number falling to 182 by the age of twenty-five. As 
life expectancies increase, it should be expected that this number will tend towards 400. The effect of 
societal ageing on intergenerational transfers is intuitive in that both refer to the relationship between 
generations. As the population gets older more givers and fewer receivers of intergenerational transfers 
will be observed. This would therefore suggest that we should see a shift in the dynamic of 
intergenerational transfers. As well as the average number of grandparents increasing, there will be a 
simultaneous rise in the number of great grandparents and the greater frequency of four generational 
families (Pennec, 1997; Matthews & Sun, 2005). As life expectancies increase there will be an increase 
the number of coexisting generations and the average number of great grandparents for children should 
similarly be expected to tend towards its natural limit of 8 per child, though this is not achievable due 
to the existence of some mortality. 
For previous generations, it was rare to have older persons for relatives and the young were more 
numerous within families. This relative scarcity of older people was intensified by the fact that as we 
move up generations we calculate arithmetically and as we move down them we calculate 
exponentially. This effectively meant that if you were lucky enough to have a grandparent, you had to 
share their time, support and resources with a large number of siblings and cousins (Ruggles, 2007). 
Now this process has been somewhat reversed and downward transfers are now intensified by two 
processes (Albertini & Kohli, 2009a). The same data from Italy suggests that the average number of 
grandchildren for the over 65s is around four. It must then be considered that given that the average 
child has 2.93 grandparents, an individual grandparent now only has 1.36 grandchildren per person 
(this is the theoretical per capita number of grandchildren a grandparent has). This ratio is set to move 
towards one and even below this as the balance between the generations continues to shift under 
societal ageing. 
Part of the decrease in this average will be due to the increasing number of the elderly who do not have 
grandchildren. In Italy, this has been reportedly as high as 1/3 of those over 65 and slightly lower in 
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France and elsewhere where the figure is closer to 20% (Golini, 2005; Puur, Sakkeus, Schenk, & 
Poldma, 2010). For these individuals it is unclear where their resources will go and what kind of family 
support they will receive in later life stages (Albertini & Kohli, 2009; Albertini & Kohli, 2009a). Again, 
the effect of this shift in the balance between generations has yet to be explored given the lack of 
comparable data. As older generations are alive longer, inter-vivos transfers may represent a means to 
compensate younger generations for delayed inheritance whilst they are constructing their own 
families. Furthermore, between an individual and a spouse, the probability that at least one of their 
parents is still alive is now significantly higher and should increase the possibility of financial assistance. 
 
Figure 2.3 - Number of Grandchildren of those aged 70+ 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement, Wave 4 (authors own calculations) 
Further Complications 
So far these estimations have looked at broad population averages, however this is again an 
oversimplification that covers a more complex depiction of current dynamics. For example it can be 
shown that the number of grandchildren is not evenly distributed amongst grandparents but that 
fertility rates are also inherited, leading to a compound interest effect of grandchildren. More broadly, 
the average number of grandchildren for those who have 1 child is just 2. Yet the average for those who 
have 3 is around 7.5 (i.e. 2.13 per child) (Golini, 2005). 
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This suggests that the fertility rate of offspring is directly related to the fertility rate of the parent which 
in turn means that populations should not been considered homogenous when discussing 
intergenerational transfers (Skirbekk, 2008). The dynamics of these distinct family structures are of 
course likely to affect the dynamics of their intergenerational payments. Those in low fertility family 
structures will have very low ‘grandchild per capita’ levels whereas those in high fertility will have 
higher levels, though still not the level of early to mid-twentieth century grandparents. 
What’s more, the three determinants of cohort overlap and family structure have all been noted to vary 
due to class, educational and income levels as well as geographical locations. Through a more detailed 
and subtle demographic analysis we therefore aid the exploration of intergenerational relations and its 
ability to yield results and findings for other areas of social policy such as social mobility, educational 
provision, economic geography and health (Woods, Rachet, Riga, Stone, Shah, & Coleman, 2005; 
Skirbekk, 2008). 
For all the diversity and complexity of family forms and structures in Europe, it remains to be seen 
how they affect transfer behaviour. Much of the empirical evidence in the literature suggests that it 
does have a significant and endogenous impact and that this needs to be explored in greater detail. 
What is striking from this brief tour is that the evidence to suggest that the institutional variation in 
family form impacts upon transfers already exists but the incorporation of this knowledge into theories 
of intergenerational transfers is significantly lacking. In addition, the lack of such demographic concepts 
could undermine arguments based on observed country differences given the established 
interdependencies between demographics and social policy. This is because patterns of cohabitation, 
family size and age structures could be causing spurious effects. 
2.4.2. Intergenerational Relations 
Demographic change gives a broader picture of intergenerational transfers. When combined with 
suggestions that it impacts wealth accumulation and social mobility, it sparks the interest of policy 
makers and social commentators (Willets, 2010; Howker & Malik, 2010). Yet the intergenerational 
transfer literature has focused more on the socio-psychological context of intergenerational transfers 
and their place within a broader pattern of intergenerational exchange and support. This interest has 
been fruitful in understanding an economically conceptualised financial exchange within the 
psychological, sociological and culturally complex notion of the family. 
These considerations challenge the modelling constructed by the economic literature. The economic 
modelling of the relationship between a parent and child is stated as a one dimensional scale that varies 
between pure altruism where they care as much about their child as they do themselves and complete 
ambivalence where the parent is entirely indifferent to the fate of their child (Cox, 1987). Sociological 
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interpretations of this relationship have suggested that this demarcation fails to capture empirical 
realities as identified in 2.2.3. In this literature the meaning of the word ambivalence is used to 
describe a situation in which conflict and solidarity between generations exist in concordance 
(Bengston, Giarrusso, Mabry, & Silverstein, 2002). 
Empirical studies on the relationships between generations tend to illustrate this point with a 
considerable degree of consistency. Some studies have shown a multiple dimensional relationship based 
on emotional, physical and effectual aspects of a relationship (Silverstein & Bengtson, 1997), others 
have demonstrated the coexistence of solidarity and conflict (Szydlik, 2008) and these ambiguities have 
themselves been shown to vary across a number of social structures such as class, race and gender 
(Swartz, 2009). All have made the fundamental point that intergenerational relations are multi-faceted 
and vary considerably between families.  
Intergenerational transfers themselves are a functional representation of solidarity within a relationship 
yet existing studies have shown that the correlation between such functional forms and emotional 
closeness are not particularly strong in that those who have a close relationship are not necessarily 
going to be those who make financial transfers (Bengston, Giarrusso, Mabry, & Silverstein, 2002; 
Attias-Donfut & Arber, 2000). The provision of effectual support in the form of time and money can 
strain emotional aspects of a relationship (Arber, Davidson, & Ginn, 2003). On the other hand, strong 
emotional relationships exist in the absence of a physical or financial representation of closeness 
(Luescher & Pilleme, 1998). The implication of this observation for intergenerational transfer in 
general is that the inferential power of observations of transfer behaviour should not form a litmus test 
for the health of intergenerational relationships as a whole. 
Further to this there is evidence that this complex multi-dimensional relationship occurs within the 
wider context of prevalent social norms. The emotional and psychological impact of giving and 
receiving support is likely to be dependent upon a broader set of values with regards to 
intergenerational relations (Kohli & Kunemund, 2003). Transfers of time and money have been shown 
to be related to wider cultural norms and values (Jappens & Van Bavel, 2012). Conflicts between 
individual level behaviour and the cultural norms are therefore likely to echo into other aspects of the 
parent –child relationship. A stereotypical embodiment of this could be seen as the child who lives with 
their parents well into adulthood despite cultural norms suggesting they should have left long ago. 
By classifying different forms of support as either effectual, physical or emotional a more complex set 
of interactions is revealed which limits the extent to which intergenerational transfers can be seen of as 
indicative of a wider relationship. Yet this classification is itself an over simplification of the interactions 
between differing forms of solidarity given that within the effectual classification of support varying 
combinations are observed within relationships (Brandt, Haberkern, & Szydlik, 2009; Attias-Donfut, 
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Ogg, & Wolff, 2005).  In certain circumstances financial support is accompanied by time and in-kind 
transfers such as babysitting or other care giving. In other scenarios financial transfers are negatively 
correlated with these other forms of effectual support. What’s more, there is consistent and clear 
evidence that the relationship varies across countries (Brandt & Deindl, 2013). Subsequent research 
into intergenerational transfers therefore must either take a holistic approach to the various dimensions 
of intergenerational relationships, or refrain from inferring about the general state of intergenerational 
relations. 
2.5. Summary 
This chapter outlines the existing literatures that feed into and draw from discussions of 
intergenerational transfers. The chapter started with a warning against entering the literature with the 
presupposition that intergenerational transfers are important and considerable movements of 
resources. It is clear from this literature review however that intergenerational transfers are indeed 
pervasive in contemporary social science debates. As a subject, intergenerational transfers cross 
boundaries and this poses theoretical and technical challenges. How can sociological and economic 
theories of the family interact and be understood in substantive terms? How do we discuss 
intergenerational relations when Europe’s demography is changing? How do we understand private, 
personal, individual behaviour in the context of rapid, macro, social change? 
These difficult questions motivated this research project and the following chapters outline a way in 
which they may be answered. The particular focus on the interaction between policy and transfers was 
shown to be a particular area of interest and it ably demonstrates the motivation and core question of 
this thesis which considers how policy affects transfer behaviour. The literature regarding social policies 
and intergenerational transfers has struggled to keep up with methodological innovations and data 
availability that have created the potential for understanding the effects of certain social policies. Social 
policies are a macro phenomenon in that they are conceived at the macro level, whether that refers to a 
country, region or social organisation. Yet they are enacted at the micro level in that it is individuals 
that pay in and benefit from such policies. For an empiricist this is a technical challenge that requires 
specific data and methods which are outlined in chapter 4. 
Furthermore, the cross level nature of this question is tricky in terms of our theories of human 
behaviour. It may now be possible to collect data on hundreds of thousands of households across 
Europe on an annual basis and then summarise that data in complex statistical models that can be run 
off a home computer but that does not mean we should as the complexity of an analysis doesn’t directly 
translate into a better understanding of social behaviour. In order for this literature to progress beyond 
the problems that were identified in section 2.3, it is essential that the enquiry is theory driven and this 
33 
 
is the subject of the next chapter. Grounding any empirical discussion in a sound and clear theoretical 
framework maximises the leverage of this thesis and ensures that it adequately contributes to the 
numerous literatures detailed in this chapter.  
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3. The Analytical Framework & Strategy 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, a conceptual and analytical framework is set out which builds on the literature discussed 
in Chapter 2 and outlines an analytical strategy for the rest of the thesis. From this literature review, 
two prominent questions emerged. Firstly, it is important for theoretical and substantive reasons to 
more precisely understand the relationship between public transfers and private transfers. Are more 
generous pensions associated with financial support for younger generations? Do social benefits for the 
working age population negate the need for financial assistance from the family? How do the family and 
state interact as welfare providers? These questions are particularly pressing with regard to the 
intergenerational dynamic of both public and private transfers given the rapidly ageing populations of 
Europe.  
Secondly, to what extent are differences in transfer behaviour across countries attributable to policy 
variation across Europe? Do Scandinavians transfer more because they have better pensions? Do people 
from Southern Europe transfer less because children are not eligible for public benefits and so cannot 
move out? Do Eastern Europeans transfer so little because of the particular nature of their welfare 
states? Or are these differences due to other factors such as prosperity, demographics or culture. These 
two sets of questions are interlinked in that the first aims to identify whether policy are 
intergenerational transfers are correlated with each other and the second set considers whether this 
association can help explain differences in transfer behaviour across countries. The framework in this 
chapter forms the basis of the analysis within this thesis which describes and explains transfer behaviour 
in Europe and its relationship with social policy in attempting to answer these two sets of questions.  
To achieve this, it is necessary to outline the concepts that are used, the specific research questions that 
are addressed and the methods that are used to answer them. First, in section 3.2, the conceptual 
framework that is used is described. Altruistic theory and an intergenerational framework are 
combined to develop a holistic approach to the analysis. Alternative approaches are discussed and the 
reasons for discarding them are outlined. This is followed by a discussion of the limitations of this 
analytical framework and the potential problems that arise from its use.  
Section 3.3 then outlines the specific research questions in the context of this framework and the 
analytical approach of the thesis. Here the complexity of the conceptual framework is addressed and 
dissected in order to outline a strategy of analysis. This is provided in a detailed account of the four 
pieces of analysis within this thesis and how they relate to each other. The limitations of this analytical 
framework from theoretical and substantive perspectives are considered whilst methodological and data 
considerations are treated in greater detail in Chapter 4. Section 3.4 summarises how this thesis 
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answers the two questions outlined above and provides a road map to the analysis in Chapters 5, 6, 7 
and 8, therefore demonstrating how policy effects on transfer behaviour in European families can be 
understood better. 
3.2. The Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
3.2.1. A Model of Transfers 
This research will look to build on the literature discussed in Chapter 2 by testing ways in which policy 
influences transfers. In order to achieve these aims it is necessary to outline a theoretical framework 
around which answers will be developed. As stated in Chapter 2, the origins of the field are in 
economics and most of the modelling in the existing literature is derived from here. The predominant 
debate within the economic literature revolves around the distinction between altruistic and exchange 
based motivations for transfers with mixed evidence from a vast array of sources (Cox, 1987; Altonji, 
Hayashi, & Kotlikoff, 1997). These two models offer two very different depictions of transfer 
behaviour: in one, the process is driven by feelings of altruism toward the younger generation and in 
the other it is driven by an expectation that the elderly will receive something in return. 
For the purpose of this study the altruistic model will be used for a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
existing literature on transfers suggests that whilst there is some evidence of reward for caring 
practices, caring practices are in themselves rare, limiting their wider relevance (Attias-Donfut, Ogg, 
& Wolff, 2005). Secondly, the altruistic model is more parsimonious and open to simpler 
interpretation. That is to say that exchange based theories are generally applicable to those with a care 
need rather than to the wider population of parents with long time delays between giving and receiving 
(Leopold & Raab, 2011). What’s more, research has generally reached a consensus that the majority of 
transfers are given for what economists would call altruistic reasons (Berry, 2008; Albertini & Radl, 
2012; Altonji, Hayashi, & Kotlikoff, 1997; Lennartson, 2010; McGarry, 1997; Attias-Donfut, Ogg, & 
Wolff, 2005; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010). A further reason is pragmatic in that using an exchange 
model puts extra demands on the data and restricts the number of sources available (Bianchi, Evans, 
Hotz, Seltzer, & McGarry, 2007).  
With these considerations in mind a formal model can be adopted that can help in formulating an 
understanding of how policy affects intergenerational transfers. Limitations to this approach are 
discussed later in this section. The following model of transfer size and frequency will be adopted 
where the parent’s utility (Up) is described as: 
1) Up = u(Cp, V (Ck)) 
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And where the function is constrained by: 
2)  Cp = Ip – T 
3) Ck = Ik + T 
In this model Cp is the consumption of the parent, V is the utility of the child and Ck is the 
consumption of the child (Cox, 1987). The first equation shows that the parent’s utility is determined 
by their own level of consumption and the utility of the child. The child’s utility is in turn determined 
by their own consumption levels. The term utility refers broadly to a relative sense of happiness/well-
being in that if one situation is preferred to another it is said to be of higher utility. This is an abstract 
term and will not be directly measured within this analysis. Consumption refers to any consumable 
good or thing purchased using income. 
The second and third equations are basic rules that constrain what the parent can choose to do. Here Ip 
is the Income of the parent and Ik is the Income of the child. T is the level of transfer from parent to the 
child. Equation 2 merely states that the total amount consumed by the parent will be their income less 
the amount they transfer to the child. This effectively means that their decision is constrained by how 
much money they have coming in. This can be displayed graphically as: 
 

















This describes a situation in which the transfer is determined by the relationship between the Child’s 
and the Parent’s Utility (∂Up/∂Ck) and it is assumed that the parent takes satisfaction in their child’s 
happiness rather than revelling in their downfall and therefore ∂Up/∂Ck>0. In other words, if you 
increase the child’s consumption whilst keeping everything else the same, the parent will be happier. 
The curve shape represents a set level of the parent’s utility and is a combination of positions at which 
the parent is equally happy. If we look at the middle of the curve in 3.1 we can see that the Parent 
consumes Cp1 and the child consumes Ck1. This scenario makes the parent have U1 level of utility.  
If the level of the child’s consumption increases the parent gets happier (because we move to the right 
of the curve). If it decreases then they become unhappier (because we move to the left of the curve). If 
the child’s consumption increases by X and the parent’s consumption decreases by X*(∂Up/∂Ck), then 
the parent’s utility will stay on U1 (Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). When Ck and Cp are utility 
maximising, equations 2 and 3 can be solved in order to establish T. 
This model then allows us to consider the effect of social policies on transfer behaviour. In order to 
ease interpretation and understanding of this we can consider I j to be net-income, allowing us to 
consider the effect of public transfers. For the sake of clarity, a ‘pro-older person’ policy can be taken to 
be public financial transfers made to parents and a ‘pro-younger person’ policy to be public financial 
transfers made to the child. Here we use these terms in the broadest possible sense to reflect what 
would be a public transfer to the child or parent. Whilst the terms younger person and older person 
may invoke education spending and pensions or social care, in reality this could reflect any form of 
social policy that directly or indirectly affects individuals of one generation more acutely than another.  
For example, property taxes are applicable to the whole population but can be generationally 
regressive or progressive (Saraceno & Keck, 2010). An increase in ‘pro-older person’ or ‘pro-younger 
person’ policies shifts the constraint line up or to the right respectively and therefore the Parent is able 
to raise both their consumption and the child’s with the distribution determined by ∂Up/∂ Uk. The 





Figure 3.2 - Parents Utility Curve after a Rise in Income 
The effect of a €1 increase in the income of the parent would be projected into a € (∂Up/∂Ck) increase 
in transfers to the child. That is to say that with every Euro spent on the parent, the parent will decide 
to transfer an amount to the child that reflects the extent to which that child’s consumption affects the 
parent’s utility (Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). This is in contrast to an increase of €1 in public 
transfers to the child. Given such an increase the parent would see fit to decrease the amount 
transferred to the child. This is because the parent will be able to reach a higher level of utility by 
decreasing the size of the transfer. The size of the decrease would be equivalent to € (∂Up/∂Ck)
-1. This 
suggests that policy has different effects depending on the recipient. For parents, it crowds in transfers. 
This means that an increase in public transfers leads to an increase in private transfers. For children it 
crowds out private transfers. This suggests that an increase in public transfers to the young leads to 
fewer private transfers.  
Furthermore, the increase in the amount transferred brought about by a €1 increase in public transfers 
to the parent should be larger than the decrease brought about by a €1 increase in public transfers to 
the child. This assertion can be supported through the model. Firstly, altruistic theory asserts that the 
amount transferred between parent and child is determined by the relationship between the income of 
the parent and the income of the child (Ip/Ik).   If the ratio is high then the transfers will also be high, as 

















that the child’s income will be closer to the parents and the motivation for making a transfer would be 
low. In terms of the effect of policy, the different effects of a €1 increase in spending can then be put as 
((Ip – 1)/Ik) > (Ip/(Ik+1)). This merely says that a €1 benefit reduction on the parent or a €1 tax 
rebate for the child will decrease transfers more and it holds as long as Ip > Ik. This leads to three 
primary hypotheses of altruistic theory which will be considered in this thesis:  
H1: Public Transfers to Parents will increase Transfers 
H2: Public Transfers to Children will decrease Transfers 
H3: The crowding in effect of public transfers to parents will be stronger than the crowding out effect of public 
transfers to children 
Potential problems and limitations of this model 
Before the altruistic model is placed in an intergenerational context it is worth first considering the 
limitations of modelling transfers in the way just described. There are a number of criticisms that exist 
within the literature both from scholars of transfer behaviour and those active within other research 
areas. 
A limitation of this model is its rigidity over time and the restrictions it places on modelling dynamics. 
For example, applying this model to a parent child relationship in which the child gets married and has 
a child is not easy because this event might change optimal consumptions levels for the child in the eyes 
of the parent. A further example would be the shift from young adulthood to full adulthood which is 
often marked by the entry to the labour market from education. The material circumstances of the 
individual may not change but the parents understanding of how the child’s material circumstances 
affect their own utility might. 
These fluctuations are not reflected because the effect of the child’s consumption on the parent’s utility 
is not thought to vary overtime. This assumption runs counter to the findings of the literature, 
especially the most recent findings (Berry, 2008; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010; Albertini & Radl, 
2012; Lennartson, 2010). This model can therefore be said to put far greater emphasis on the role of 
income rather than the characteristics of the relationship between the child and the parent. This rigidity 
buys parsimony but the empirical models within this analysis persistently consider event based theories 
such as a child birth or house purchase as potential alternative explanations for the empirical findings, 
even whilst at the theoretical level they are notable for their absence and subsumed by the emphasis on 
material circumstances. 
The second criticism that is often levelled at this modelling of transfer behaviour is that it doesn’t 
distinguish between transfers and potential substitutes (Kohli, 1999; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010; 
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McGarry, 1997). This refers to the role of transfers as a source of cheap capital. This suggests that the 
child could smooth their own consumption and make investments in a home or child by simply going to 
the market and accepting prevailing credit prices. Transfers offer an alternative to this and therefore 
one would expect that transfer behaviour will react to credit markets. 
There is little evidence of this taking place except in references to individual instances such as Belgium 
in 2006 which has high levels of capital requirements for first time homeowner purchase which has 
been suggested as the cause of high levels of transfers there (Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010). Despite 
this limited evidence, it is a compelling criticism. It highlights the possibility that the child can finance 
needs elsewhere thus raising the question of whether the child’s income is measured before or after 
they have been to credit markets. This raises questions about the transaction dynamic and whether it is 
based around demand or supply agreements.  
The final criticism that should be discussed in relation to this model is that it vastly oversimplifies a 
complex parent child relationship, and it does (Luescher & Pilleme, 1998). Parent child relationships 
are immensely complex and shift over time in response not only to external events but as part of an 
endogenous evolution as highlighted in Chapter 2. Psychological approaches have explored this 
complexity in detail and it is common for economic models to be too rigid and unable to reflect any 
change in such a relationship (Luescher & Pilleme, 1998; Attias-Donfut & Arber, 2000; Bengston, 
Giarrusso, Mabry, & Silverstein, 2002; Daatland & Lowenstein, 2005). Yet in this analysis the 
relationship is constant over time and furthermore the assumptions of any empirical model will assume 
that V is uncorrelated with the independent variables. This assumption cannot be tested within this 
theoretical framework and it is merely assumed that there is a set relationship dynamic within which 
the effects of changes in income and circumstances are played out. The accuracy of this assumption is 
hard to test, especially within the framework of this model given that neither Up nor V are measured. 
It should therefore be noted that if findings do not support the parental altruism model, this maybe a 
reason why. To test this, a number of alternative measures such as indicators of care giving are included 
within the analyses to assess their robustness. 
3.2.2. Altruism in an Intergenerational context 
The parsimony of the altruistic model is one of its main advantages. This is derived from the assumed 
rationality of all individuals and the closed system through which all exogenous factors must affect 
transfer behaviour (Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). This is a common feature of rational choice 
models and a primary benefit of their use. Yet the altruistic model is not explicitly referenced within 
contemporary theories of transfer behaviour. This is partly due to the ability to which it is able to 
explain and incorporate empirical observations and substantive dynamics as discussed in the previous 
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chapter. There are two such areas which the theory does not confront which are related to the 
intergenerational nature of the topic.  
Intergenerational research has developed considerably in the past 20 years and offers a number of 
conceptual frameworks through which to analyse intergenerational behaviour (Bengston, Giarrusso, 
Mabry, & Silverstein, 2002; Szydlik, 2008; Attias-Donfut, Ogg, & Wolff, 2005). The need for specific 
conceptual approaches arises from the complex nature of the dynamics understudy. For example, 
altruistic theory has not been the focus of empirical testing relative to the comparative assessments of 
transfer behaviour. Much of the research over the previous two decades has determined that there are 
large differences in transfer behaviour across countries as outlined in chapter 2 (Villanueva, 2005; 
Schenk, Dykstra, & Maas, 2010; Albertini & Kohli, 2012; Brandt & Deindl, 2013). The amount of 
evidence in this regard has led to the field primarily focusing on their explanation and altruistic theory 
being largely forgotten. 
In addition, the altruistic model is parsimonious given that it only has a single decision making actor 
(the parent) yet individuals live within a large network even if only the family is considered. This 
complicates the modelling in section 3.2. Consider a family with more than one child; does an increase 
in the oldest child’s income affect the transfer receipts of their siblings? Does the parent still transfer 
money if their own parents may be a better source of financial support to their child? The theory 
presented above does not answer this, yet there are very few empirical explorations of these aspects. 
To address these concerns, altruistic theory itself can be placed in a broader intergenerational context. 
To do this, Marc Szydlik’s (2008) conceptual framework of intergenerational research which was 









This framework demonstrates where altruistic theory stands within the wider theoretical debate.  









Figure 3.3 - A Theoretical Model of Intergenerational Solidarity  
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Altruistic theory incorporates the need structure of the child and the opportunity structure of the adult 
which encompass the personal circumstances of these two individuals. But the theory fails to consider 
the role of the cultural-contextual structure and family structures around them which include the 
aforementioned complications. These are not necessarily incompatible with altruistic theory but are 
often neglected given the tendency to focus on the point closest to the variable of interest 
(solidarity/transfers). Altruistic theories scientific value should therefore depend upon the extent to 
which it is able to incorporate family and cultural contextual structures. This thesis aims attempts to 
incorporate these factors into the altruistic model and the extent to which the model accurately 
predicts the role of these factors. 
The framework is valid to the extent to which family and cultural-contextual structures can be 
subsumed to the material circumstances of individuals. Figure 3.3 illustrates this in that there are no 
direct effects of cultural-contextual factors or family structures on solidarity within the model. In 
existing analysis, authors have identified family and cultural-contextual effects using fixed effect models 
which were mentioned in 2.3.1 and will be discussed in chapter 4. From a theoretical perspective, 
these analyses imply that family and cultural-contextual issues have a direct effect on solidarity. The 
argument is generally grounded in a regime or typological approach which intimates that processes 
differ across countries. This contradicts rational choice’s universality principle and the basic conceptual 
framework of altruistic theory which places an individualist narrative at the centre of intergenerational 
dynamics. 
Country Differences 
The conceptual framework in figure 3.3 refers to ‘cultural-contextual’ factors which are often 
collapsed into a comparative, cross national narratives. These were discussed in 2.3.1. Whilst such 
factors do vary meaningfully between countries, it is somewhat crude to simply reduce all such factors 
to a between country comparison (for an exception see: Jappens & Van Bavel, 2012). Nevertheless, the 
primary strategy within the analysis of such effects has been noting differences in transfer behaviour 
between geographical regions or countries.  
Some elements of cultural-contextual effects can be incorporated within an altruistic model such as 
policy effects which are explored within the thesis. Nevertheless there is a growing theoretical 
movement toward cultural or value based narratives of the decision to transfer (Jappens & Van Bavel, 
2012; Albertini & Radl, 2012; Attias-Donfut, Ogg, & Wolff, 2005; Chen, 2012). Such theories where 
discussed in Chapter 2 and cover themes such as cultural, religious, linguistic or class based approaches 
to transfer behaviour. They are the antithesis of altruistic theory in that they do not assume a latent 
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universal rationality in the decision process. Instead, observed cross-national differences are attributed 
to differences that are linked to the material circumstances of the parent or child.  
As the literature in Chapter 2 has asserted, altruistic theory is undermined by variations in transfer 
behaviour across countries. The empirical observation of such differentials undermines altruistic 
narratives given that they dilute or outright contradict the theory laid out in section 3.2.1. Altruistic 
theory suggests that the individual’s decision is driven by the particular circumstances and is a process 
by which the parent redistributes financial means to their children. Value or culture based explanations 
for this undermine it. If the cultural-contextual effect which circumvents the parent and child’s 
circumstances is large, altruism is inflexible to its incorporation. 
Within the intergenerational literature there is an on-going debate regarding cross national narratives. 
Several studies have asserted cross national differences that undermine purely individualistic 
interpretations (Brandt & Deindl, 2013; Albertini & Kohli, 2012). These studies also tend to attribute 
these differences more specifically to social policy differences based on the observation of differences in 
aggregated transfer behaviour. This neglects the possibility that cultural, demographic or social 
variation may also be driving the differences or the extent to which the policy is consistently applied 
throughout the population. Nevertheless, counterpoints to these arguments have been raised but a 
clear and distinctive order to the debate has yet to emerge (Schenk, Dykstra, & Maas, 2010). This 
thesis will contribute to this by examining the extent to which cross-national differences are pervasive 
after individual level narratives have been considered. 
Complex Family forms 
As figure 3.3 suggests and Chapter 2 detailed, family structures vary considerably across Europe and 
are in part determined by cultural-contextual factors. Furthermore, these family structures are thought 
to affect the context of the individual dynamics implicit in the altruistic model. By family structures, 
the conceptual framework is referring to a broad number of dimensions including the number of 
children, the extent of an extended family network, cohabitation arrangements and the balance of 
generations (Szydlik, 2008). The validity of altruistic theory is therefore dependent on the extent to 
which it can incorporate these issues which are not necessarily contrary to altruism but do complicate 
the model outlined in 3.2.2. 
The basic principle here is that altruistic theory views the decision to transfer within a dyadic 
relationship rather than a network. Models of family financial networks are more complicated in reality 
and exceptionally difficult to survey. Therefore, as of yet, no suitable replacements for an altruistic 
model exist (Szydlik, 2008). Regardless, there is nothing contradictory between the understanding of a 
family as a network and the altruistic perception of the relationship as purely dyadic given that altruistic 
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theory and the conceptual framework above suggest that all factors can be reduced down to effects via 
the need and opportunity structures of the parent and child respectively. 
This is to say that the circumstances regarding family structure can be incorporated within a model of 
transfer behaviour via their effect on the circumstances of the parent and child. For example, it may be 
that the parent will not make a transfer to their child given that there is a more prosperous third party, 
such as a grandparent or the child’s spouse’s parents. This complicates altruistic theory given that the 
parent’s decision is now dependent on a third party. Altruistic theory is therefore required to 
incorporate such complexities or show that they are of little importance.   
Such exogenous factors can be captured by longitudinal methods which will be explored in Chapter 4. 
From a theoretical perspective, a far more troublesome aspect of family structures is the number of 
children and whether parents give money to Child A depends on whether they give money to Child B 
and vice versa. Again this is not contradictory to the altruistic model but does necessitate a theoretical 
extension. 
In order to adjust the altruistic model to include more than one child it is possible to simply include a 
further child within the utility function previously described: 
4) 𝑈𝑝 = 𝑢 �𝐶𝑝, �𝑉1(𝐶𝑘2),𝑉2(𝐶𝑘2)�� 
Where the function is constrained by: 
5)  𝐶𝑝 =  𝐼𝑝 − 𝑇1 +  𝑇2 
6) 𝐶𝑘1 =  𝐼𝑘1 + 𝑇𝑘1 
7) 𝐶𝑘2 =  𝐼𝑘2 + 𝑇𝑘2 
Here the suffixes k1 and k2 represents the first and second child respectively. V represents the utility 
function in relation to each individual child from the perspective of the parent but is assumed to be the 
same for all children.   
The main drawback here is that the introduction of additional children erodes the parsimony for which 
the altruistic model is valued and this is worsened further if we relax the assumption that all children 
are the same (Becker G. , 1991). This messiness may explain the absence of family size in the majority 
of the existing literature. One aim of this thesis will be to establish whether such additional complexity 
is necessary to explain empirical findings. Such complexity will only be considered necessary if the 
consideration of family structure can be seen to affect transfer behaviour. If it is a key determinant of 
transfer behaviour, it suggests that the existing theoretical framework has obstructed a view of a key 
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determinant of transfer behaviour. This can be determined by comparing the effect size with other 
variables and the extent to which it improves predictions of transfer behaviour. 
The main problem with making theoretical comparisons across different sized families without 
aggregation is that the effect of an additional child is dependent upon what characteristics that child has. 
It is difficult to say that a family with one child will transfer more than if they had two children because 
it is dependent on the characteristics of that additional child. One way to circumvent these issues is to 
assume that the additional child has the same consumption and utility curve as the existing child. If this 
is assumed, then it is clear that transfers should increase and that the total amount transferred by the 
family is more with each additional child given that parent carries inherent altruistic feelings for each 
child and a subsequent desire to give.  
Despite this, it should not be expected that transfer behaviour will double when an only child is joined 
by a sibling as though there were a fixed sized payment made to children. Instead the rate of increase is 
inversely proportional to the marginal returns to additional consumption for the utility of the parent. 
As the total needs of their children increase with each new child, a parent is increasingly impinged upon 
and they are increasingly resistant to increasing funds proportionately to their children. Therefore the 
total amount transferred will increase at a decreasing rate with each additional child. The extent to 
which it does this will reflect the elasticity of the parents own utility curve. This does not imply that a 
parent’s affection for their children is diluted with each additional child but merely that to 
proportionally increase the total amount transferred would represent an increasingly drastic reduction 
in their own quality of life. Therefore with each child, ceteris paribus, there is a decreasing marginal 
increase in the family’s transfer budget. 
For the original child, who now must share transfers with their sibling, their situation will be worse. 
This can be shown by the fact that the parent’s marginal returns on consumption will be positive and 
the burden of an additional child will not be met with an increase in transfers to the point where each 
child’s utility is the same as it would be if they were an only child. Therefore the altruistic model 
suggests that if the number of children in a family increases then the amount received by a child will be 
lower than in a family with fewer children, assuming all children are treated equally. 
This theoretical extension demonstrates that the incorporation of family structure within altruistic 
theory is feasible. The question regarding family structure is therefore whether such an extension 
detracts from the existing power of altruistic theory. This may occur either by excessively complicating 
the theoretical model or by failing to improve its descriptive and predictive power. This thesis seeks to 
explore whether such an extension is effective and the extent to which the answer to this question 
affects the findings with regards to the three main hypotheses in section 3.2.1.  
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3.2.3. Research questions 
The primary research question of this thesis is:  
To what extent is policy associated with intergenerational transfer behaviour in families across Europe? 
Using the theoretical distinction between the impact of public transfers to younger and older persons 
which is supported by the conceptual framework presented, this question can be broken into two parts? 
1. To what extent is policy directed at parents associated with transfer behaviour in European families? 
2. To what extent is policy directed at children associated with transfer behaviour in European families? 
Section 3.2.2 introduced a broader conceptual framework which aims to incorporate additional aspects 
that are often neglected by altruistic understandings. This leads to two secondary questions which are 
evident within this thesis: 
3. To what extent does the altruistic model explain differences in transfer behaviour across Europe? 
4. To what extent does the presence of siblings affect transfer behaviour in European families? 
In addressing this question this thesis aims to demonstrate the merits of altruistic theory and its validity 
as a model for understanding policy effects on intergenerational behaviour. It is important to stress the 
hierarchical nature of the questions. Altruistic theory is used within this thesis to understand the effect 
of policy on intergenerational transfer behaviour. Questions three and four are secondary in that they 
do not directly address the primary topic of this thesis. They are necessary however in that they are 
fundamental to understanding the broader validity of the theory that is applied here and therefore the 
inferences made from the analysis presented here. They provide contextualisation which is lacking in 
existing research. 
In answering these four questions, the analysis contributes to the existing literature. In exploring all 
four questions in one thesis, the effects of policy can be held within the context of alternative 
explanations such as the individual circumstances of the parent or child or the size of the family itself. 
The analysis enables a judgement to be made as to whether the size of the family matters more than the 
parent’s income or wealth. The analysis reveals whether, when estimating if an individual receives a 
transfer, is it of more use to know which country they are from or how many siblings they have? The 
analysis presented here therefore not only answers the prominent questions within the literature but 




3.3.  Research Strategy 
The questions in 3.2.3 represent the primary research questions of this thesis and look to answer the 
more general question of how policy affects transfer behaviour as well as the extent to which we can 
incorporate cross national considerations and varying family forms. Here the questions that are to be 
the subject of the chapters are presented and a brief insight into how they are to be answered will be 
given: 
3.3.1. Transfers from the Parental Perspective 
Altruistic theory argues that policy differences will be reflected in transfer behaviour. According to this 
theory, policies that improve the well-being of the parent will increase their propensity to provide 
financial assistance (Cox, 1987). In instances where pensions and other social payments are made to 
older individuals, they give some of this on to family members with greater needs. Künemund and Rein 
(1999) labelled this process ‘pension overshooting’. Older Persons receive pensions that are in excess of 
their material needs or even desires and so they redistribute the income within their extended family.  
In this scenario, the financial well-being afforded to older generations induces downward financial 
transfers to generations with less access to finance. 
Social provisions for older persons vary considerably within and between countries in Europe 
(Ebbinghaus, 2012). In Chapter 5 this variation will be exploited in order to establish whether those 
who get more, give more. Do those who receive generous social benefits transfer more than those who 
do not?  The implications of this are that those seen as in need of financial assistance differ between 
familial and public forms of welfare. The state provides pensions in order to ensure the welfare of older 
citizens, yet the family identifies younger family members as those in need of assistance (Kohli, 1999).  
Altruistic theory is only an adequate framework for understanding transfers if it can explain cross 
country differences in behaviour. The power of altruistic theory in explaining transfer behaviour is in 
part determined by the extent to which country level variance dissipates. That is to say, once individual 
circumstances have been considered, do differences in transfer behaviour across countries remain? If 
they are still evident then this suggests that transfer behaviour is only partially explained by altruistic 
theories. In chapter 5, differences in parental circumstances are considered. As noted above, these vary 
widely across Europe. This could mean that observed differences in transfer behaviour are due to 
compositional effects (Hox, 2010). An example of this would be the anticipation that a richer 
population would transfer more than a poor one.  
Chapter 5 addresses 1 & 3 of the research questions posed. Firstly, it aims to assess the extent to which 
policy affects transfer behaviour via the parent’s individual circumstances.  That is to say the extent to 
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which policy changes a parent’s circumstances and thus their propensity to provide financial assistance 
to their adult children. It has been established that households with higher levels of income are more 
likely to give financial assistance to others (Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2009; Kohli, 1999; Kohli & 
Kunemund, 2003; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995). It has also been established that higher social benefit 
receipts induce transfers in a process labelled ‘crowding in’ (Künemund & Rein, 1999; Daatland & 
Lowenstein, 2005). Chapter 5 examines whether these findings can be supported. 
Secondly, it explores the extent to which such differences in parental circumstances are accountable for 
observed differences in countries’ aggregated transfer behaviours and thus addresses question 3 of this 
thesis. Chapter 5 therefore considers whether policy affects transfer behaviour via the parent and 
whether this explains such variation across countries. This analysis will then provide the basis for 
similar analysis in chapters 6 & 8 which will consider the same questions in relation to family structure 
and the transfer recipient’s needs. 
3.3.2. How do changes in a child’s income affect transfer behaviour? 
Whilst chapter 5 is concerned with who makes transfers, chapter 6 asks who receives them. It 
considers if the poorest households are more likely to receive financial transfers than richer households. 
If poor households are more likely to receive transfers it could demonstrate that financial transfers are 
used to meet a basic minimum standard of living rather than as a way to invest in a household or as an 
alternative source of finance. This recipient’s perspective of financial transfers therefore tests if 
investment, enablement and social advancement narratives are supported by empirical evidence. Or 
alternatively, are households with severe financial constraints the primary recipients of financial 
assistance? 
In order for this thesis to address question 2, it is necessary to understand this child’s eye view. This 
question asks; to what extent does policy directed at adult children affect transfer behaviour in 
European families? This is a formidable challenge as almost all studies of Intergenerational Transfers 
have been from a parent’s perspective in terms of sampling and data collection (Bianchi, Evans, Hotz, 
Seltzer, & McGarry, 2007). This limitation is addressed in chapter 6 by using a broader definition of 
financial transfers. Altruistic theory suggests that the child’s circumstances are important but empirical 
evidence has been exceptionally thin (Cox, 1987; Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). By using a 
household survey which is representative of the entire population, the analysis in chapter 6 identifies 
who receives financial transfers and when. 
Research suggests that richer parents are more likely to transfer money to their children than poorer 
parents. This was the conclusion of all of the existing literature on this issue (Cox, 1987; Kohli, 1999; 
Schenk, Dykstra, & Maas, 2010). But if rich parents make the transfers, are rich children receiving 
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them? It is well established that rich parents are more likely to have rich children, but to what extent 
does this alter the profiles of recipients of financial assistance (Van Bavel, 2005). This chapter asks who 
is receiving these financial transfers and whether financial assistance is in fact received by richer or 
poorer households.  
Chapter 6 also allows for more detailed analysis in Chapter 7. There, the effect of public financial 
transfer receipts on private financial transfer receipts is explored and the crowding out argument is 
addressed. Whilst this is the primary aim of this thesis, it is necessary to first understand financial 
transfers from a child’s perspective given that this is an understudied area in the transfer literature. For 
example, altruistic theory discusses the circumstances of the child as a primary driver of financial 
transfer behaviour but does not elaborate on how this works in practice. Therefore to test the validity 
of this theory, it is necessary to understand financial transfers from a recipient perspective and test 
potential extensions to the theoretical model. 
3.3.3. Do Public Transfers Crowd Out Private Transfers? 
Chapter 7 asks if public financial transfer receipts encourage private financial transfer receipts. Whilst 
Chapter 5 examines whether financial transfers to the parents increase the likelihood that they would 
make private financial transfers to their children, a process labelled ‘crowding in’, Chapter 7 examines 
whether receiving public financial transfers decreased the likelihood of receiving a private financial 
transfer, a process known as ‘crowding out’ by building on the analysis of chapter 6. The looks for 
evidence of ‘crowding out’ or whether public transfers encourage parents to supplement public financial 
assistance. This will then provide an answer to the second question posed in this thesis. The analysis is 
embedded in a contemporary debate about the way in which the family and state interact.  
The current economic crisis has led to reductions in public transfers in a number of countries in Europe 
(Avram, et al., 2013). This process links with an established debate that asks whether the expansion of 
the state means a reduction of family and social ties (Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). Given this debate, to 
what extent can we expect family networks to be re-established and increase welfare provision when 
public transfers are reduced? This chapter examines whether there is an identifiable relationship 
between public and private provision of financial support and therefore whether such a crowding out 
effect can be identified in contemporary Europe. 
There has been considerable research investigating the ‘crowding out’ principle with mixed evidence 
suggesting that it is highly context dependent (Argimon, Gonzalez-Paramo, & Roldan, 1997; Andreoni 
& Payne, 2011; Reil-Held, 2006). It is also evident that due to a number of factors, the effect is 
particularly hard to isolate and identify from an empirical perspective. Using comparative and 
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longitudinal methods in a multilevel design, this chapter looks at the relationship between receipts 
from public and private transfers across 24 European countries between 2005 & 2010. 
Given the significant retrenchment in many welfare states following the financial crisis, understanding 
the capacity and willingness of the state to respond is a pertinent and substantively interesting question. 
In addition to this, chapter 7 considers the extent to which public financial assistance is a confounding 
factor in the effects observed in chapter 6. For example, there appears to be a large difference between 
social classes in their private transfer behaviour (Albertini & Radl, 2012). This observed effect could be 
spurious if public transfer receipts are higher amongst some social classes and are also ‘crowding out’ 
private transfers. 
3.3.4. Do Birth Order and Family Size affect Transfers? 
Chapter 8 asks if the size of someone’s family and their position within it is a key determinant of 
intergenerational transfer behaviour. The intergenerational transfer literature is well developed and sits 
at an important junction between family studies, economics and demographics. Existing research is 
rich, fruitful and proved insightful over the past 20 years to the extent that we now know a great deal 
about the support role played by the extended family throughout the life course (Berry, 2008; Cox, 
1987; Hurd, Smith, & Zissimopoulos, 2007; Attias-Donfut, Ogg, & Wolff, 2005; Altonji, Hayashi, & 
Kotlikoff, 1997; Albertini, Kohli, & Vogel, 2006; Hurd, Smith, & Zissimopoulos, 2007; Albertini & 
Radl, 2012) 
Yet intergenerational transfers are about families and in existing analysis the family size, birth order and 
variance clustering are largely absent from the empirical and theoretical framework. As noted by 
Szydlik (2008), it is highly likely that such ‘family structures’ determine many of the parameters 
identified as directly affecting transfer behaviour. The aim of chapter 8 is to explore the validity of this 
assertion and it concludes by suggesting that such issues are of equal if not greater importance than the 
parental resource variables that have thus far garnered the majority of the attention. In doing so it 
answers question 4 and places the analysis of parental and child circumstances in a wider context. 
Chapter 8 begins by exploring the routes of this neglect and argues that it is to be found in the 
econometric routes of the analysis. It goes on to argue that this has led to biased estimates and an 
incomplete theoretical comprehension of transfer behaviour. Furthermore, using multilevel techniques 
to analyse data from the Survey for Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), the chapter 
considers whether more accurately specified modelling reveals family size and birth order to be key 
determinants of intergenerational transfers and subsequent welfare outcomes.  
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Family size and birth order have played a crucial role in other areas of family studies such as investment 
in children and the provision of care for the elderly (Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2005; Voorpostel & 
Blieszner, 2008).  Research on intergenerational transfers has however tended to ignore family size and 
birth order due to a lack of multilevel methods and a focus on economic variables such as parental 
income such as is the case in chapter 5 (Cox, 1987; Altonji, Hayashi, & Kotlikoff, 1997; McGarry, 
1997; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2009).  Chapter 8 asks whether this tendency is distorting inferences 
regarding social mobility and the interaction between the family and the welfare state which underpin 
intergenerational transfers’ substantive contributions and the primary questions underlying this thesis. 
In order for this thesis to understand the relationship between social policy and intergenerational 
transfer behaviour it is therefore necessary to consider the mediating effect of family size and structure. 
The evidence presented here offers greater context. Chapter 8 therefore asks whether the number of 
siblings and an individual’s birth order are more powerful predictors of transfer receipt than the 
material circumstance of the parent or the child. 
3.4. Summary 
3.4.1. Limitations of the Research Project 
The model outlined attempts to offer a comprehensive understanding of intergenerational transfers and 
behaviour in Europe. The elements of the research project are designed to assess to what extent a 
theory of parental altruism can describe transfer behaviour and, where possible, describe the 
parameters of such a theory. It also examines the extent to which altruistic theory can address the 
structural issues identified by the conceptual framework in section 3.2.1 of this chapter. In doing this 
there are a number of limitations based on practical considerations. 
The main limitation is the inability to monitor both parent and child income simultaneously. This is due 
to limits with regards to data as no cross national survey carries such simultaneous measurement 
(Bianchi, Evans, Hotz, Seltzer, & McGarry, 2007). One potential alternative data source that could 
have been used is the Generations and Gender Survey, established by the United Nations in Europe 
(Vikat, et al., 2007). This survey was not used because the data does not provide child specific links 
with regards to financial transfers and therefore limits the analytical power regarding this research 
question. This is also true of more recent waves of SHARE and prohibited a longitudinal analysis of the 
parental perspective in chapters 5 & 8.  
The inability to simultaneously measure both parent and child income means that the theory of parental 
altruism cannot be fully elaborated upon as we cannot be sure whether rises are due to an increase in 
parental or child income. This is a serious issue with the research design and a limitation to the testing 
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of the theory. The use of longitudinal and family clustering analysis do control for fixed effects within 
families, however caution still needs to be maintained given that increases in child income maybe 
related to increases in the income of the parent. Therefore any findings must be qualified by the 
acknowledgement of this limitation. Even still, the analysis outlined does contrast the effects of 
increases in parental income and child income on transfer behaviour and this method represents the 
best available alternative to a simultaneous analysis of parent and child income. 
The second limitation is the narrow understanding of policy. It is the contention of this research that 
the existing literature on transfers and social policy is poor given that it primarily uses a fixed effects 
approach to examine potential policy effects (Albertini & Kohli, 2012; Brandt & Deindl, 2013). This 
logic effectively attributes any differences between countries after individual characteristics have been 
considered as evidence of a policy effect (Schenk, Dykstra, & Maas, 2010). This analysis possibly goes 
too far in the opposite direction by narrowing the operationalisation of policy to an individual’s social 
receipts.  
In chapter 5 & 7 policy is measured simply as the amount of money that is received under a specific 
definition. Yet, existing social policy narratives of transfers tend to focus on in kind policies such as 
care and rights (Saraceno & Keck, 2010; Lennartson, 2010; Attias-Donfut & Arber, 2000). This 
limitation is not a practical one either. SHARE measures non-financial indicators of policy such as care 
and rights within its extensive survey. There are also imputation techniques for identifying policy 
eligibility within the EU-SILC and other surveys. The limitation is instead one of scope. A narrow 
understanding of policy was adopted to mirror the financial metric in which transfers operate. To 
include further measures would have been theoretically tenuous in the context of altruism and it is the 
author’s contention that it would have increased the complexity of the analysis without sufficient 
theoretical backing. This is most certainly an area in which future research can and should focus 
however. What must be stressed is that such individualistic measures of policy are superior to 
clustering and fixed effects approaches to policy analysis. The tradition here is to attribute any cross 
border differences in behaviour to the cloudy concept of welfare regimes which are inseparable from 
broader cultural, demographic and economic patterns. 
The final limitation that will be discussed here is the very narrow view of intergenerational transfers 
that is taken. This does not include in kind payments, co-residence or other forms of support and is 
therefore not indicative of wider intergenerational solidarity and relationship intensity (Bengston, 
Giarrusso, Mabry, & Silverstein, 2002). This restriction was again made for reasons of parsimony but 
does allow for several key theoretical hypotheses to be tested, such as testing whether money from 
Mum & Dad is the same as money from the state. Therefore this research seeks to explore differences 
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between state and family welfare and the broader meaning behind them rather than undermining it by 
reducing the relationship to pounds and pence or euros and cents.  
Furthermore, the intergenerational transfer debate is a key area of intergenerational relationships more 
generally given that it mirrors public debates on intergenerational justice (Ter Meulen, Topinkova, & 
Callahan, 1994; Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2009; Golini, 2005; Street & Cossman, 2006). Whilst the 
discussions of care giving and receiving are important in an ageing society, the primary concern for 
most policy makers is the intergenerational contract that underpins social security systems (Magnus, 
2008). Social policy researchers became interested in the issue via the work of Kohli (1999) for 
precisely this reason.  
The findings of the research would be severely limited if the research question sought to assess the state 
of relations between generations within the family. Fortunately, the research question here seeks to 
establish what this narrow area of intergenerational relationships means to individuals and the broader 
implications of this for society. Furthermore, whilst unable to conclusively comment on other 
intergenerational dynamics, the analysis within this thesis does contain methodological and theoretical 
challenges and solutions that are common in the study of such complex interactions at a time of change. 
Given this, this does not represent a holistic treatment of intergenerational relations but it is extremely 
relevant to such discussions nonetheless. 
3.4.2. Conclusion 
This chapter started by presenting a model of transfer behaviour in the context of the literature on 
transfer behaviour that was presented in Chapter 2. This model was explored and developed so as to 
provide the key research question that this thesis aims to address, namely what is the effect of public 
policy on private intergenerational transfer behaviour. The discussion then turned to how we might 
expect this effect to differ between a donor and recipient perspective. This allowed for the assertion of 
the core analytic hypotheses of this thesis which suggest that public transfers to parents crowd in 
downward intergenerational transfers and that public transfers to the child crowd them out. 
This model was then assessed and extended to consider the theoretical and empirical challenges that 
have confronted the model in recent years. This was done through the contextualisation of the altruistic 
model within the conceptual framework of intergenerational research more broadly. In doing so family 
and cultural-contextual factors were considered and research questions established through which the 
altruistic model could be more fully evaluated. The model was extended to incorporate complex family 




This led to four broad research questions that this thesis will address. Section 3.3 then discussed the 
analytic strategy adopted in this thesis. The chapter structure was laid out and the specific questions 
which each chapter addresses were identified. These four pieces of analysis are then drawn together in 
chapter 8 to offer an assessment of altruistic behaviour and the extent to which it can describe transfer 
behaviour. This thesis is therefore able to offer a comprehensive assessment of how public transfers 




4. Data & Methods 
This chapter details the data and methods that are used throughout this thesis. Many substantive and 
theoretical issues are encountered and addressed within this chapter that are not fully developed or 
considered in previous research. In this sense it is not possible to detach the practical tasks of analysis 
from theoretical considerations. This chapter therefore outlines the ground work for the largest 
theoretical contributions of this thesis whilst outlining the practical issues regarding the choice of data 
and analytical methods.  
Whilst section 4.1 outlines the data and details its structure and limitations, sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 deal 
with the complex measurement and operationalization of intergenerational transfers. Section 4.2 
examines ways of sampling the dyads which make up intergenerational transfers and the strategy 
adopted here. Section 4.3 compares intergenerational transfers with a broader definition of inter-
household transfers and discusses its implications for an analysis based on multiple surveys. Section 4.4 
then details the analytical strategy and methods that are used. 
4.1. The Data 
4.1.1. The Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe 
The Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a longitudinal dataset of the over 
50’s in 19 European Countries2. Respondents have been interviewed every two years since 2004 and 
the interview includes a complex and exhaustive list of question items ranging from the respondent’s 
retirement savings to their grip strength. The dataset is funded by the European Commission having 
initially been supported by grants from U.S. National Institute of Aging which runs the Health and 
Retirement Study in the United States. It is also funded by grants from the German Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research. The study is designed to provide a comprehensive overview of the ageing 
process from a comparative perspective. As of the time of writing 4 waves of SHARE3 have been 
conducted, of which only wave 2 is used here. Initially, multiple waves were to be used and this would 
have enhanced the analysis by allowing for analysis of specific dyads over time. However due to changes 
within the dataset this was no longer possible. 
                                                          
2 Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, 
Portugal, Hungary, Estonia, Ireland, Israel, Sweden, Netherlands 
3 Four waves of SHARE have been completed with a fifth being fielded in 2014 
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Firstly, wave 3 did not include many of the variables used in this analysis as the wave focused only on 
life histories in what is called SHARE Life. Wave 4 could not be used in the analysis because it does not 
identify the specific recipient of a financial transfer, merely indicating whether it is a child of the 
respondent. This was a decision made by SHARE so as to provide greater detail as to the support 
networks used by older people in their everyday lives. This prevented longitudinal techniques from 
being used and therefore wave 4 was not considered for analysis.  This limited the analysis to wave 1 
and 2. Wave 1 is not used here because without a third wave there is little gain from having multiple 
waves within the analysis. Wave 2 is used as it is the most recent wave for which analysis is possible and 
is representative of the population over 50 at the time of the sample. 
SHARE Wave 2 
Data Structure 
SHARE Wave 2 (Release 2.5.0, 2011) consists of 34,415 respondents from 23,561 households across 
14 countries4. The dataset was then collapsed down into a household dataset and 20,055 households 
were selected where respondents indicated that they had living children. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Participant Countries in Wave 2 of the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe 
                                                          




This produced a representative sample of households with household members over 50 within the 
sampled countries. However in intergenerational research the interest is on the dyad and not the donor 
or recipient households. In order to do this it is necessary to re-orientate the dataset into dyads rather 
than households. In each household there exist a number of variables regarding specific children and 
these allowed for the reorientation of the dataset from wide to long. To reflect this Table 4.1 & Table 
4.2 demonstrate the physical change observed in the dataset. 
This process produces a dataset of 50,403 adult children. The sampling frame for this dataset is 
however slightly contrived given that it represents the children of households with an individual over 
50. The substantive use of such a sample is therefore questionable and the extent to which it reflects 
the population more generally is explored in section 4.2. Nevertheless, this process re-orientates the 
dataset to one where individuals are now clustered within extended families and shifts the unit of 
analysis from the parental household to the intergenerational dyad. In terms of these dyads, this does 
not reflect a representative sample of parent child dyads where the parent is over 50. This is because 
children with parents who are not cohabiting are over sampled compared to the population of dyads 
where the parents remain living together.  














1 10,000 2 22 19 . . 
2 25,000 3 33 33 30 . 
3 15,000 2 40 31 . . 
4 35,000 4 19 16 13 11 
5 10,000 1 27 . . . 
6 25,000 1 36 . . . 
7 45,000 2 45 40 . . 
8 9,000 0 . . . . 
9 25,000 2 50 48 . . 













1 10,000 2 22 
1 10,000 2 19 
2 25,000 3 33 
2 25,000 3 33 
2 25,000 3 30 
3 15,000 2 40 
3 15,000 2 31 
4 35,000 4 19 
4 35,000 4 16 
4 35,000 4 13 
4 35,000 4 11 
 
Weighting and Multiple Imputation 
Within any dataset there are issues relating to the representativeness of the sample and missing data. To 
address issues of representativeness in this instance, weights were used to ensure that the sample of 
households accurately reflected the sampled population. Within SHARE wave 2 this variable is w2mdh 
(Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, 2011). This weight is calibrated to match the size 
of the population of each participant country for individuals born in 1956 or earlier. The primary 
variables across which the population is weighted are gender and sex. That is to say that the weight 
does not correct for the under or over sampling of other groups that have been identified by existing 
research on survey methods. These weights are primarily for ensuring that the sample is sound with 
regards to the parental node on basic demographic grounds. This is in itself a difficult task in the 
sampling of a population that falls outside of traditional framing methods (i.e. those who are in the later 
stages of life who often live in institutional settings). 
In order to address issues of non-response, the multiple imputation datasets provided by SHARE were 
used in the analysis. These datasets provide all the original responses and four duplications (Carpenter 
& Kenward, 2012). For these duplications an estimate of any missing values is made based on all known 
values across the other variables. This process is then repeated four times so as to reflect a degree of 
uncertainty in the estimate. The analysis can then be run four separate times and the results aggregated. 
This process addresses values that are not missing at random within the dataset. If data is missing not at 
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random then it will affect the results. To check against such effects, the sample is checked against 
indicators from a number of sources in section 4.2.  
Within each of the analyses using SHARE wave 2, multiple imputation was used but only as a validation 
technique to ensure that the estimates did not change significantly. In all instances the original dataset 
performed well in comparison to the analysis provided by the imputed data. The results from the 
original dataset are given however because diagnostic tests and summary statistics are more easily 
represented without the need for complex aggregation processes. In addition, many of the models 
within the analysis were exceptionally complex and took considerable time to be computed. To 
conduct such analysis systematically across four datasets would have taken four times as long. For 
example, to compute the marginal effects for an estimate within the analysis would have taken four 
times as long as those from the original dataset and given questionable added value. For all the multiple 
imputation analysis in this thesis, the inbuilt mi commands for STATA 12 were used.  
4.1.2. European Union Statistics on Income & Living Conditions 
The second data set used in this thesis is the European Union’s Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC). This is a longitudinal, rotational household panel survey which covers 29 
European Countries (EU27 + Norway & Iceland). The survey is harmonised, coordinated and collated 
by the European Statistical Office in Luxembourg (Eurostat) but is constructed from a number of 
existing longitudinal household surveys throughout European countries. In the majority of these 
countries the survey is conducted by the government statistical offices and the statistics derived from 
the dataset are commonly used as the official statistics on issues such as poverty and inequality at a 
national and supra-national level. 
The survey is collected each year, with households retained within the survey for four years 
(Luxembourg does not operate a rotational panel instead using a traditional panel design). This 
rotational element allows the survey to ensure that the sample reflects the existing population and 
reduces bias related to attrition commonly found in other longitudinal surveys. Data collection started 
in 2003, however the vast majority of countries started collecting data in 2005. In this thesis data is 
taken for the years 2005 to 2010. Some countries have not provided data in every year however, with 
Germany in particular only providing data in only two years of the survey and they were therefore not 




Figure 4.2 – EU-SILC participating countries 2005-10 
The data provided in the EU-SILC focuses on income, work and living conditions. The main aim of the 
survey has been to assess the material circumstances of households and so no variables are collected 
regarding some very basic social indicators. For example religion, ethnicity, language, values, opinions 
and other activities are not included in the survey. This restricts the extent to which analysis can 
incorporate sociological theories of transfer behaviour put forward within the literature. What are 
given are detailed work histories for individuals and a comprehensive financial overview of the 
household. 
Data Structure 
The pooled dataset for 2005-10 across the 29 countries has 875,702 household observations within it 
from 430,369 European households. In this analysis the household is the unit of analysis and therefore 
the data is conducted with datasets H and D within the survey5. However where appropriate data is 
aggregated by household from data in R and P. These datasets contain detailed individual level 
responses from individuals with the household who are over 16 and partial data on those under 16. 
                                                          
5 Datasets H & D within the EU-SILC contain information about the household such as the overall income of the household or 
the condition of the residence. The datasets R and P contain individual level information such as whether an individual is 
employed, how old they are, their education level etc. A variable in datasets R and P allows individuals to be linked to the 
households within which they live. 
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Despite the unit of analysis being noted as the household, the observations within the dataset are 
household-year observations in that they reflect the responses from a household in a given year. This 
allows for the longitudinal, multilevel analysis that is conducted within chapter 6 & 7. The sample for 
the survey is for households generally, unlike SHARE, and so reflects a sample of the all households in 
the country at the time of the interview. In this survey, no details are given regarding other households 
and therefore it cannot be said to reflect a dyad in any sense.  
The use of the EU-SILC within this project is aimed at contextualising and validating the findings of 
other analysis and the literature. A considerable amount has been written on the wider impact of 
intergenerational transfers, yet this can only be gauged by a full and comprehensive survey of the 
population generally. The EU-SILC provides this. It also provides a large number of countries with a 
diverse range of policy packages. This increases the variance within the primary variable of interest and 
enables a more comprehensive overview of social policy diversity within Europe than that offered by 
SHARE alone. 
Weighting and Multiple Imputation 
The EU-SILC contains weights that attempt to adjust the sample so as to more accurately reflect the 
population. In this thesis the EU-SILC is sometimes used in a cross-sectional context for descriptive 
purposes. Where this is the case DB090 is used to weight results. This weight ensures that the sample 
matches a given population. In the longitudinal analysis, weights were specified based on the number of 
years which the household had been in the survey. The weighting for the first year was the same as that 
for a cross-sectional sample. The weighting in year 2 then corrected for attrition and similar weights 
were applied to years three and four to do the same there. This is a complex procedure that will not be 
detailed here, however details are provided in the ‘Description of Target Variables Document’ for the 
EU-SILC (Eurostat, 2010, p. 38). 
Imputation in the EU-SILC is also more complex than in SHARE, covers various forms of income and 
expenditures and occurs in three stages: deductive, deterministic and stochastic. Deductive refers to 
the use of general known principles to infer what a missing value might be. For example, if there is a 
child in the household but the value for child benefits is missing, the value can be imputed from the 
households’ eligibility. Similarly, if the gross level of income is reported and not the net, the tax 
liability can be calculated and used to determine the net value. Deterministic approaches calculate 
values based on known values that logically lead to a given value. For example if all constituent parts of 




In addition to these, stochastic multiple imputation is used in a similar manner as to that described in 
SHARE. This is conducted by the author using the procedures outlined in ‘Multilevel Analysis: An 
Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel Modelling’ (Snijders & Bosker, 2011, p. 130). This was 
conducted using the mi impute command in STATA 12 and produced 10 iterations. As with SHARE 
this was merely a validation process given the computational issues involved with multilevel analysis. 
Given the low levels on non-response already existent within the EU-SILC, the estimates did not differ 
substantively from the results presented here. This low level of non-response is attributable to the two 
earlier stages in the imputation process and the official nature of the data collection via statistical 
agencies rather than research institutes. 
4.1.3. Alternative Datasets 
There were a number of alternative datasets that were considered for the analysis before the EU-SILC 
and SHARE were chosen. The first consideration was the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) 
(Vikat, et al., 2007). Like SHARE, this survey is a longitudinal, cross-national survey aimed at 
analysing the effects of demographic change. It differs from SHARE in that the whole population is 
sampled and is an individual not household sample. The GGS is limited in a number of ways for the 
analysis of intergenerational transfers as specific amounts are not systematically recorded and there is 
limited data on the other individual. That is to say that if adult children are analysed then there is little 
information on the parents and if parents are analysed then there is little information on the adult child.  
Another reason for not using the GGS was initially the longitudinal element of SHARE which would 
have allowed for a more robust analysis of time variant factors. The limited number of waves of the 
GGS would have restricted the analysis to a purely cross-sectional perspective. However, once the 
project was undertaken and further waves of SHARE were published, it became clear that longitudinal 
analysis was impossible given that SHARE wave 3 included a very limited number of variables that 
were observed in waves 1 & 2 and that SHARE wave 4 had scrapped the data linking processes that 
made the identification of individual children possible. In hindsight therefore, the GGS may have 
provided a more practical dataset for analysis. 
An alternative strategy of analysis may have been to conduct the study on a collection of household 
panels, many of which include variables regarding intergenerational transfers. The British Household 
Panel and the German Socio-Economic Panel are two such datasets and carry a vast number of waves 
allowing for extensive longitudinal analysis. These surveys are greatly underutilised in transfer analysis, 
specifically in the analysis of events and life course approaches to transfers (for an exception see: 
Leopold & Schneider, 2010). In such panels, it is possible to follow individuals over very long periods 
of time which allows for the greater isolation of fixed, family level effects. Yet they do not allow for 
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comparative analysis that is necessary within the context of the research questions and therefore these 
surveys were not used here because of this.  
Altruistic theory focuses primarily on the economic circumstances of a household and less on life 
course events. The variation is therefore more acute over short periods of time than life stages. The 
analysis is primarily concerned with policy which varies far more across countries than across time and 
therefore places a greater stress on comparability rather than the length of study. Furthermore, given 
the EU-SILC is itself a longitudinal study, the benefits of using such panel studies was limited.  No 
other datasets that measured intergenerational transfers could be identified which covered European 
Union Member States, the primary area of interest (Bianchi, Evans, Hotz, Seltzer, & McGarry, 2007). 
4.2. Sampling & the Relationship between Datasets 
Given that two surveys are used in these analyses, it is necessary to consider how they relate to each 
other. The multiple source approach is one of the key contributions of this thesis in that it allows 
outstanding questions in the research literature to be addressed through two measures of transfers. 
Given that the understanding of what a transfer is can differ across data sources, analysis using two 
sources should enable the impact of these differences to be observed.  Intergenerational studies such as 
this require complex data structures, collection procedures and statistical methods given that they do 
not operate in the single unit perspective of traditional economic or sociological theory. One of the 
challenges of intergenerational studies in an ageing society is the need to answer questions that look 
beyond the nuclear family or the household as an economic unit to explore interdependency between 
generations. Analytical techniques need to be adapted to this new understanding of the social world 
(McDaniel, 1997). This section explores how the EU-SILC sample is related to the SHARE sample in 
countries where both surveys operate6.  This is done through a comparison of the surveys sampling 
procedures and the relationship between the two is described.  
The key difference between the two datasets within this analysis is their sampling frame. Figure 4.3 
illustrates this. The EU-SILC is a sample of the entire population and is weighted to reflect this. 
SHARE only samples those over 50 years of age. This distinction is relatively clear in that the 
population that is eligible for SHARE is also eligible for the EU-SILC but those in the EU-SILC are not 
necessarily eligible for SHARE. The challenge within this analysis stems from the fact that the unit of 
analysis is not the respondent within SHARE but the recipient of the intergenerational transfer or what 
is sometimes referred to as the parent child dyad. This involves the transformation detailed in section 
4.1 of this chapter.  
                                                          















In this context the relationship between the EU-SILC and SHARE is the relationship between the 
children of the 50 + and the wider population. This is important for comparing the results of the 
analyses in the subsequent chapters. As can be seen from figure 4.3 the children of the 50+ are also 
partially eligible for the survey themselves. It is entirely feasible that an individual sampled for SHARE 
is also included as a Child within SHARE given that the children of the over 50s also include individuals 
who are over 50 themselves. In such a scenario they would be in SHARE twice, once as a respondent 
and once as a child. This does not affect the inferences made regarding this population but it is 
important to note. Figure 4.4 illustrates the age structure of this group. The oldest child within this 
sample is an 87 year old man living in Ireland. In this analysis the use of the word child therefore refers 
only to an individual with a parent rather than being a word with age specific connotations. 
Children of the 50+ 
(SHARE Reshaped) 










Figure 4.4 - Age of Sampled Children of the Over 50's 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 2 
In addition to there being an overlap with the SHARE sample, there is also a lack of fit with the EU-
SILC sample. Figure 4.4 illustrates that the age distribution of the children of the Over 50’s is almost 
normally distributed which is not the case with the age distribution in the wider population. Most of 
the over 50’s gave birth when they were in their twenties and so their children are heavily concentrated 
around the 30-40 age group. Young children are severely underrepresented for this to be considered a 
sample of the population generally. For example, the age category 20-25 represents 5.39% of the 
population in the SHARE children’s sample. In the EU-SILC this age group represents around 8.25% of 
the population. 
The issue here is that this sample of SHARE children has been used consistently within the 
intergenerational transfer literature to make inferences about the likelihood of receiving a transfer. 
Studies have suggested that the proportion of children within their samples that receive financial 
assistance from parents is indicative of the wider population. The discrepancy in the samples suggests 
that this is clearly not the case and a consistent finding of this thesis is that this has often led to an 
upward bias in estimates of transfer receipt amongst the general population. Figure 4.5 reflects the age 















Figure 4.5 - Respondents Age in the EU-SILC 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. Note: Those over the age of 80 in the EU-
SILC are coded as 80 and this is reflected in the disproportionate number of those giving their age as 80.  
Age is not the only factor which introduces bias into these estimates of transfer receipt. Individuals in 
the SHARE children sample are more likely to have wealthier parents that than those in the population 
generally given that richer parents are more likely to have survived and been included within the 
SHARE sample. What is more, poorer households tend to experience child births earlier and so these 
parents are not yet eligible for the SHARE sample (Berent, 1952; Skirbekk, 2008; Matthews & Sun, 
2005).  
As an example here, results for the education variable from SHARE, which are based upon the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), appear to be out of line with the population 
estimates. A low level of education refers to an individual who has only reached level 2 or lower on the 
ISCED scale. In our sample this refers to 17.54% of the population, whilst Eurostat estimates that the 
value for 25-64 year olds is around 30% in 2006 for the EU-15. This discrepancy could exist for a 
number of reasons, most of which relate to the sampling method. 
Whilst the sample of children includes all children over 18, the vast majority are concentrated around 
the mean and are aged between 20 and 40. If one assumes that education access improves over time, 














could explain the levels observed given that the sample contains proportionally more people aged 20-
40 than in the population generally. One way to verify this is to look at the value for those individuals 
in a very narrow age range. This way, fluctuations in achievement across that range will be minimal and 
therefore the age group distribution should be eliminated. Eurostat provides data on educational 
attainment that, unlike the sample of children in SHARE, is representative. This data suggests that 24% 
of the age group 25-34 have very low educational levels. When the population of children in the 
sample is narrowed in a similar way then the percentage with low levels of education also declines, to 
around 14.43%. This therefore suggests that our population of children is substantially different from 
the general population. 
A further reason is that it is possible that this particular variable is biased upward because it is the 
parents who are asked and not the children, leading to substantial inflation in the child’s achievements. 
This is plausible as the bottom two categories of ISCED imply the child was under educated and did not 
finish compulsory schooling. A parent is probably less likely to respond if their child’s education is low 
or to over report the education level of the child. These caveats do raise concerns about what this 
sample of children can tell us and illustrate the complexities of inferring from an indirect sample to a 
wider population. 
Another potential reason for this could be if children of younger parents are generally less likely to 
succeed in education because younger parents can invest less in their children or if they are more likely 
to come from disadvantaged backgrounds themselves. These individuals will not be included within our 
sample as they may not yet be the children of an individual over 50. For example, a line of very young 
mothers could imply that only the great grandmother and above are eligible for the SHARE sample. 
This may be causing a proportion of the bias. 
What’s more, reconstituted families are a further means by which the indirect sampling method warps 
the sample used within this analysis. Here, because of random sampling, each unit should be equally 
likely of selection. When everybody has one mother and one father that are equally likely of being 
sampled by SHARE, then this process should not affect the outcome to a noticeable, systematic extent. 
However once a home is reconstituted or split into two, an individual’s chances of being drawn in the 
sample of the population are effectively doubled. The sample above should therefore over sample those 
individuals from reconstituted families. However this is difficult to test given the lack of accurate, 
comparable statistics on family reconstitution. All these factors indicate that the existing research is 
potentially biased in its estimates of intergenerational transfer receipt and underlines the need to 




4.3. Comparability of Transfers 
4.3.1. Intergenerational Transfers in SHARE 
The complex process by which responses are matched to specific children has considerable 
consequences for this analysis. Within SHARE, financial transfers are measured in a series of questions. 
The first of these asks individuals: 
“Now please think of the time since the last interview. Not counting any shared housing or shared food, have 
you or your partner given any financial or material gift or support to any person inside or outside this household 
amounting to €250 or more?” 
Note: FT001 - By financial gift we mean giving money, or covering specific types of costs such as those for medical care or 
insurance, schooling, down payment for a home. Do not include loans or donations to charities. (Survey of Health, Ageing & 
Retirement in Europe, 2011) 
If the respondent answers yes then it starts a loop sequence which looks at each payment in turn. The 
first of these questions identifies the person receiving the transfer: 
“To whom did you or your partner provide such financial assistance or gift?” 
The responses are then recorded with children identified by a ranking system specified by the parent in 
the section on children within the survey. This ranking system is arbitrary and is not necessarily 
determined by age. This ranking system is used in the transformation of the dataset from long to wide 
that was detailed in section 4.1. The respondent is then asked to specify an amount: 
“About how much did you or your partner give to this person altogether in the time since the last interview?” 
Note: Add single values to arrive at a total amount in Euros. (Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, 2011) 
These values can then be attributed to specific children within the dataset. If a respondent failed to 
identify a transfer made to a given child, it is assumed that no transfer took place. The loop will only be 
executed three times. This means that if a respondent made more than 3 transfers, the smallest 
transfers will not be included in the dataset. Only 4.23% of respondents made at least three transfers 
(to anybody, not just children). This is compared to 12.69% who made at least two transfers and 
28.64% who made at least one. Therefore, some censoring of transfer behaviour does exist but it 
would be anticipated that this would be very small and priority is given to larger transfers.  
The attribution process is therefore relatively complex. However once the financial transfer data has 
been matched to the child’s records, the dataset is ready for analysis.  As outlined above, the 
methodological approach needs to be careful in trying to merge the findings of this thesis with the 
existing literature. This is because the dataset of parent-child dyads that was presented in section 4.1 
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has been treated in various ways in the existing literature.  The dataset consists of observations (parent-
child dyads) which are not independent of each other. The likelihood of one observation registering a 
transfer is not independent of the likelihood that another observation in the sample will receive a 
transfer. This is because our dataset includes brothers and sisters who share a parent who plays a key 
role in determining whether a transfer is received or not. This is problematic because it is a core 
assumption of most statistical analysis that each observation is independent of each other. 
Existing research has addressed this problem in a number of ways. The first of these is simultaneously 
the most problematic and the most common: simply ignore the interdependence of observations and 
then take the dataset as a sample of the population. This second issues is particularly problematic as 
authors then tend to infer about the wider population from a sample of children of those over 50. For 
example, Kohli & Albertini and Schenk, Dykstra & Maas are two prominent and oft cited papers which 
conduct such analysis and imply that their results are representative of children (Albertini & Kohli, 
2012; Schenk, Dykstra, & Maas, 2010). Therefore such studies tend to underestimate standard errors 
in their regression analysis and then infer this to the wider population rather than the children of those 
over 50 which it is a sample of.  
An alternative approach to this is to consider the data in parental household rather than dyad form. This 
aggregates parental behaviour rather than behaviour specifically related to one child (Albertini, Kohli, 
& Vogel, 2007; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2009; McGarry, 1997). This is feasible and a common 
approach within the literature and negates the need for the complex data management outline above. 
Yet there are issues regarding the spurious nature of family size and structure. This is elaborated upon 
in Chapter 8 where family structures are considered more thoroughly. To summarise however, 
considerable detail is lost in such a summation and it becomes difficult to fully identify the effect of 
parental resources on relationships and describe transfers from a recipient perspective. This relates 
back to the unit of analysis within this study which was identified in chapter 3 as the parent-child 
relationship, rather than any specific node.  
The third approach to this data management challenge is to consider the data as a multilevel dataset. 
This is the approach that is taken within Chapter 8. This incorporates the clustered nature of the data 
within the analysis and, depending on the research question, can be used to ensure greater analytical 
power. This is particularly true in questions that involve attributes of both nodes within a dyadic 
relationship or where the higher level (parental level) can be used to make comparisons between 
similar individuals (siblings). Such estimations can be complex however and, as with measuring transfer 
size, can entail unnecessarily complex estimation methods with restrictive assumptions. If the research 




This approach quite simply picks one of the children at random. This ensures that each observation is 
independent of all other observations and therefore traditional estimation methods such as Ordinary 
Least Squares are correct. As with the first method discussed, it is still necessary to emphasise that the 
population that this is drawn from is not ‘children’ or the population generally but reflects a random 
sample of children from a representative sample of the over 50’s. This is important to stress as this 
severely limits the inferences that can be made from such analysis. The existing research has not 
stressed this enough. In spite of the awkward nature of the sampling population, this option is used in 
chapter 5 because it is a representative sample of the parental node within the analysis. Given the focus 
of the question within chapter 5, this is the most logical approach. This survey of approaches should 
however underline the often neglected incomparability of various pieces of analysis and the suitability 
of various approaches for addressing specific questions. 
4.3.2. Transfer Receipts in the EU-SILC 
The measurement of the dependent variable in the EU-SILC is more straightforward than in SHARE. 
Within the survey, individual households are asked how much they have received from other 
households or persons in the income reference period. This is measured at the household level and not 
the individual level as in SHARE. Inferences across surveys are however limited given the different 
sampling frames that were described in section 4.2. Nevertheless, as chapters 6 & 7 detail, this means 
that the analysis must be conducted on a household level and reflect the extent to which households and 
not individuals are in receipt of financial assistance. 
The measurement also differs distinctly from SHARE in that the transfers are not necessarily from the 
parents or residents within the household. The financial assistance could have been provided by anyone 
who is not living in the household and this could be parents, grandparents, other relatives or even 
friends. If we consider the analysis in SHARE wave 2 referred to earlier, exactly 70% of transfers were 
made to the respondents’ children. This suggests that the primary source of informal means of financial 
support is likely to be parents. This does not mean that the two measures are directly comparable but 
they are conceptually linked. In the hypothetical scenario in which an individual’s parents were asked to 
participate in SHARE and they were asked to participate in the EU-SILC, any financial transfer 
between the two should be simultaneously recorded in both surveys. That is to say that the definition 
used in the EU-SILC is inclusive of the definition of SHARE but not vice versa. 
What’s more, the data from the EU-SILC provides no information as to the provider of financial 
assistance. No data is collected as to the nature of the support beyond the annual amount received. This 
limits the extent to which the analysis can be said to fully and accurately model the dyadic nature of the 
relationship described in chapter 3. To counter this, a number of statistical techniques are used which 
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use the longitudinal element of the EU-SILC to control for the time invariant factors of the donor such 
as their socio-economic status, education level or norms and values. This approach is second best to a 
survey where detailed information is collected on both nodes of the dyad, however at the time of 
writing, no such data exists. 
A final difference between the EU-SILC measurement of transfers and those of SHARE is the time scale 
used by the survey. The EU-SILC is an annual survey and the question explicitly refers to the income 
reference period which lasts 12 months. In SHARE, the time period is given as the time since the last 
interview took place which is approximately two years. This has the effect of producing slightly inflated 
figures for the SHARE analysis compared to the EU-SILC data. These factors suggest that the figures 
produced by the EU-SILC and SHARE are not strictly comparable. What connects the two measures is 
the conceptual link of financial assistance between households. The strength of this link is investigated 
in the remainder of this section. 
4.3.3. The Comparability of Measures 
The findings in Table 4.3 represent data on the parent child dyad in SHARE. There is significant 
variation in the prevalence of transfers as indicated by the percentage of respondents who indicated that 
they had received a transfer.  This ranges from Spain where only 3.4% of the children of the over 50’s 
said they had received a transfer, up to Sweden where the figure were almost 21%. Such variation is 
less evident in the transfer size where, save for the Eastern European countries of Czech Republic and 
Poland, there is only a small variation in the total amount transferred by a parent in any given year. 
The last two columns attempt to place the financial transfers evidenced by SHARE within a wider 
economic context. By using the weights provided by the SHARE survey and by totalling all 
intergenerational transfers for each household, it is possible to produce an estimate of the total amount 
transferred by those over 50 to their offspring over a two year period. Obviously these values are 
largely dependent on the size of the country and its economy so these have then be represented as a 
percentage of gross domestic product as a point of reference.  These figures appear to show that the 
downward flows in financial support are not substantial relative to the public transfers as suggested by a 
number of authors (Kohli, 1999). 
The data from SHARE can be viewed as limited given that there are few covariates provided that will 
allow for the contextualisation of statistics. For example, given the data available in SHARE, it is not 
possible to frame the transfers in terms of the recipient’s income position or the wider distribution of 
resources within society. Given the comprehensive nature of the EU-SILC and its role as the primary 
source of social statistics for the European Union, it is possible to view transfer behaviour in a broader 
macro-economic context. In table 4.3 we have the aggregated statistics on transfer behaviour for the 
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EU-SILC. It is immediately clear from this data that one advantage of using the EU-SILC is the increase 
in countries and the breadth of the study. 












Austria 16.12%  €2,427   €1,500,000,000  0.542% 
Belgium 12.30%  €3,498   €1,450,000,000  0.424% 
Czechia 14.74%  €717   €513,000,000  0.362% 
Denmark 19.82%  €3,039   €1,630,000,000  0.729% 
France 11.30%  €3,155   €8,030,000,000  0.426% 
Germany 18.37%  €2,812  €17,200,000,000  0.724% 
Greece 14.47%  €2,706   €1,480,000,000  0.639% 
Italy 12.68%  €2,248   €6,160,000,000  0.405% 
Netherlands 13.76%  €2,991   €3,170,000,000  0.554% 
Poland 9.13%  €580   €791,000,000  0.255% 
Spain 3.74%  €3,590   €2,570,000,000  0.245% 
Sweden 21.04%  €2,028   €1,840,000,000  0.628% 
Switzerland 12.10%  €4,156   €1,300,000,000  0.354% 









Transfer Size  Total Transfers  
Transfers  
(% GDP) 
Austria 12.32%  €3,032  €990,000,000  0.359% 
Belgium 12.29%  €2,178  €722,000,000  0.212% 
Bulgaria 12.96%  €829  €308,000,000  0.881% 
Cyprus 11.98%  €4,938  €152,000,000  0.905% 
Czech Republic 14.60%  €608  €331,000,000  0.234% 
Denmark 9.30%  €3,892  €190,000,000  0.085% 
Estonia 4.66%  €948  €14,400,000  0.105% 
Finland 22.52%  €700  €200,000,000  0.116% 
France 7.26%  €2,809  €12,500,000,000  0.663% 
Greece 12.02%  €3,305  €1,480,000,000  0.638% 
Hungary 19.37%  €547  €227,000,000  0.249% 
Italy 8.96%  €3,833  €5,260,000,000  0.346% 
Latvia 10.65%  €1,155  €44,700,000  0.241% 
Lithuania 5.41%  €1,056  €27,100,000  0.102% 
Luxembourg 4.67%  €6,785  €10,500,000  0.028% 
Malta 2.52%  €2,255  €5,266,648  0.090% 
Netherlands 13.89%  €2,421  €814,000,000  0.142% 
Norway 6.37%  €3,979  €637,000,000  0.236% 
Poland 8.08%  €1,155   €1,070,000,000  0.345% 
Portugal 4.29%  €3,883  €526,000,000  0.312% 
Slovakia 8.42%  €221   €22,000,000  0.035% 
Slovenia 5.20%  €648   €26,900,000  0.076% 
Spain 3.63%  €2,875  €1,140,000,000  0.109% 
Sweden 6.31%  €1,473   €205,000,000  0.070% 
UK 4.03%  €4,758  €3,250,000,000  0.206% 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010 
Despite the conceptual distinction evident within the phrasing of the questions, there appears to be a 
degree of agreement between the two surveys with regards to aggregated transfer behaviour. The 
estimates for both the percentage of individuals receiving a transfer and the estimates for the average 
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size of a transfer are similar if not identical between the datasets. There is a large discrepancy between 
the estimates of transfer size when we aggregate the transfer receipts for all individuals but it is 
anticipated that this is due to the fact that the EU SILC will sample individuals who are not included in 
SHARE’s sampling methods and that the EU-SILC includes transfers from other individuals except 
parents. For example, to be included within the SHARE target sample you have to have a parent who is 
over 50 whilst in EU SILC you are sampled directly via your household. 
When examining the total sum of transfers from EU SILC it can be seen that the total values are 
substantially lower than the estimates from SHARE but that as a percentage of GDP the range is not 
too dissimilar. As with the SHARE data there is a suggestion that these numbers indicate that the 
importance of intergenerational support, or in the context of EU SILC informal financial inter-
household support, has been widely exaggerated and over-emphasised in recent sociological and 
economic debates, particularly when placed in the context of public transfers. Having said this, the EU 
SILC data does suggest that some £30 billion is transferred annually between households in the 
European Union. 
 
Figure 4.6 - Total Transfer Receipts as a Percentage of GDP in SHARE & the EU-SILC 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010 & the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
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Differences between the data from EU SILC and SHARE might be more expected than when 
agreement is identified given the differences in sampling methods and conceptual underpinnings of the 
dependent variable. As detailed in section 4.1 & 4.2, the EU SILC is a general household survey 
whereas SHARE’s inferences to the general population are made through the sampling of children of 
those over 50. We would therefore expect that the percentage identified as receiving a transfer would 
be higher in SHARE than in the EU SILC. Figure 4.7 plots the two estimates for each country with the 
red line identifying the point of agreement. 
 
Figure 4.7 – The percentage in receipt of a Transfer in SHARE & the EU-SILC 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010 & the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe, 2005-10 
Interestingly, the anticipated over estimation is only seen in Denmark and Sweden. In all other 
countries the estimates do not appear to be systematically different, although the estimates can hardly 
be said to be in full accord. Whilst there is an evident relationship between the two numbers, the 
correlation coefficient is low at just 0.31. It jumps dramatically to 0.835 if we exclude the two 
Scandinavian countries. Given what is known about sampling methods, it should be expected that all 
countries would lie below the red line and not scattered randomly around it. It would appear that there 
is in fact little to no evidence of a systematic difference between the estimates. Conceptual differences 
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in its definition of a transfer than the treatment of SHARE data used here as EU-SILC includes transfers 
from people other than parents. 
The analysis here only uses intergenerational transfers from SHARE whilst the EU SILC data refers to 
receipts of all forms. There are therefore two explanations as to why there may be a degree of 
agreement between the two estimates. Firstly it could be due to the fact that the sampling system used 
by SHARE over-estimates the percentage who receives a transfer but that this is then counteracted by 
the systematic bias in the opposite direction due to a more inclusive definition of transfers used by the 
EU SILC. At a substantive level this would be similar to asserting that there is a perfect substitution 
effect between transfers from the family and other forms of informal support (i.e. friends and other 
organisations). If you have no one who is capable of offering financial support (i.e. a parent) then 
people other than parents will generally replace this support. The second possible explanation is 
simpler and it suggests that intergenerational transfers and informal inter-household transfers are 
synonymous and that the vast majority of financial support comes from parents regardless of their age. 
This would mean that the two biases are not sizeable and hence the relative agreement between 
estimates. To further explore this it is possible to look at the estimates for the average size of a transfer. 
 
Figure 4.8 – Average Size of Transfer in the EU-SILC & SHARE 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010 & the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
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Here there is little evidence of a systematic bias in the difference between EU-SILC and SHARE 
estimates given the even distribution of observations around the equivalence line. The correlation 
coefficient for these figures is 0.67 which whilst not at a level where we can talk about an exact 
substitute, does suggest that there is no systematic difference in the way the values are estimated. In 
assessing the average size of a transfer this is even more surprising. If as discussed the bias in the 
percentage of individuals receiving a transfer was due to a two way systematic bias that cancelled each 
other out then it might be expected that the amounts observed in the EU SILC would be lower. This is 
because the logic of such a two way bias would be that there is a substitution such that individuals not in 
receipt of a transfer from parents were in part compensated by other sources of income. One would 
expect that such sources would be less generous than one’s own parents and therefore we might 
anticipate that the values from the EU SILC would be lower regarding average transfer size.  The 
evidence demonstrates that this is not the case. 
This leads to a tentative conclusion that whilst the measures are not perfect substitutes, to a degree 
they can be considered as related and systematically affected by conceptual or sampling differences. 
The tentative restraint should not be underestimated however as the coefficients and values associated 
with these relationships all indicate that there is a degree of discord evident, only that it is not 
systematic across countries or method. This tentativeness should be heightened by Figure 4.6 which 
showed the corresponding estimates for the % of GDP that the transfers represent. As we saw, there is 
a significant difference with SHARE data estimating higher levels than the EU SILC. Given the relative 
proximity of other values, this could be due to the sampling frame of each study and the weighting 
techniques, highlighting the need for inferential caution. 
This section has sought to establish the extent to which the EU-SILC and SHARE are comparable. This 
is difficult to verify but the discussion implies that whilst they are not entirely synonymous, there are 
clear links between the measurements. The proceeding sections will utilise both SHARE and the EU-
SILC to examine the extent to which such transfers can be seen to affect and be affected by macro, 
socio-economic processes. 
4.4. Methods 
It is with one eye on the existing literature and another on the analytical framework of this thesis that 
the analysis of the dependent variable of this study must be considered. The first part of this section 
examines the methods used to analyse the dependent variable and details the probit and tobit models 
used here. Section 4.4.2 then discusses how multilevel methods are used to explore the complex data 




4.4.1. Logits, Probits & Tobits 
In some studies the dependent variable has been simply noted as a dichotomous variable that merely 
indicates whether a transfer has taken place or not (McGarry & Schoeni, 1995; Sikora & Peters, 2011; 
Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2009).  The alternative or sometimes dual strategy is to consider the size of a 
transfer made (Albertini & Radl, 2012). The primary weight of analysis is on a dichotomous measure 
given the excessive methodological complexities that come with measuring a zero inflated variable such 
as transfer size. Such variables are distributed in ways that are difficult to model and require specific 
assumptions. The assumptions of such models restrain inferences and the external validity of any 
analysis given that it entails a two-step process of inference, one where the parent decides to make the 
transfer and then a second when they decide how much to give. 
The analysis will be conducted using a probability unit (probit) model with fixed country effects 
(Gelman & Hill, 2007). This model was selected because it is operationally simple and does not place 
stringent assumptions on the analysis. If we can assume that all observations are independent of each 
other, the analytical model, the interpretation and the inference are accessible and straight forward. 
The link function in a probit model itself can be defined as: 
Pr(𝑌 = 1 | 𝑋) =  𝛷(𝛼 +  𝑋𝛽 +  𝜀) 
This states that the probability of a transfer occurring (Y) is estimated using the normal distribution 
(𝛷) (Gelman & Hill, 2007). This serves to transform the estimates of the probability of Y occurring 
into a non-linear function so as to eliminate impossible estimates (i.e. Pr(Y=1) > 1, Pr(Y=1) < 0).  
Using this, the observed values of X are then used to estimate the Z scores for Pr(Y=1). The 
coefficients of X (β) for this estimation process are then determined by maximum likelihood 
estimation. This returns the values of β which were most likely to return the observed values of Y.  
Probit models are well established in the social sciences, as are logit models. A probit model is 
preferred here given that the results are grounded in estimated probabilities rather than in odds ratios. 
The two methods produce largely identical estimations except when the observed event is rare (Liao, 
1994). The choice between the two is therefore largely a matter of interpreting estimates and 
coefficients which is an issue of both preference and the question which the analysis seeks to answer. I 
contend that the probit’s grounding in an estimated probability of Y occurring ensures that estimates 
reflect the absolute effect size more acutely.  
The logit by contrast is traditionally expressed in odds ratios rather than log odds in results tables. This 
tends to encourage statements of relativity rather than absolute terms of probability. For example, a 
traditional interpretation of a logit model would state that Y is twice as likely to occur if X=1 than if 
X=0. Given that probit coefficients cannot be converted into substantive, meaningful figures in the 
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same way as logits, a probit estimate emphasises the fact that the effect of X on Y is not constant (given 
the link function) and refocuses attention on estimated probabilities of Y occurring. A traditional 
interpretation of probit estimates therefore expresses the marginal effect of X on Y at the means, a 
statement that is made in terms of the absolute probability of Y occurring. This results in an 
interpretation that states that if X=1 then p(Y = 1) = P and if X = 0 the p(Y = 1) = P. 
In chapter 8 tobits are used in conjunction with probit models. These models allow for the amount 
transferred to be estimated with results weighted by the initial decision to make a transfer. The 
decision to use them in chapter 8 was intended to increase the validity of the conclusions made there. 
However, the results in chapter 8 illustrate that the tobit models rarely provide additional insight into 
transfer giving and thus the results of further tobits were not included. The additional explanatory 
power provided by the tobit in no way appears to justify the additional complexity of the analysis, 
estimates and inferences that they entail.  
This is partly due to tobit estimates being OLS estimates that are weighted by the probability that the 
transfer is above a given amount. Therefore the estimate of the probability that a transfer is registered, 
which is the dependent variable in the probit models, is also built in to the estimates of the tobit. In 
substantive terms, it is difficult to identify an effect that increases the likelihood of a transfer but 
reduces the size of the subsequent transfer but even if one did exist it would be poorly estimated by any 
tobit analysis. On a conceptual level, including tobit estimates within the analysis adds little given that 
the conceptual and theoretical framework does not include the size of the transfer explicitly within its 
theory in a manner that is distinct from the dichotomous indicator.  
4.4.2. Multilevel Modelling 
The datasets detailed in section 4.1 involve complex structures. This implies that the observations are 
not independent of each other and therefore traditional analytical methods such as probit and ordinary 
least squares are insufficient. In order to address this multilevel methods are used. These methods 
allow the error term within analyses to be split in to components and estimated separately and thus 
reflect the interdependence of observations (Hox, 2010). Subsequently, the analysis produces estimates 
that are unbiased and more accurately identify effects at different levels. In this thesis, two types of 
multilevel models are used but they are very similar and the distinction lies in what the two levels 
represent. 
The SHARE dataset consists of parent child dyads. Amongst these some dyads belong to the same 
parent because that parent has more than one child. In a number of analyses these observations have 
been assumed to be independent of each other which is a very unrealistic assumption. The probability 
of an individual receiving financial assistance is highly correlated with whether their siblings also receive 
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financial assistance. To account for this we can ‘nest’ individual parent child dyads within a parental 
household. This helps more accurately identify why a transfer has taken place. If a transfer takes place 
because the parents are rich then we would expect to see high correlation between siblings. If transfers 
take place because a child is poor, then lower correlation levels would be expected. These methods 
therefore drastically improve the internal validity of the analytical design (Gelman & Hill, 2007).  
In the EU SILC by contrast, the observations are not independent because they represent the same 
household at different points in time. The assumption here is that the probability of receiving financial 
assistance in one year is associated with receiving financial assistance in any other year. That is to say 
that some people have an underlying tendency to receive financial transfers and others don’t. Therefore 
in order to ensure unbiased estimates of the coefficients, it is necessary to ‘nest’ household-year 
observations within households. 
To achieve this the probit model is extended: 
Pr(𝑌 = 1 | 𝑋) =  𝛷�𝛼 + 𝑋1𝛽1𝑖𝑗 + 𝑋2𝛽2𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗 +  𝜗𝑗� 
This model is almost identical to the one presented in 4.1 except for a few additional terms. Firstly 
there is a distinction between effects at level 1 (𝛽1𝑖𝑗) and level 2 (𝛽2𝑗). The distinction here is between 
effects that vary between observations and ones that do not. For example, in the SHARE analysis the 
characteristics of children such as their education level or employment status will vary between 
siblings. Parental characteristics on the other hand will not as they have the same parents. In the EU-
SILC the distinction is between characteristics that change and those that do not. This very much 
depends on conceptual understanding of what constitutes a household and the various 
operationalisation of concepts. Nevertheless an example of a time invariant variable in this analysis 
might be the educational level or cohort and a time variant factor might be employment status.  
The other distinction with section 4.1 is the inclusion of 𝜗𝑗.This is the level 2 specific error term and is 
distinct from the observation specific error term. It is this term that relaxes the assumption of 
independence between observations and leads the between and within effects to be estimated 
separately. The estimate for this error term can be used to control for the unobserved level 2 
characteristics that are uncorrelated with the coefficients estimated at level 1. That is to say if a 
household has an underlying unobserved tendency to receive transfers in the EU-SILC data, this error 
term can be used to capture it as long as the tendency is uncorrelated with level 1 estimates. 
An example of this might be a household that has certain cultural characteristics such as belonging to a 
particular religion. As an arbitrary choice let us say that they are Catholics and due to cultural traditions 
they are therefore more likely to receive financial assistance. As long as Catholics are just as likely to be 
employed as the rest of the population, just as likely to have a degree, just as likely to have children and 
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every other characteristic at the individual level, then the estimates for 𝜗 can be used to describe time 
invariant factors such as being a Catholic. If the populations do differ and the primary interest is in 
estimating such time invariant factors then the individual level factors can be mean centred for the 
household in order to generate a population that is referential to their own characteristics rather than 
each other’s (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012; Hox, 2010). However mean-centring does not prevent 
omitted variable bias with regards to the time invariant factors. Results must therefore consider the 
possibility that omitted variables at level 1 cause bias estimates of the random intercept which is 
designed to capture the time-invariant factor. 
With specific regard to the analysis using the EU-SILC in chapters 6 & 7, a final issue that needs to be 
considered is autocorrelation. The analyses in these two chapters clusters observations within 
individuals and this clustering is designed to reflect that observations of the same person are likely to be 
more similar to each other than the observations of other individuals. However, even for a specific 
individual, the observations of transfer behaviour over a four year period cannot be said to be 
independent of each other. That is to say, whether you receive a financial transfer this year has a lot to 
do with whether you received one last year.  
This interdependency is not taken into account in the model given that it is unclear in which direction 
the autocorrelation would work. For example it could be argued that receiving a transfer last year 
increases the likelihood of receiving a transfer this year given that the transfer could be due to 
circumstances that continue between the two time periods such as an increase in the income of the 
parents. In contrast, it could be argued that receiving a transfer last year makes receiving a transfer this 
year less likely. This could be due to parents financial resources being exhausted by the transfer made 
last year. The issue of autocorrelation should not be overstated however. Autocorrelation does not bias 
estimates of the coefficients but it does cause underestimates of the standard errors (Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal, 2012). This makes Type I errors more likely and so robust standard errors are used where 
appropriate.  
4.4.3. Comparative Analysis of Transfers 
In addition to the complexities involved with observations that are interdependent within households 
and families, there is also a suggestion that observations are not independent within countries (Albertini 
& Kohli, 2012). As detailed in chapter 3, this is one of the core assumptions that this analysis is looking 
to address. Such narratives assert that transfer behaviour is best described by nesting households and 
families within their countries given that countries exhibit dynamics and mechanisms that make 
observations interdependent. This has often been depicted in the form of regimes and typologies that 
assert fundamental differences in the theoretical models across borders (Esping Andersen, 1990). If 
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such an approach is argued for then the model used to test it should be a random coefficient model 
(Gelman & Hill, 2007). This would enable the identification of country or regime specific dynamics 
and illustrate that variance in transfer behaviour is only interpretable at the country level. 
These models are not considered here. The assertion of this theoretical model is that such narratives are 
inaccurate and that country level differences in behaviour can be attributed to differences in the 
composition of population. This is to say that such narratives are secondary to the altruistic theory put 
forward in chapter 3. To test the hypothesis that such country affects do not exist is easier analytically 
than to assert that they do. In order to demonstrate that the inclusion of a third, country level is 
unnecessary, fixed country effects can be included. This approach allows for the estimation of whether 
the probability of receiving a transfer is different in one country from another after individual level 
characteristics have been accounted for. If they do not show significant differences in the transfer 
behaviour between countries then it would strongly suggest that country level narratives are 
unnecessarily complex. If they show significant differences then it would indicate that the country of 
residence of the respondent contributes to our understanding of transfer behaviour. 
The comparative strategy of this thesis is therefore to include such fixed effects and observe them 
within each chapter and note the extent to which they can be used to predict transfer behaviour. If they 
are poor predictors then it would suggest that country or regime specific narratives of transfer 
behaviour are unnecessary. Having stated this, a caveat must be added. To observe insignificant results 
at the statistical country level is not to infer the irrelevance of macro structures in theories of 
intergenerational transfers. For example, if the country level effects are shown to be insignificant, it is 
not to be assumed that policy, cultural or macro-economic factors play no part in transfer behaviour. 
Policies greatly affect the material conditions of millions of individuals and their impact varies greatly 
across Europe. In the analytical strategy here it is essential therefore to remember that macro processes 
are predominantly understood through a micro interpretation. This is how this thesis aims to examine 




5. Intergenerational Transfers & the Parental Perspective 
5.1. Introduction 
Having established an analytical framework with which to answer the questions posed by this thesis, we 
now turn to the main analysis. This chapter addresses two of the research questions posed in Chapter 3: 
To what extent does policy directed at parents affect transfer behaviour in European families? 
To what extent does the altruistic model explain differences in transfer behaviour across Europe? 
Firstly it aims to assess the extent to which policy affects transfer behaviour via the parent’s 
opportunity structure.  That is to say the extent to which policy determines a parent’s circumstances 
and thus their propensity to provide financial assistance to their adult children. It has been established 
that households with higher levels of income are more likely to give financial assistance to others 
(Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2009; Kohli, 1999; Kohli & Kunemund, 2003; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995). It 
has also been established that higher social benefit receipts induce transfers in a process labelled 
‘crowding in’ (Künemund & Rein, 1999; Daatland & Lowenstein, 2005). This chapter supports these 
findings. 
Secondly, it will also identify the extent to which such differences in parental circumstances are 
accountable for observed differences in countries’ aggregated transfer behaviours as identified in 
chapters 2 & 3. The chapter therefore concludes by evaluating the extent to which policy affects 
transfer behaviour via the parent and the extent to which policy explains variations in transfer 
behaviour. This analysis will then provide the basis for similar analysis in chapters 7 & 8 which will 
consider the same questions in relation to family structure and the transfer recipient’s needs. 
How does policy affect transfer behaviour?  
Altruistic theory argues that policy differences will be reflected in transfer behaviour. According to this 
theory, policies that improve the well-being of the parent will increase their propensity to provide 
financial assistance (Cox, 1987). In instances where pensions and other social payments are made to 
older individuals, they give some of this on to family members with greater needs. Künemund labelled 
this process ‘pension overshooting’ (Künemund & Rein, 1999). Older persons receive pensions that are in 
excess of their material needs or even desires and so they redistribute the income within their extended 
family.  In this scenario, the financial well-being afforded to older generations induces downward 
financial transfers to generations that have less access to finance. It should be noted that the term 




Social provisions for older persons vary considerably within and between countries in Europe 
(Ebbinghaus, 2012). In this chapter this variation will be exploited in order to establish whether those 
who get more, give more. Do those who receive generous social benefits transfer more than those who 
do not?  The implications of this are that those seen as in need of financial assistance differ between 
familial and public forms of welfare. That is to say that the state provides pensions in order to ensure 
the welfare of older citizens, yet the family identifies younger family members as those in need of 
assistance.  
Is transfer behaviour different across Europe? 
The analytical framework discussed in Chapter 3 also argued that altruistic theory is only an adequate 
framework for understanding transfers if it can explain cross country differences in behaviour. In this 
chapter, differences in parental circumstances are considered. As noted above, these vary widely both 
within and across the countries of Europe. This could mean that observed differences in transfer 
behaviour are due to compositional effects (Hox, 2010). An example of this would be the anticipation 
that a richer population would transfer more than a poor one. These differences are consistent with 
altruistic theory in that such cross national differences are understandable through individual 
characteristics alone. Once such individual differences are incorporated within estimates of transfer 
behaviour, remaining differences in transfer behaviour at the country level can be ascertained. The 
analysis demonstrates that the differences are greatly reduced with only a few outliers. 
The chapter proceeds by first outlining the specific hypotheses, how they will be tested and the data 
that will be used to do so. Particular attention is paid to the operationalization of key concepts and 
unique features of SHARE. The analysis is then presented and discussed in section 5.3. This analysis 
will focus on answering the two specific hypotheses: do higher social benefits, in the form of public 
pension receipts increase the propensity to transfer and does this explain cross-country differences in 
transfer behaviour. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter by discussing limitations of the model and its 
contribution to the broader thesis. 
5.2. Methods and Models 
This section outlines the research questions of this chapter and how they will be answered. 5.2.1 details 
the two questions that this chapter addresses: whether households with higher public pension receipts 
are more likely to transfer money to their child and whether, once individual characteristics are 
considered, country level differences in behaviour disappear. Section 5.2.2 then details how transfers 
are operationalized and gives an overview of cross-national variations in transfer behaviour. Section 
5.3.1 then illustrates how the main independent variable of public pension receipts is measured before 
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section 5.3.2 does the same for the remaining variables in the model. 5.3.3 then concludes the section 
by outlining the analytical strategy of this chapter. 
5.2.1. The Research Question 
Altruistic theory suggests that any policy that increases the material circumstances of the parent will 
increase that parent’s propensity to provide financial assistance. In order to maximise utility, the parent 
will give part of any increase in income on to their children given that their own utility is in part 
dependent on that of the child. This chapter examines this theory by exploring whether parents with 
higher public pensions are more likely to give money to their children than those with lower public 
pensions.  
This is the first piece of analysis in this thesis because it is the area that has received the largest amount 
of attention from the literature thus far and therefore represents a good point of departure before areas 
that re less prominent in the existing literature are covered in chapters 6, 7 & 8. There are a large 
number of studies that have considered the effect of parental circumstances on the propensity to 
transfer (Kohli, 1999; Villanueva, 2005; Albertini, Kohli, & Vogel, 2007; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 
2009; Albertini & Radl, 2012). There are also studies which considered the specific effects of receiving 
social transfer receipts and demonstrated a positive correlation with transfer giving (Künemund & 
Rein, 1999; Daatland & Lowenstein, 2005). This attention has been due to the rhetorical mirroring it 
allows regarding the strain an older population places on public finances. Large upward public transfers 
have been sometimes regarded as unjust (Magnus, 2008). Even so, if private, downward, financial 
transfers are stimulated by public, upward, financial transfers it could be argued that it is a cyclical 
effect. 
It is within this literature that country level variation has also been identified and discussed (Albertini & 
Kohli, 2012; Villanueva, 2005; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2009). The assertion within such studies is that 
differences in transfer behaviour between countries are still evident once the parental circumstances 
have been considered. The common inference is therefore that such remaining differences are due to 
the varying social policy arrangements between countries. An example of this can be found in the work 
of Albertini, Kohli and Vogel (2007, p. 332) where they argue that a policy effect is the country 
dummy after controlling for individual level characteristics. 
Yet such inferences do not acknowledge that the relevant characteristics of the parent are part of the 
effect of policy on transfers. That is to say those parental circumstances are in part due to the welfare 
regime in which they find themselves. For example, in their statistical analysis they include household 
income as part of the characteristics of the parent, yet this is in part determined by the welfare state 
that the parent finds themselves in. In latter work, the same authors assert that part of the ‘welfare 
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regime effect’ is due to the indirect effect on the parental circumstances such that the fixed effects for 
Scandinavian countries may represent the higher pensions received in those countries (2012, p. 10). 
The observed country level differences cannot be attributable to this indirect effect of ‘old-age security’ 
on transfer behaviour given that it is accounted for within their statistical model. Such an effect may 
indeed be attributable to the good provisions for younger adults but cannot be considered as indicative 
of crowding in through the sizeable pensions identified by Künemund & Rein (1999). This is because, 
statistically any correlation would be captured through the indirect effect that pension receipts have on 
the household income of the parental household. Here part of the macro concept of the welfare state 
has been subsumed by the micro-analysis in use. This is a common feature and benefit of multilevel 
modelling (Gelman & Hill, 2007). 
The country level fixed effects in the models of Albertini, Kohli & Vogel (2007) therefore only 
represent the amount of variance between countries that is not attributable to individual level 
characteristics. In order to assert the differential effects of pensions on transfer behaviour, it would be 
necessary to construct a random coefficient model7. Nevertheless, what remains in country level 
variation in their model does reflect the extent to which observed differences in transfer behaviour 
across countries can be attributed to variation in the circumstances of parents at the individual level. If 
country level variation decreases after controlling for individual level variation, then altruistic theory 
can be said to describe transfer behaviour in Europe. If it does not decrease then it is likely that country 
level theories such as welfare regime typologies will more accurately describe behaviour. Sections 
5.2.2, 5.3.1 & 5.3.2 now consider how to measure these concepts before section 5.3.3 provides an 
analytical framework. 
5.2.2. Transfer Behaviour from the Parental Perspective 
Within this analysis, the dependent variable is simple but the sample it represents is complex. The 
dependent variable is dichotomous and reflects whether a financial transfer of €250 or more was made 
from the parental household to an adult child in the last two years. In chapter 4 the various sampling 
methods were discussed in detail with regards to dyadic relationships. Given that the analysis here aims 
to explore the behaviour from a parental perspective, the parental household will remain as the core 
sampling unit from which inferences are to be derived. Within each household there can be a number 
of dyads (parent-child relationships) and from these one is selected at random. That is to say, in cases 
                                                          
7 A random coefficient model is one in which the effect of an independent variable upon a dependent variable is allowed to vary 
across given units. So for example, it could be said that the effect of extra time a student spends studying on their grades differs 
depending on which school they go to. A random coefficient model allows analysts to capture such variation. 
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where the parental household has more than one child, one child is selected at random and included in 
the sample. 
The dependent variable therefore reflects the behaviour of a random sample of parental households 
towards a randomly selected child. As chapter 4 stressed, this has inferential implications which are 
reiterated in chapter 8 where methods are used to include all children. What is of central importance is 
that this does not represent a generalizable sample of children or parent child relationships. As an 
example, only children are over sampled and so inferences are biased. In contrast households with only 
one child are not over sampled. This is a subtle but necessary distinction between a sample of 
individuals and a sample of households. The dependent variable itself is therefore a dichotomous 
indicator of whether a financial transfer of more than €250 was made to the randomly selected child in 
the last two years. 
5.3. Transfer Behaviour on the Parent-Child Dyad 
The tables and figures on the proceeding pages illustrate descriptive statistics of transfer behaviour 
across the sample. The results suggest that, amongst parents over 50 in the countries sampled, 16.16% 
made a transfer to a specific child each year. There is considerable variation in this figure across Europe 
as illustrated by Figure 5.1. In Sweden the figure is as high as 25% and it is as low as 5% in Spain. Most 
countries have a transfer rate of between 10-20%. The statistics are largely in line with that of the 
literature with some divergence attributable to the more appropriate sampling used here (Schenk, 
Dykstra, & Maas, 2010; Albertini & Kohli, 2012).  
One of the aims of this chapter is to establish the extent to which altruistic theory explains country 
level variation in transfer behaviour. To this end, these figures represent a starting point to which we 
will eventually refer back. In section 5.5 it is noted whether the country of residence itself is a good 
predictor of transfer behaviour. If it is no longer seen to be so then it will be concluded that the 
differences evident here are attributable to individual level characteristics of the parent. Therefore, the 
altruistic model would be considered successful in explaining country level variation in transfer 
behaviour. If differences across countries remain, macro level narratives such as typological, regime-




Figure 5.1 - Parental Transfer Behaviour for a given child 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, Wave 2. Note: Estimates of the proportion and 95% confidence 
intervals. The sample population is one from all parents over the age of 50 in the sample country. Details of the sampling 
method can be found in Chapter 4. 
5.3.1. Public Pensions & Intergenerational Transfers 
This section considers why this analysis focuses on Public Pension Receipts rather than other forms of 
policy. Public pension liabilities are considerable and are by far the largest policy relating to the 
material circumstances of older persons, followed by care services (Eurostat, 2013). Given the 
tendency of the latter to be distant from the cash nexus in which transfer behaviour operates, public 
pension receipts are used as the primary explanatory variable in identifying policy effects on material 
circumstances. It’s unlikely that in kind services will directly affect the tendency of individuals to 
provide financial support given that they do not directly affect the financial circumstances of the 
household. An increase in care services may however affect the time a child cares for their parent 
(Brandt, Haberkern, & Szydlik, 2009; Costa-Font, 2010). 
In addition to these substantive reasons, existing research has attempted to establish the proportion of 
public pensions that is subsequently transferred back to the working age population (Kohli, 1999). This 





































































































between public, upward, financial transfers as a determinant of downward, private, financial transfers. 
In the context of intergenerational justice, this relationship between public and private financial 
transactions therefore appears to be wholly pertinent. 
This approach is problematic. Firstly, only a single policy area is considered. To consider public 
pension receipts as capturing the full impact and diversity of European Welfare States would be 
misleading. This chapter will only assess the impact of this single policy, all be it the most significant 
and relevant regarding the issue of societal ageing given the amount of expenditure relative to other 
policy areas. This means that the analysis forgoes the ability to make inferences regarding welfare states 
in their broadest sense by focusing on a specific, all be it, prominent policy area. 
Furthermore, the definition of what constitutes a public pension in itself is problematic. For example, 
there are pensions which are mandated by the state yet reflect a personal risk and personal pension 
accounts that are supplemented by state subsidies. Given the use of secondary data in this study it is 
largely a decision that is predetermined. However it is difficult to assert with any confidence that the 
measure provided here is an unquestionable understanding of what constitutes a public pension. The 
definition used by SHARE is a pension which: 
“.. provide financial support to those out of the labour market because of reaching the statutory retirement age. 
This category gathers the first‐pillar of public pension payments, e.g. general compulsory social insurance 
scheme which may be either flat‐rate or earnings related (or a combination of both). In some countries, means‐
tested top‐ups or minimum payments for those with null or incomplete work and contribution histories might 
also be included.” (SHARE, 2011) 
This is a comparative definition of a first-pillar public pension which allows this analysis to conclude 
whether variations in transfer behaviour at the country level are due to variations in this form of public 
pension. Using a comparative definition such as this also enables the role of policy to be understood 
within the wider context of variations in material circumstances between countries. That is to say that 
the amount of variation attributable to differences in public pensions can be compared to the amount 
attributable to differences in material circumstances. Do more Swedish parents give financial assistance 
to their children than Spanish parents because they are richer or specifically because of differences in 
the public pension provision? The analysis will therefore be able to illustrate how important policy 




Figure 5.2 - Proportion in Receipt of a Public Pension 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, Wave 2, 2006. Notes: The sampling population is all parental 
households over the age of 50 in the sample country 
Yet this definition does not reflect the extent to which the pension is a defined contribution or defined 
benefit scheme. This would more accurately reflect the extent to which the pension is derived from a 
‘pay as you go’ or funded scheme. This would in turn allow for a more accurate depiction of the 
intergenerational nature of the debate. If it was possible to identify defined benefit schemes then it 
would be possible to identify any effect as part of a cycle of public upward and private downward 
transfers. The inability to distinguish should therefore limit inferences in this regard. Individuals with 
higher benefits may not be receiving a pension subsidised by the working age population as it may be a 
defined contribution, personal account. To assert that these individuals are recycling upward public 
transfers would therefore be misleading. Furthermore, the measure doesn’t take account of the large 
public subsidies offered via tax exemptions to private pension schemes. This vehicle is used to varying 
degrees across Europe and this is not reflected in this specific measure.  Any conclusion in this regard 

















































































































Figure 5.3 - Public Pension Income amongst Pensioners by Country 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, Wave 2, 2006. Notes: Central line is the median, box edges are 
quartiles and whiskers represent 95% values. Outer values are excluded. The sample population is all parents over the age of 50 
in the sample country. Pensions are estimated using the variable PEN1V for all individuals who are retired. 
5.3.2. Additional aspects of Parental Decisions to Transfer 
In addition to public pension receipts, there are many other characteristics of a parental household that 
determine their decision to make a transfer. This section will briefly discuss how these are 
operationalized and the theoretical reasoning behind their inclusion within the analysis. 
Income across Countries 
Altruistic theory and the existing literature on transfers both suggest that the primary determinant of 
transfer behaviour from the parental perspective is income (Cox, Motives for Private Income 
Transfers, 1987; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995; Villanueva, 2005; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2009). 
Altruism suggests that a parent will make a financial transfer if the financial circumstances of the parent 
and child are not already distributed to maximise the utility of the parent. Whilst this model can be 
applied to ‘time’, we are referring to financial transfers in this thesis and thus a financial transfer is most 
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likely to be induced by a financial imbalance. Thus parental income becomes the key indicator of a 
parent’s propensity to transfer with higher parental income, associated with higher transfers. 
 
Figure 5.4 - Household Income per Annum by Country 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, Wave 2, 2006. Notes: Central line is the median, box edges are 
quartiles and whiskers represent 95% values. Outer values are excluded. The sample population is all parents over the age of 50 
in the sample country. 
In addition to income there are other financial indicators which could be used such as wealth (wealth 
will be discussed in more detail in section 5.3.2 of this chapter). Nevertheless income is the established 
indicator in spite of the great differential in parental and child wealth. The reason for this is largely 
practical and habitual. There is little in the theory of altruism that suggests income rather than wealth 
should be used, even if lifecycle approaches focus on income rather than wealth. Yet income is the 
established indicator of parental resources used and has been shown to be a strong predictor of transfers 
(Cox, 1987; Berry, 2008; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995). As the analysis shows, this should be challenged 
more readily.  
Figure 5.4 depicts the distribution of household income for the sample within SHARE.  From a 
comparative perspective, income is a key concern given that it varies greatly across countries within the 
European Union. Altruistic theory suggests that differences in country level transfer rates are largely 
due to such differences.  
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Given this, income’s inclusion in the analysis is important for three reasons. Firstly, the analysis is 
looking to understand the impact of public pension receipts on transfer behaviour. To do this it is 
necessary to control for income given that it is through increasing a household’s income that public 
pension receipts affect transfer behaviour. Secondly, given that income varies so much across and 
within countries, accounting for this within the analysis will help assess the degree to which altruistic 
theory can explain country level variance. Thirdly, in terms of its direct effect on transfer behaviour 
and the extent to which it explains country level variation, income offers a way of contextualising the 
effect of public pensions. In short, what matters more, public pensions or other sources of income? 
Wealth 
Wealth could be considered as a more accurate depiction of the imbalance in resources between 
generations. Younger generations have had less time to accumulate wealth and the financial restraints 
younger generations face may be capital issues rather than revenue. That is to say, children may be 
more likely to receive money from their parents to buy a house, a car or invest in education rather than 
to buy groceries or cover bills (Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2009). This distinction is more thoroughly 
explored in chapter 6.  
Whilst it is apparent that altruism would suggest that wealth has a positive effect on transfer behaviour, 
its relative importance within an individual’s decision is not that well understood. Therefore wealth’s 
inclusion within this model is designed to contextualise the effect of income. In addition, wealth will 
inevitably be correlated with public pension entitlements given that both commonly reflect the 
respondent’s career.  
To measure wealth this analysis will be taking the financial and real assets of the household at the time 
of the interview into account. Financial assets include the interest income from bank accounts, interest 
income from bonds, dividends from stocks and shares, interest and dividend income from mutual 
funds, individual retirement accounts, contractual savings for housing and whole life insurance 
(SHARE, 2011). Real assets include the value of the main residence, the value of other real estate, the 
value of shares in businesses, the value of cars and less the mortgage on the main residence. Figure 5.5 
illustrates the different wealth distributions within European countries. As with income, the variance in 




Figure 5.5 - Household Wealth by Country: Financial and Real Assets  
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, Wave 2, 2006. Notes: Central line is the median, box edges are 
quartiles and whiskers represent 95% values. Outer values are excluded. The sample population is all parents over the age of 50 
in the sample country. 
  


















Employment Status  
Employment status is a very important consideration within the analysis given the high degree of 
correlation with public pension receipts which serve as the independent variable of interest. 
Employment status at older ages is heavily influenced by the state retirement age and this in itself varies 
considerably across Europe.  Life cycle models of transfers suggest that when the individual moves 
from work to retirement they, broadly speaking, move from being a net provider to a net recipient of 
support (Cyrus Chu & Lee, 2006). This effect is independent of actual levels of income and reflects a 
stage in the life cycle in which the individual is no longer the primary source of financial support within 
an extended family network. Altruistic theory does not distinguish between the sources of income or 
wealth in their impact on transfer behaviour. Retirement income is the same as that earned on the 
labour market. To assess the degree to which this is true, the employment status of the financial 
respondent will be included within the model.  If employment status is seen to affect transfer behaviour 
independent of income and other parental resources, it will undermine the altruistic position. 
 
Figure 5.6 - Employment Status of Financial Respondent  
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, Wave 2, 2006. Financial Respondents are selected by the interviewer 
to respond on behalf of the household to financial questions if the residents indicate that they share their finances. In such cases 
only those answering financial questions are included. In households where finances are separate between respondents, each 
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To capture employment status, the employment status of the financial respondent was recorded on the 
date of the interview and this was subsequently coded as: employed, not employed or retired. This 
simplified classification focuses on the self-perception of the respondent and the particular distinction 
between retirement and continued participation in the labour market. Given that this comparison is the 
substantive and theoretical interest, retired is considered the reference category. Figure 5.6 shows the 
extent to which labour market status varies across respondent households. 
Financial Transfer Receipts & Inheritance 
In addition to employment status, another potential blind spot of altruistic theory is the position of the 
parent within a wider network of altruistic individuals. That is to say the family or other individuals 
who care about both the parent and child. For example in altruistic theory a parent will transfer money 
to their child if doing so would increase the parents overall utility. This would not be the case if there 
was another individual within the network who either cared for their child more than the parent’s or 
that was relatively better off than the parents (Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). That is to say that 
the propensity of an individual to transfer under a more complete consideration of altruistic theory 
would suggest that it is highly dependent on the parent’s positioning within a wider network. This will 
elaborated upon considerably in Chapter 8. 
Ideally, longitudinal or network analysis would allow for this to be captured but data restrictions limit 
this. Here, in order to account for this affect, the parents own private transfer receipts are considered. 
The sum of the transfer receipts for the respondent or respondent couple are therefore used to indicate 
the extent to which the parent is the primary source of financial assistance within the network. To 
clarify, the variable measures whether the parent has received any financial transfers from individuals 
other than the specific child and the dichotomous indicator is then included in the model. Incorporating 
this within the model avoids potential spurious effects. This is because the resources and depth of a 
financial support network would presumably be highly correlated with income and thus a potential 
reduction on the actual effect of transfers.  
A similar logic applies to the inclusion of inheritance receipts within the model. Individuals from 
wealthier, high income backgrounds are more likely to receive inheritance which is itself a potential 
stimulant of further downward financial transfers. As with transfer receipts, the inclusion of this within 
the model is intended to reflect the extent to which the parental household is part of a wider support 
network. If such effects are found to be significant and prominent, altruistic theory would not in itself 
be contradicted but its parsimonious nature may well be brought into doubt. The need to consider it 
here is due to the potential spurious effects that inheritance may render. To capture the inheritance 
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effect, the household was asked whether they received inheritance in the 12 months prior to the 
interview and this was included as a dichotomous indicator. 
Age 
As with employment status, there are life cycle effects which are not reflected directly within altruistic 
theory but have been referenced within other transfer literature (Cyrus Chu & Lee, 2006). These 
theories emphasise the extent to which the model of altruism shifts over the life course.  They are not 
necessarily directly contradictory to the theory of altruism but do emphasise different aspects of 
transfer dynamics. In addition, to understand country level variance, age may well be a key factor given 
the differing population structures within countries. This reflects not only differences in life expectancy 
across Europe but also historical demographic legacies such as the distinct nature of the post war baby 
boom in European countries (Neyer, Andersson, Kulu, Bernardi, & Bühler, 2013). What’s more, age 
is inevitably highly correlated with the key independent variable of public pension receipts and is 
therefore important to consider in the context of this chapter. In instances where the financial 
respondent was responding on behalf of a couple, age was recorded as the average age of the couple.  
Education 
Recent research on transfers using this dataset has suggested that the income differential is attributable 
to socio-economic status over and above the effect of income (Albertini & Radl, 2012). This argument 
is notoriously difficult to disentangle, especially considering that income and wealth are more closely 
associated with socio-economic status later in the life course. The need to consider this here derives 
from the high correlation between educational level and public pension receipts, particularly where 
receipts are largely dependent on the nature of an individual’s career. Individuals with high levels of 
education will have been in higher paying jobs for longer and will likely receive more in the way of a 
public pension.  If education, or more precisely socio-economic status, does drive transfer behaviour 
then this may affect the estimates. Education level was taken as the average number of years in 
education for the household. This measure is not ideal and International Standard Classification of 
Education codes are generally preferred given that they reflect the actual level of achievement rather 
than the time spent in educations. However this is not available for the respondents in SHARE (given 




Single or Couple 
A key methodological issue centres on the distinction between couples and single households. There 
are obvious differences in a single person’s household’s utility curve and that of a couple. Consumption 
requirements and patterns are very different and these are often addressed through the simple 
exclusion of single households. This is not an unreasonable strategy. Here the decision was made to 
include both couples and single households in order to maintain a representative sample of older 
person’s households. This is particularly important given that the proportion of households with single 
respondents varies considerably across Europe. Here the focus is on the Eastern European nations 
within the sample which show very high levels of single occupancy due to a number of factors. The 
primary one being the higher differential in female-male life expectancy in this region which makes 
widowhood a more common and longer lasting period in the life course (Hoff, 2011). 
Characteristics of the Adult Child 
In addition to these factors, the analysis also includes a number of child characteristics. These 
characteristics are highly correlated with those of the parent. The public pension receipts of an 
individual may be correlated with the employment status of the child if existing research is correct in 
understanding the relationship between parental and child employment patterns (Brandt & Hank, 
2011). This inheritance is complex and more thoroughly dealt with from both a theoretical and 
practical perspective in Chapter 8. The processes used there are identical to those used here. These 
variables include age, birth order, number of children, employment status, marital status & education. 
5.3.3. Methods to be used 
Hypotheses 
The main aims of this chapter were to establish whether policy affected transfer behaviour via the 
parent circumstances, what is referred to as the parental opportunity structure in chapter 3, and 
whether altruistic theory would account for country level differences in parental transfer behaviour. 
Section 5.3.1 outlined how policy and the parental opportunity structure were operationalized and so 
it is now possible to outline the specific hypotheses that this chapter tests.  
1.  Households with higher public pension receipts are more likely to transfer money to their child 
2. Once individual characteristics are considered, country level differences in behaviour will be zero 
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In testing these hypotheses, this analysis establishes whether policy affects transfer behaviour via the 
parental opportunity structure as outlined in chapter 3. Yet this hypothesis is worded in a cross-
sectional form given that longitudinal analysis was not possible. This is due to the nature of SHARE. 
This, among other things, limits the extent to which the coefficient identified for public pensions can 
be considered causal in that there is considerable unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. The 
cross-sectional design of this analysis therefore means that inferences are purely associational. Chapter 
7 discusses and explores more conclusive methods using the European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions.  
The second hypotheses can be more vigorously tested given that both theoretically and empirically it is 
cross-sectional in nature. If the difference in transfer behaviour is not statistically significant after 
individual level circumstances are considered, this would imply that altruistic theory can account for 
country level variance. If altruistic theory is able to explain such variance then it will address one of the 
main puzzles in intergenerational transfer research. If the second hypothesis is not confirmed and the 
country level variation persists then it can be concluded that individual level variation does not fully 
account for differences in transfer behaviour at the parental level and thus supports macro-social 
narratives of transfer behaviour (Albertini & Kohli, 2012). 
 The Analytic Strategy 
To establish whether the hypotheses are correct the following analytic strategy was adopted. Firstly a 
model of transfer behaviour was constructed on a step wise basis at the individual level using the data 
detailed in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012). This provided a model of 
transfer behaviour at the individual level (Model 1). Then the key independent variable was introduced 
and model fit measures were used to determine whether public pension receipts improve estimates of 
the probability of a transfer occurring (Model 2). This includes an assessment of the estimated effect 
direction, significance and marginal effects. Model fit characteristics are also considered at this stage 
but they are not considered as vital to the evaluation of the hypothesis given that it is the effect itself 
which is of primary interest. 
After the first hypothesis has been tested, country level fixed effects (dummy variables for each 
country) are included (Model 3). The coefficients are then examined and marginal effects for each 
country obtained and compared to those observed in 2.1. Model fit statistics are also considered given 
that the assertion is that, given individual characteristics, country level information will not significantly 




5.4. Results  
This section outlines the analysis conducted and summarises findings. It describes the processes by 
which the models where constructed and the extent to which it tests the hypotheses outlined in section 
5.3.3. Methodological limitations are discussed in order to inform and support the substantive and 
theoretical conclusions of this chapter. To achieve this, the initial model is analysed and its construction 
discussed in section 5.4.1. This provides the basis by which the analysis progresses. Section 5.4.2 
addresses the first of hypotheses in section 5.3.3 and the primary concern of this chapter and indeed 
thesis. By introducing public pension receipts to the analysis, the model is used to establish whether 
public transfers induce downward transfers.  
Section 5.4.3 then assess the impact of this model on country level variance and the extent to which 
country level variance is accounted for by the individual level characteristics under consideration. This 
is supplemented by an evaluation of the transfer regime approach that has been adopted elsewhere in 
the literature. The section concludes with a brief summary of the empirical findings and 
methodological limitations encountered. 
5.4.1. The Altruistic Model of Transfer Behaviour 
Table 5.1 (p.103), Table 5.2 (p.107) and Table 5.3 (p.111) illustrate the results for the four models 
presented in this analysis. The results in the three tables refer to the same models. They are separated 
in order to present what are large and complex models in a simple and accessible way. Table 5.1 
presents the estimates for coefficients of Parental Variables (Income, Wealth, Employment Status, 
Transfer Receipt, Inheritance Receipt, Age, Education, Couple or Single). Table 5.2 presents the 
estimates for coefficients of child variables (Cohabiting, Age, Gender, Proximity, Marital Status, 
Employment Status, Education, Contact, number of Children). Table 5.3 presents the coefficient 
estimates for country and regime fixed effects as well as model fit statistics.  
The models are constructed as outlined in section 5.3.3. Model 1 was constructed in a stepwise fashion 
using the variables from sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 as well as the child level variables which are outlined 
in more detail in chapter 7. This section will concentrate on these results from model one and in 
particular, the results in Table 5.1 which refer to the parental characteristics, the subject of this 
chapter. As altruistic considerations suggest, income is significant and a considerable effect size. The 
same is also true of wealth. Whilst any comparison of these two measures is beyond the scope of this 
chapter and thesis, the results here do suggest that a theoretical distinction between the two should be 
advanced given that the income and wealth considerations act in very distinct ways. Thus far, income 
has served as the core of most analysis even in the analysis of status reproduction (Albertini & Radl, 
101 
 
2012). This tendency is questionable and the extrapolation of the distinct effects would serve the 
theory of transfers considerably. Nevertheless, this is a side issue in the context of the research 
presented here particularly given that it does not serve as an evaluation of altruistic theory itself. 
As outlined in section 5.3.2, two variables within this model do serve to test the legitimacy of altruistic 
theory: age and employment status. As the results in Table 5.1 show, there is no statistically significant 
difference in the transfer behaviour of a household where the financial respondent is retired and one 
where they are still in employment. There is a difference between those who are retired and those out 
of work but this does not reflect the life course change of moving from employment to retirement. The 
age of the parents also shows no significant effect which is telling given the compelling life course 
analysis of transfers discussed in Chapter 2. Nevertheless it would appear that such life course effects 
can be subsumed within altruistic theory rather than supplant it. That is to say that as we grow older 
our income is less relative to our children and it is this that reduces behaviour rather than life stage 
processes. 
There are three additional factors which are included as counter points to altruistic theory: transfers 
received by the household (as opposed to whether they give transfers, which is the dependent variable), 
inheritance and education. Inheritance and transfer receipts show an effect in the hypothesised 
direction in Table 5.1 and suggest that the relative position of an individual within a support network is 
important. That is to say, independent of the individual’s own financial position (represented by 
income and wealth) the behaviour of third parties within a family network is a key determinant of 
transfer behaviour. This is indicated more by the effect size rather than the significance levels. These 
effects of family form and structure are considered in greater detail in chapter 8 where they will be 
shown to considerably alter our understanding of altruistic theory. 
The coefficient for education supports assertions that transfer differentials extend beyond financial 
indicators and supports previous research (Albertini & Radl, 2012). Yet there is little room to fully 
explore these within this thesis and they are possibly not given the attention that they deserve. A 
variety of other indicators could have been used to explore the cultural and sociological drivers of 
transfer behaviour and the failure to do this limits the extent to which this thesis is able to 
comprehensively assess the explanatory power of altruistic theory relative to other theories of transfer 
behaviour. The reason for this is that the aim of this chapter is to ascertain whether altruistic theory can 
accommodate policy within its framework. As with the consideration of wealth however, a comparison 
of sociological and economic theories of transfer behaviour would assist an evaluation of altruistic 
theory. 
The models F statistic indicated that the model was significantly better than a constant only model and 
so satisfies the minimum requirements of an analytical model in that it is preferable to the observation 
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of mean transfer proportions detailed in section 5.2.1. The pseudo R squared in Table 5.2 is 0.116, a 
credible value for such a model (Liao, 1994). This model is very similar to the analysis provided 
elsewhere and mirrors many of the existing findings of the literature.  
The conclusions from this model suggest that altruistic theory does explain transfer behaviour in 
Europe to a degree. The limited effect of age and employment status implies that life course 
considerations such as those discussed in section 5.3.2 add little to the parental perspective. Indicators 
of a wider financial support network indicate that altruistic theory does need to consider the wider 
context of a parent child dyad within a family network. Education significantly improved the model 
though the effect size is not dramatic. This implies that sociological explanations maybe valid but do not 
confound the altruistic model. This model echoes existing research and demonstrates the established 
validity of the altruistic model. The rest of this section is dedicated to addressing the hypothesis 




Table 5.1 - Probit Estimates: Parental Variables 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Parents Household Public Pension Income 
(Log, Euros) 
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 Source: Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, Wave 2. Note: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 0.05. Standard 
Errors are in Parentheses. Model statistics included in table 5.3. 
5.4.2. Public Pension Receipts and Transfer Behaviour 
The first hypothesis that this analysis seeks to test is whether households with higher public pension 
receipts are more likely to make a transfer. To do this, model 2 includes the log function of public 
pension transfer receipts and the coefficient for this can be found in Table 5.1. The model returned a 
coefficient of 0.017 and a standard error of 0.01. This makes the coefficient significantly different from 
0 at the 95% level. The interpretation of this coefficient is statistically and theoretically complex. 
Firstly, the value of public pension receipts is logged in order to normalise the distribution. A probit 
model is not the best estimate of the relationship between x and y if x is not normally distributed (Liao, 
1994). The log transformation seeks to rectify this. Secondly, the dependent variable in a probit model 
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is itself a transformation of the probability of y occurring. These two transformations cloud 
interpretations somewhat. For example, the coefficient of 0.017 states that for an increase of 1 in the 
log value of the Household Public Pension Receipts, the Z score for the probability of Y occurring 
increase by 0.017. Figure 5.7 illustrates this marginal effect, showing that the estimated Z score ranges 
from -1.083457 to -.9601248. 
This interpretation underlines the argument made in chapter 4. It was argued there that a probit model 
effectively prohibits raw interpretations of coefficients given the transformation that the dependent 
variable undergoes. To understand the model effectively, it is necessary to translate the models 
estimates into absolute probability values rather than relying on interpretations similar to those in 
ordinary least square regressions. To place this into substantive terms, this can be translated into an 
estimated probability of a transfer being made using marginal effects. These consist of calculating the 
models predicted probabilities at given values of the independent variables. The values calculated here 
are done so with all other values in the model taken at their means. When the log value of the Parental 
Households Public Pension Receipts is 1 (€0), the estimated probability of a transfer is 0.1393. When 
this log value is 6.5, the mean value amongst those receiving a pension and equivalent to €665 per 
month, the probability of a transfer is estimated at .16. When the log value is 9 which is close to the 




Figure 5.7 - Marginal Effect at the means of Public Pension Receipts on Probability of a 
transfer 
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Figure 5.8 - Probability of a Transfer over Public Pension Receipts  
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, Wave 2. Note: Authors own calculations 
Figure 5.8 displays the models estimate for the probability of Y over public pension receipts in Euros. 
This reveals the effect of the logarithmic transformation which imposes a non-linear relationship. In 
order to establish whether this restricted the estimate, the model was rerun with the log value of 
pensions squared included. This was insignificant and the model fit was not significantly improved. The 
effect of pension receipts was also captured using a dummy variable which indicated whether the 
household received any public pension in the last year. This model was inferior to model 2 on the basis 
of Akaike information criteria (Hox, 2010). This implies that the effect cannot be reduced down to a 
distinction between recipients and non-recipients. The subsequent increase in the probability of a 
transfer as public pension receipts move into higher levels improves the model’s ability to predict 
transfer behaviour and is therefore preferred. 
A substantive interpretation of this model suggests that public pension recipients are around 2-3% 
more likely to give money to a specific child than households that are not in receipt of financial 
transfers. In addition, pensioners who receive more than €2,000 per month have a transfer rate of 
between 17-17.5%. This is compared to those who receive less than €2,000 per month whose transfer 
rate is estimated at between 16-17%. Grounding the understanding of the model in such estimated 
probabilities avoids the ambiguities of odds ratios which would have suggested that public pension 
recipients are up to 25% more likely to make a transfer. As it is the estimated probabilities suggest that 
whilst significant, the difference between pension recipients and non-recipients is not dramatic and 
raises doubts about the extent to which policy differences can be said to account for observed variance 




Table 5.2 - Probit Estimates: Child Variables 
  Model 1 Model2 Model 3 
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 Source: Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, Wave 2. Note: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 0.05. Standard 
Errors are in Parentheses. 
5.4.3. Country Level Differences 
Table 5.2 includes the country and regime fixed effects that were added in model 3 and model 4. This 
was to test whether the altruistic model and public pension receipts explained the country level 
differences identified in section 5.2 of this chapter. It is important to stress that the focus here should 
be on the effect size itself rather than significance levels. This is because the significance merely 
indicates the extent to which each country is different to the reference category country. There has 
been a tendency within analysis to use Austria as a reference country given the arbitrary fact that it is 
coded with the lowest number amongst SHARE countries (Schenk, Dykstra, & Maas, 2010). Austria 
has a relatively high level of transfer behaviour, which has the consequence of showing all country level 
fixed effects to be significant.  
In this analysis, Greece is used as the reference category for the similarly arbitrary reason that it has the 
largest sample size yet this is in some sense preferable given that Greece has a transfer rate of around 
16%, close to the average for the pooled sample. Even still it should be stressed that the significance 
levels reflect very little with regard to this hypothesis. Whilst the existing research has not inferred 
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country level effects from these significance levels, their presentation has tended to over emphasise 
fixed effects in comparative analysis.  
 
Figure 5.9 - Estimated probability of a transfer by country, Model 3 marginal effects at 
the mean. 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, Wave 2. Note: 95% confidence intervals indicated 
As with the estimates for Public Pension receipts, the tendency to focus on significance levels is 
heightened by the absence of an immediate substantive interpretation. Instead, marginal effects are 
presented as in Figure 5.9. This shows that the difference between countries is not great and that once 
confidence intervals are considered, the country level of variance appears to have largely dissipated. 
This can be seen given that the confidence intervals largely overlap suggesting that we cannot be 
confident that the transfer rates in each country are different form one another given our sample which 
should be sufficient to find substantial differences between countries. 
For example, Spain, Switzerland, Austria and France are the only outliers that we can confidently 
interpret as deviating from the probability of 13-14%. The potential interpretations of these deviations 
will be discussed later but the emphasis here is that the estimates suggest that individual level 
characteristics account for observed differences between Italy, Greece, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, 
Poland and the Czech Republic which have strikingly similar estimates for their transfer behaviour yet 



























































































This raises questions about the need for a comparative narrative for transfer behaviour and suggests that 
altruistic theory is in large part sufficient to explain observed differences in behaviour. Whilst the 
model fit statistics for model 3 show significant improvement compared to model 2, this is largely 
inevitable for a variable that accounts for so many unobserved factors. To this end they do incorporate 
outliers such as France, Spain and Austria and therefore reduce the unexplained variance and thus 
altruistic theory is limited. Nevertheless the model fit statistics show that including country dummies 
into our model improves our understanding of transfer behaviour. A comparison of effects suggests 




Table 5.3 - Probit Estimates: Country Effects 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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Log Likelihood -24578870 -24565169 -24109403 
Pseudo R Squared 0.116 0.117 0.133 
N 14,337  14,337 14,337 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing & Retirement in Europe, Wave 2. Note: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 0.05. Standard 




The analysis provided here aimed to address the two hypotheses put forward in this chapter which form 
question 1 and 4 in the Research Design outline in Chapter 3. The analysis suggests that an altruistic 
model does describe parental transfer behaviour in Europe well. With regards to the first hypothesis 
and question 1 in chapter 3, it was shown that those households in receipt of first tier public pensions 
were more likely to make transfers in line with altruistic theory and the findings of previous research 
(Künemund & Rein, 1999; Cox, 1987). However this effect is small and unlikely to be the 
predominant cause of country level variance. This second hypothesis (part of question 4) in Chapter 3 
was tested and the results suggest that the altruistic model does indeed reduce country level variance 
substantially, though not entirely. The primary cause of this is most likely to be income and broad 
compositional differences rather than specific policy variation. This is concluded given the large 
difference in effect size between pension receipts and income and wealth observed in all of the models. 
To corroborate this conclusion, model 3 was run without the public pension receipts variable and there 
was no significant change in the country estimates. 
Outliers persist however and these are still in need of exploration. Firstly, Spain is an outlier that 
should be considered individually. Whilst no evidence of methodological peculiarities could be 
identified, this difference could easily be attributable to a practical difference in the data collection 
techniques of the various participating countries. The observation of depressed transfer behaviour in 
France, Belgium and Switzerland is less likely to be attributable to such factors and remains the only 
observation that justifies the use of a regime or typological approach to comparative transfer behaviour. 
This could be a difference in other areas of policy as the French speaking world has a very distinct 
approach to family policy (Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
5.5. Conclusions 
5.5.1. Limitations 
As with any analysis, there are considerable limitations. The primary limitation is the lack of 
longitudinal data. Longitudinal data would allow for a greater focus on the effects of public pensions 
receipts and would enable insightful observations of the transition from work to retirement. 
Nevertheless this is primarily a limitation that concerns the first hypothesis. The comparative 
conclusions of this chapter are more robust. Furthermore the lack of longitudinal data tempers the 
conclusions but does not undermine them. This conclusion speaks of a potential contradiction within 
contemporary European societies that is not dependent on the observation of a causal mechanism: 
Those who are receiving financial assistance from the state are more likely to provide private financial 
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assistance than those who do not. Section 5.2.2 stressed the need for a further assessment of the 
‘crowding in’ hypothesis which this is. This analysis does not conclude that transfers cause individuals to 
make transfers. Instead it asserts that those in receipt of assistance are more likely to give assistance. 
At the comparative level, this analysis is limited in its consideration of the outliers and the extent to 
which altruism explains transfer behaviour in Spain and Francophone countries. These should be 
considered in isolation which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 use different 
approaches that go some way to explain these outliers but they in no way fully address the behaviour 
observed in these countries. This should be the focus of further research. In addition to this, it should 
be recognised that this analysis, and more generally this thesis, explicitly focus on transfers in Europe. 
Looking beyond Europe would allow for far greater variation in policies and parental opportunity 
structures. For example the transfer behaviour of East Asia has been observed to be upward and far 
more prevalent (Frankenberg, Lillard, & Willis, 2002). This is most likely due to the underdeveloped 
welfare state and lack of welfare provision in old age. Nevertheless this lies beyond the concern of this 
research project. 
5.5.2. Do pensions drive transfers? 
This thesis aims to explore the extent to which policy drives transfer behaviour. The analysis presented 
here has argued that those in receipt of public pensions are more likely to make a transfer to a specific 
child than those who do not. This supports a crowding in hypothesis to a limited extent yet this should 
not be exaggerated. The effect is not dramatic and is a constituent part of the broader altruistic theory 
of transfers. Nevertheless, crowding in occurs and it would appear that upward public transfers are 
compensated by downward private transfers. These findings are not radical in the transfer literature 
and as outlined in the introduction this analysis served to ground the wider thesis in the existing 
empirical work of the field. The results do support the existing findings regarding parental 
circumstance.  
Beyond the search for a causal effect this chapter has demonstrated a potential contradiction within 
contemporary society. Those receiving public financial assistance are more likely to give private 
financial assistance. The differential is not large but it is striking. Altruistic theory suggests that private 
transfer behaviour redistributes money from the well off to the worse off and the findings here imply 
that the state does the opposite. Whilst public pensions are generally not need based, it might be seen 
as contradictory for public transfers to redistribute money to older persons that are then redistributed 
back to younger generations via private financial assistance. If the conclusions of this chapter are robust 
it raises the question of whether the existing public upward transfers are efficient and whether transfers 
directly to those in need might be more effective. 
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5.5.3. Do policy differences lead to Transfer differences? 
The primary contribution of this analysis lays in the comparative endeavour encapsulated within the 
second hypothesis. This has shown that the country level narratives of transfer behaviour are largely 
rendered irrelevant once parental circumstances are considered. This was evidenced by the dissipation 
of country level differences in Model 3. In this respect the conclusion of this paper supports the 
assertions of Schenk et al in that transfer regimes appear to be under theorised and lacking empirical 
foundation (Schenk, Dykstra, & Maas, 2010). 
This is not to undermine the comparative method of analysing transfer behaviour. This approach 
enhances the variance in variables such as income, wealth and pension receipts. For example, to 
understand the effects of income and wealth it is helpful to incorporate Eastern European countries that 
have distinct and divergent wealth and income profiles. What this analysis suggests is that the 
comparative narrative of typologies or cultural distinctions is not helpful in understanding transfers 
from the parental perspective. Later chapters will seek to see if this is similarly true with the child and 
family perspectives of transfer behaviour. From a parental perspective however, policy is best 
incorporated through a micro model of altruistic theory rather than the regime and typological 
approaches found in much of comparative social policy. 
5.5.4. Implications for the Thesis 
This chapter has argued that transfer behaviour is affected by policy via the parental household’s 
circumstances. Upward public transfers via the taxing of the working age population, are correlated 
with downward private transfers. Given that this thesis seeks to understand the effect of policy on 
transfer behaviours, this finding is important. Furthermore, the parental household’s circumstances 
have been shown to account for a considerable amount of country level variation. This supports the use 
of altruistic models in analysing transfer behaviour and undermines arguments that seek to employ 
typology or regime based narratives to the analysis of comparative transfer behaviour. In short, if the 
Swedish transfer more than the Czechs, then it is because they are richer and not because they are more 
Swedish. 
Yet this is only one perspective through which to view transfer behaviour. Almost all of the existing 
literature has sought to explore transfers via the parental households. There have been legitimate and 
practical reasons for this. The rest of this thesis will however diverge from this and seek to understand 
whether the findings of this chapter can be supported and validated with alternative sampling methods, 
analytical techniques and data sources. This allows new questions to be addressed such as; what is the 
effect of children’s circumstances on transfer behaviour? Do bigger families transfer more or less? Do 
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policies that support the child, crowd out transfers? Does this help explain variation in transfer rates 
across countries? These are the questions that are to be answered in Chapters 6, 7 & 8. In this context, 
this chapter represents only a validation of existing research and we now turn to these questions in 




6. Receiving Transfers: For consumption or investment? 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter examined who makes transfers. This chapter considers who receives them. Is it 
richer households or poorer households? A child’s eye view of financial transfer receipts is used to 
investigate whether investment, enablement and social advancement narratives are supported by 
empirical evidence or if households with severe financial constraints are the primary recipients of 
financial assistance. Therefore two hypotheses are considered: 
1. Financial transfers are used to meet a basic minimum standard of living  
2. Financial transfers are a means of investing in a household as an alternative source of finance.  
In short, are transfers given to those who are most in need or are they received by those with the 
richest parents? Ultimately, do the recipient’s circumstances matter? 
In order for this thesis to assess to what extent is policy directed at children associated with transfer 
behaviour (page 46, question 2), it is necessary to understand this child’s view. This question asks; to 
what extent does policy directed at ‘children’ affect transfer behaviour in European families? This is a 
formidable challenge as almost all studies of intergenerational transfers have been from a parent’s 
perspective in terms of sampling and data collection (Bianchi, Evans, Hotz, Seltzer, & McGarry, 2007). 
Altruistic theory suggests that the child’s circumstances are important but empirical evidence has been 
exceptionally thin (Cox, 1987; Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). By using a household survey 
which is representative of the entire population, the analysis in this chapter identifies who receives a 
financial transfer and when. 
This analysis also allows for more detailed analysis in Chapter 7. There, the effect of public financial 
transfer receipts on private financial transfer receipts is explored and the crowding out argument is 
addressed. Whilst this is the primary aim of this thesis, it is necessary to first understand financial 
transfers from a child’s perspective given that this is an understudied area in the transfer literature. For 
example, altruistic theory discusses the circumstances of the child as a primary driver of financial 
transfer behaviour but does not elaborate on how this works in practice. Therefore to test the validity 
of this theory, it is necessary to understand financial transfers from a recipient perspective and test 
potential extensions to the theoretical model. 
Section 6.2.1 extrapolates on altruistic theories understanding of the child’s perspective. This revolves 
around a distinction between what are defined as a ‘Minimum Income Model’ and an ‘Aspirational Model’. 
Section 6.2.2 then evaluates a number of measures of a child’s well-being and material circumstances 
and other issues of operationalizing the theoretical model. Section 6.2.3 then details the analytical 
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strategy and data utilised within this analysis. Section 6.3 presents the results of the analysis and 
individual evaluations of the hypotheses put forward in section 6.3. This is then followed by section 6.4 
which summarises the chapter’s findings, their significance for the wider project and argues that only 
materially deprived households with well-resourced support networks can expect financial assistance.  
6.2. Model and Methods 
The primacy of the parental perspective in existing research derives from the decision to transfer being 
firmly in the hands of the parent (Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). Nevertheless it is also of 
substantive interest to understand who receives such financial assistance and when (Berry, 2008). This 
chapter argues that parents are best understood as seeking to ensure a minimum standard of living for 
their children rather than maximise a child’s well-being and this is evidenced by financial transfer 
behaviour that appears to target the poorest households. This section outlines a theoretical model to 
support this assertion and an empirical model with which to test it.  
The section therefore proceeds as follows. Section 6.2.1 discusses the various models which may 
describe financial transfer receipts based on the altruistic model outlined in Chapter 3. Section 6.2.2 
discusses how we might define the material circumstances of the child. This includes detailed outlines 
of how such concepts are operationalized using the EU-SILC. Section 6.2.3 then gives a detailed 
outline of the hypotheses, analytical strategy and methods used in section 6.3. 
6.2.1. Aspirational or Minimum Standard? 
When looking at the parental perspective, altruistic theory clearly states that richer parents will be 
more likely to make financial transfers to their children than poorer children (Cox, 1987). We can 
empirically test this by comparing rich parents with poorer parents and observe differences in financial 
transfer behaviour as in Chapter 5. However, altruistic theory does not imply that children who are 
poorer will receive more financial transfers. Whilst altruism suggests that those in need will receive 
financial transfers, the empirical implications deviate from this. This is because an altruistic parent is 
still happy to provide financial assistance to their child, even when they are not poor. For example, a 
parent may help a child purchase a family home and improve their own circumstances even if the child 
is not in severe financial hardship but is still poor relative to their parent. 
On the other hand, altruistic theory could be interpreted as predicting financial transfer receipts for 
those households with the greatest need. This interpretation suggests that the effect of a child’s 
circumstances on a parent’s propensity to transfer should be understood in absolute terms. For 
example, a parent would be concerned that their child had enough food, could keep their house warm 
and afford to pay rent. If it is such absolute needs that drive financial transfer behaviour then we would 
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expect there to be a strong relationship between the child’s household income and the probability of 
receiving a financial transfer. In this scenario, the parent’s own resources are only then relevant as a 
conditional factor rather than the main motivation for making a financial transfer. 
Most existing literature has tended to view financial transfer behaviour as the former. For example, 
Albertini & Radl (2012) argue that financial transfers are a class based practice used to transmit social 
status. The crucial determinant in their model is therefore the social status of the parent and not the 
needs of the child. Similarly, Zissimopolous and Smith (2009) identified education as a primary 
motivation for financial transfers. Such transfers could be better described as an investment rather than 
a boost in the child’s consumption. Indeed much of the rhetoric surrounding financial transfers 
identifies them as a middle class practice and a key transmitter of inequalities (McDaniel, 1997). 
The distinction between these two interpretations is to be found in the relationship between the 
parent’s utility and child’s utility. If the effect of a child’s utility on a parent’s utility has rapidly 
diminishing returns then this would imply that the parental household is primarily concerned with the 
child meeting a certain standard of living, after which the parent’s concern is muted (Browning, 
Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). This is referred to here as the ‘Minimum Income Model’. 
Alternatively, the diminishing returns could be more gradual. If the returns in utility on a financial 
transfer are more constant then financial transfers would be seen to occur irrespective of the child’s 
circumstances. In this situation the relationship between financial transfers and the child’s own material 
circumstances would be weaker and financial transfers would be driven more by the child’s 
circumstances relative to the parent’s. The parent is inclined to make transfers to their child, not 
because they are poor but because they are poorer than them. In this respect, children are seen more 



















This difference is graphically illustrated in Figure 6.1. Firstly, the solid black line shows the ‘Minimum 
Income Parent’ who is concerned with their child meeting a certain level of material well-being. For 
example if we look at the increase in the Child’s utility from the point of 0 to the point CU1, there is a 
large increase in the Parents Utility from 0 to PU1. However when we compare this to the subsequent 
gains in the child’s utility from point CU1 to CU2, which is a much larger increase in child’s utility than 
the move from 0 to the point CU1, we see the resulting increase in parental utility from PU1 to PU3 is 
actually rather small. This reflects the steep drop in marginal returns to child utility in the ‘minimum 
income’ model of altruism. 
This can then be compared to the scenario depicted by the grey dotted line. Again, there is a large 
increase in parental utility as we move from point 0 to CU1. Yet this time the move from CU1 to CU2 is 
much greater relative to the previous increase. This is because of the more consistent marginal returns 
to child utility. This is labelled the ‘Aspirational Model’ as the parent is more consistently interested in 
the child furthering themselves and will therefore be more likely to take actions such as financial 
transfers to further this regardless of the level of income already enjoyed by the child. A scenario of 
increasing marginal returns is possible but is not considered here given that it should be considered 

















Figure 6.1 – The hypothesised relationship between Parent and Child Utility 
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company director than they would from them being lifted from abject poverty to a minimum level of 
decency. This is something that defines diminishing marginal returns. 
The substantive context of this distinction is that in a ‘Minimum Income Model’ the child’s income is of 
greater importance than in an aspirational scenario. In an ‘Aspirational Model’ a parent will seek to make 
a financial transfer more consistently as the returns for their own utility of doing so will be consistent in 
relation to the child’s utility.  
The most straightforward way to explore this distinction is to attempt to replicate Figure 6.1 using 
proxies and establish which pattern the results closer approximate to.  To do this a model is 
constructed that allows an estimation of the effect of a child’s circumstances on the probability of a 
financial transfer. If the ‘Minimum Income Model’ is correct then the model will show a strong 
relationship between deprivation and financial transfer behaviour. If the ‘Aspirational Model’ is more 
accurate, the effect size will be weaker and a child’s circumstance will not be seen to affect the 
probability of receiving a financial transfer. To do this in the most comprehensive manner possible, a 
number of indicators for circumstances are used which are detailed and discussed in section 6.2.2. 
 The limitation of this approach is that it does not offer a clear point by which the ‘Aspirational Model’ is 
preferred over the ‘Minimum Income Model’ and vice versa. This is partly due to the two theories being 
two points on a single gradient rather than absolute states. The point at which an ‘Aspirational Model’ 
becomes a ‘Minimum Income Model’ is unclear. Both models predict that the probability of a financial 
transfer will decrease when circumstances improve; the distinction is in how dramatic that decrease is. 
The ambiguity of testing a theory based on effect size therefore requires subtle and tempered analysis of 
the estimates. Yet this limitation should not be over stressed. This chapter argues that the evidence is 
fairly conclusive in supporting a ‘Minimum Income Model’ over an ‘Aspirational Model’ given the weight of 
evidence.  
6.2.2. Financial Assistance & Children in Need 
The ‘Minimum Income Model’ and ‘Aspirational Model’ provide two interpretations of basic altruistic 
theory. With regards to transfers specifically, the two models imply a relationship between financial 
transfer receipts and the material circumstances of a household. Ceteris Paribus, a household that 
become richer is less likely to receive a transfer under the ‘Minimum Income Model’ given that the returns 
on the financial transfer, in terms of the parent’s utility, will be less. This section details how these 
concepts are measured within this analysis. Firstly, financial transfers are discussed before a detailed 




Financial Transfer Receipts 
In Chapter 4 the distinction between the two databases, SHARE and EU-SILC, which are used in this 
thesis were outlined and in particular the shifting definition of financial transfers that this implied. To 
reiterate this briefly here, when referring to the receipt of financial transfers we are referring to 
whether a household received a financial transfer from any other household in the last year. Therefore 
financial transfers do not only refer to those received from parents of household members but refer 
more broadly to all financial transfers received. 
With regards to the wider thesis, this chapter seeks to test the altruistic understanding of financial 
transfer behaviour from the perspective of the child which is here more broadly defined as the 
recipient. Doing this is difficult from an empirical perspective. This is because data on income and 
living conditions are usually collected at the household level. Studies of income and living conditions 
are carried out at the household level because this is viewed as a primary economic unit in modern 
societies. The coordination of couples and the extent to which they redistribute income amongst 
themselves is a good example of such problems (Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). A male bread 
winner may provide for his wife but in a statistical survey of individuals she may appear as of low 
income (Millar & Glendinning, 1989). For this reason, household surveys are often used as a more 
comprehensive assessment of individual’s material well-being.  
In the EU-SILC, both individual and household level data are collected. However, the key dependent 
variable which indicates the receipt of financial assistance from other households is measured at the 
household level. Household data are therefore used in this research.  Nevertheless, as detailed in 
chapter 4, this is not a serious limitation for the analysis but has implications for inference and 
contextualising of this chapters findings within the wider thesis. 
The proportion in receipt of a financial transfer is considerably lower than those who were identified as 
giving them in SHARE. This is because SHARE sample a population that are net givers amongst the 
population as a whole, not everyone has a parent who falls within SHARE’s sample, SHARE has a 
reference period of two years and the EU-SILC is a general social survey including the respondents 
within SHARE. Despite these methodological and theoretical ambiguities the operationalisation of 
financial transfer receipt is relatively straight forward in that it simply measures whether a household 
received financial assistance from another household in the past 12 months (HY080G). It will be this 




Figure 6.2 - Household Financial Transfer Receipts across European Countries 
 Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. Notes: Calculations based on pooled data. 
The proportion is that of those households who responded to hy080g with a value greater than €0. Where hy080g was missing 












































































































































































































































Figure 6.3 - Annual Equivalised Net Household Income (Euros) 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. Central line is the median. Box edges are 
quartile values. Whiskers represent 95% boundary. Outer values are excluded. 
Income 
The theoretical framework in section 6.2.1 referred to a child’s utility and material circumstances. This 
section details how this is measured within this analysis and the limitations of such an approach. First, 
household income is considered but revealed to be an unnecessarily burdensome measure with many 
limitations. To address this, the section then discusses a subjective self-evaluation measure of material 
circumstances that is better suited to this analysis and is used in section 6.3. 
Household Income has been a core concept for measuring household need in spite of its crude and 
narrow understanding of living conditions, household distributional factors, cross-cultural variation and 
arbitrary treatment of compositional factors such as the individual needs of household members 
(Muellbauer, 1974). For example, Household income may identify two households as having an 
income of €20,000. Nevertheless, one may contain a severely disabled adult and a teenager, whilst the 
other contains a housewife and a toddler. Income as an indicator fails to consider such distinctions 
(Blundell, 1991). 
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Central line is the Median. Box Edges are Quartile values.
Whiskers represent 95% boundary. Outer values are excluded.
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The limitations of income as an indicator of material circumstances have been discussed in detail 
elsewhere (Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz, & Diener, 1993; Helliwell, 2003). Operationalizing material 
circumstances inevitably encounters the narrow and inflexible nature of income as an indicator (Meyer 
& Sullivan, 2003). As with our understanding of family relationships, a desire to generalise does not 
circumvent the subjective and multi-dimensional aspects of conceptual measurement. The universality 
of accounting measures such as income does not negate households experiencing distinct and complex 
scenarios to which income as a measure is insensitive. Income is extremely limited in this regard and is 
unable to capture issues of gender, cultural diversity and a subjective understanding of what is 
necessary (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002). Therefore whilst adaptations such as purchasing power 
parity are incorporated here, the extent to which it is comparable across households and countries is 
questionable. 
Its centrality in existing analysis derives from its status as the primary medium of exchange but also 
from the nature of the exchange under study. The central question in this analysis is what circumstances 
induce financial transfers. It is reasonable to assume that a household would need to be considered 
financially constrained if the solution is then to give financially. If a household has a high level of need 
for emotional or physical support then one might expect a transfer of time or support to be induced 
instead of financial payment (Kalmijn & Saraceno, 2008).  
Household Size & Composition 
A key problem with using income as an indicator is its insensitivity to issues of household composition. 
This consideration is often dealt with by using a standardised measure of income which divides the 
overall income of the household across its members using a scale to reflect the impact of each additional 
person. Increasingly in comparative research, the first person in a household counts for 0.67, 
subsequent adults count for an increase of 0.33 and children under 13 count as 0.2 (Anyaegbu, 2010). 
Income is then divided by this equalising figure. The accuracy of this is debatable particularly in a 
survey whose sample population totals almost 500 million people across 29 countries (Aaberge & 
Melby, 1998). These figures are largely arbitrary divisions to reflect the effect of household size on the 
needs that an income must meet. 
Whilst income is standardised in this analysis, further steps are taken to smooth the crude manner by 
which such methods operate. Compositional issues relating to age are the primary differentiation that is 
addressed. There is a large amount of evidence demonstrating the evolving consumption patterns of 
individuals over the life course (Lee, Lee, & Mason, 2006).  The very old and the very young require 
fewer resources. This evidence implies a more developed life course narrative of need than that 
captured by standardisation processes and is based on the primary focus of intergenerational research 
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which considers the redistribution of resources across the life-course (Mason, Lee, Tung, Lai, & Miller, 
2006). 
The analysis in this chapter is based on a sample of the population rather than a sample of a specific sub 
group as is the case in SHARE. Given this the full age spectrum of society is included, the incorporation 
of such compositional factors is important. For example, older person’s households have far lower 
income than households with working age adults yet incur significantly less in the way of costs (Börsch-
Supan, 1992). In addition to this those in poor health are also likely to be in greater need than those 
who are not, reflecting the complex interaction between financial status and the more abstract and 
slippery concept of material circumstances or utility. Nevertheless, this measurement of material 
circumstances of a household is severely limited and so alternative measures are preferred. 
Making Ends Meet 
Given the crude nature of income as a measure, this analysis considers alternative indicators of material 
circumstances. This is in order to encapsulate a more valid measure of the concept of need within a 
household. The strategy within a number of social surveys of recent years has been to evaluate material 
circumstances through a list of measures that aim to evaluate the material circumstances of a household 
more directly (Boarini & d'Ercole, 2006; Whelan, Nolan, & Maitre, 2008). In the EU-SILC this has 
included a question regarding how difficult the household finds it to ‘make ends meet’. That is to say 
the extent to which they are able to live within their means. This measure has the advantage of 
circumventing tricky issues of needs and resources by simply asking for the household’s assessment 
based on these two factors (Guio, Fusco, & Marlier, 2009). Yet this comes at the expense of inevitable 





Figure 6.4 - How difficult is it to make Ends meet?  
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. Note: ‘Making Ends Meet’ is taken from 
variable hs120 in the EU-SILC and the results here are from a pooled longitudinal sample.  
For example, it might be suggested that older individuals are less likely to report a difficulty in making 
ends meet even after controlling for resources and needs. That is to say those certain households are 
less likely to report difficulties, independent of their actual needs, yet there is little empirical evidence 
to support this (Gordon, et al., 2000). The impact of this on conceptual validity is further dampened 
by the broader requirements of this operationalisation process. The concern here is to consider the 
response of donors to recipient’s needs and this in itself is a subjective assessment that will in large part 
be based on the self-reporting of the recipient household. In summary, a household that is 
underreporting its needs to the EU-SILC could also be underreporting them to potential sources of 
support. 
It is this subjectivity that supports its use as the primary indicator of need. This analysis focuses on this 
measure so as to establish a greater understanding of this subjective self-reporting element in the 
driving of financial transfer behaviour. Figure 6.5 illustrates the relationship between this indicator and 
measures of household income and demonstrates that, whilst linked, they are not one in the same so 
this additional dimension will be considered within this analysis. In the context of the distinction 
between a minimum income and aspirational model of financial transfers, this measure should also be 
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insightful given that the minimum income model predicts that it will be a very strong predictor of 
financial transfer behaviour, reflecting the assistance rather than investment nature of financial transfers 
for donors.  
 
Figure 6.5 - Difficulty to make Ends meet by Income Quartile 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. Note: ‘Making Ends Meet’ is taken from 
variable hs120 in the EU-SILC and the results here are from a pooled longitudinal sample. The income quartiles are calculated 
from a pooled sample across countries and time and are based on Household Income for the Income reference period. 
6.2.3. Methods 
Unobserved Heterogeneity 
In estimating the effect of material circumstances on the probability of financial transfer receipt there is 
an underlying concern about the potential spurious effects of parental income or what will be more 
broadly referred to here as the resource capacity of support networks (Albertini & Radl, 2012). That is 
to say that there is a correlation between a household’s material circumstances and the capacity of their 
friends and family to provide them with financial assistance (Behrman & Taubman, 1976; Solon, 2002). 
As detailed above, this effect is less important in a ‘Minimum Income Model’ given that the decision to 
transfer is conditional on the material circumstances of the recipient as well as the capacity of the 
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network. In an ‘Aspirational Model’ there is a more constant incentive to transfer and thus the recipient’s 
material circumstances are less important. 
Nevertheless, if the recipient’s material circumstances are positively correlated with the capacity of the 
network which is itself positively correlated with the probability of receiving a financial transfer, then it 
should be anticipated that the effect of material circumstances on the probability of receiving a financial 
transfer will be biased upward. This therefore risks a Type I Error regarding both models, but 
particularly the ‘Minimum Income Model’. This is because it states that material circumstances will be 
negatively correlated with the probability of receiving a financial transfer and this would be clouded by 
the spurious effect relating to the support network’s capacity. 
It was therefore necessary to control for this factor as it is the primary threat to the internal validity of 
the analysis. To do this a longitudinal approach was needed to shift from comparisons between 
households to comparisons within households over time. Given that the capacity of a support network 
is assumed to not change dramatically over time, this should reduce the potential spurious effects 
(Kohli, 1999; Börsch-Supan, 1992). The validity of this assumption is not beyond reproach and the 
evidence from Chapter 5 illustrates that financial transfer behaviour is sensitive to even subtle changes 
in the capacity of parents to give. 
The ideal remedy to this problem is the accurate measurement of financial transfers at both the parental 
and child level as detailed in Chapter 4, yet such data is not available in a comparative dataset that 
contains dyad specific information (Bianchi, Evans, Hotz, Seltzer, & McGarry, 2007). Therefore 
longitudinal modelling of a latent, time constant coefficient which captures network capacity and other 
time-invariant factors is the best available alternative. It is to this that we now turn as the analytical 
methods used in section 6.3 are detailed. 
Cross Sectional Analysis 
In order to test the two models of financial transfer receipt in section 6.2.1, this chapter uses three 
separate models and uses the summation of findings to come to a clear conclusion as to which model is 
better. Firstly, a pooled probit analysis will be run which looks to estimate the extent to which the 
probability of receiving a financial transfer varies across indicators of material circumstances. This will 
allow for marginal effects to be drawn which can then be compared and the rate of diminishing returns 
established. This cross-sectional analysis allows us to identify poorer households as the primary 





In order to address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity which is attributable to the support 
network’s resource capacity, a multilevel random coefficient model will be used to cluster observations 
within households (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012). This approach shifts the analysis so that 
comparisons are made within households rather than between households with the random coefficient 
capturing the underlying latent tendency of the household to receive financial transfers. In this model 
this is taken as a control for the resource networks capacity to give financial assistance to the household.  
Nevertheless the random coefficient model is not without its problems. Most importantly the model is 
only the best estimate of the effect of income on the probability to receive a financial transfer if all 
factors correlated with the dependent variable at the household level are included (Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal, 2012). Given that numerous pieces of research have demonstrated cultural and social 
characteristics that are not incorporated within this model it would be impossible to assert that this is 
the case (Albertini & Radl, 2012; Szydlik, 2008; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2009; Jappens & Van Bavel, 
2012). To counter this, global mean centred values are included to estimate unbiased, within 
household effects. The analysis is then able to accurately estimate whether the material circumstances 
of the recipient household affect the probability of receiving a transfer. 
Fixed Effects 
To provide a robustness check against potential violations of internal validity, a fixed effects logit model 
will be used to ascertain whether the coefficient is consistent. This fixed effects model has far more 
internal validity and is far more efficient at controlling for unobserved heterogeneity than a random 
coefficient model and thus is a more appropriate procedure (Gelman & Hill, 2007). However the 
reason that this fixed effects model is used as a validation rather than the primary model is due to the 
fact that all households that never make a financial transfer or that always make a financial transfer will 
be excluded from the analysis (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012). This means that the sample is not the 
same and only refers to individuals who received at least one financial transfer during their observation 
period. It does however offer an insightful counterpoint to the random coefficient model. The analysis 
is then able to determine whether it is the households broader support network and socio-economic 





The question of who receives transfers is a complex one as outlined in the previous section. The 
following section attempts to go some way to answering it through the use of a probit regression 
analysis and then a multilevel model which nests household-period observations within their household. 
In so doing, the analysis reveals clear evidence of a minimum income standard model of transfers. The 
following section includes discussion of statistical models designed to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity and the distinction between within and between household variations. This is merely a 
sideshow to the underlying assertion that transfer behaviour is primarily targeted at those most in need.  
In order to outline the empirical evidence for this assertion, this section proceeds as follows; section 
6.3.1 details a cross-sectional assessment of transfer receipt that attempts to identify whether it is 
poorer or richer households which are in receipt of transfers. The primary concern of this section is 
exploratory and the evidence presented appears to support a minimum income model of transfers. 
Section 6.3.2 then considers potential alternative explanations by employing a longitudinal model of 
transfer receipt. This analysis, whilst less conclusive, still shows strong evidence for a minimum income 
standard of transfer behaviour over an aspirational model of transfers.  
Section 6.3 then looks only at those households who varied their transfer behaviour over the period of 
observation and estimates what factors drove this change in behaviour. This further tempers the 
evidence for a minimum income model of transfers by demonstrating that transfer receipt is heavily 
conditional on time invariant factors unrelated to temporal material circumstances. Section 6.4 of this 
chapter then attempts to synthesise these somewhat contradictory findings and summarise their 




6.3.1. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Table 6.1 - Results Tables for the Main Covariates in all three models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Probit : 2010 Random Intercept 
Probit : 2005-10 
Fixed Effects Logit : 
2005-10 
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N 26,158   147,000   8,423 
 
Log Likelihood -5,420,000   -23,800   -2,889.03 
 
AIC 10800000   47775.9   5818.057 
 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. Note: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 
0.05. Standard Errors are in Parentheses. 
Model 1 is a probit model of the probability of someone receiving a financial transfer. The sample 
under analysis is from the 2010 wave of the longitudinal EU-SILC survey as detailed in section 6.2.3. 
These are households from across 24 European Countries, the fixed effects for which can be found in 
appendix 1. As it is just those observations from 2010, each household has only one observation within 
the analysis. The coefficients are therefore calculated exclusively on cross-sectional comparisons. Given 
this, a more descriptive inferential process is adopted here. Nevertheless, such descriptions are of 
significant substantive interest. Regardless of whether transfers are a key mechanism of 
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intergenerational status transmission, it is important to understand who receives financial assistance 
from other households. The results in Figure 6.6 show the indicative decreasing marginal returns that 
would be expected if the ‘Minimum Income Model’ were accurate. As suggested in section 6.2.3, this is 
not clear cut as it is unclear at what point an ‘Aspirational Model’ would be preferred. Nevertheless, if 
returns to a child’s utility were constant we would expect the family to continue to provide financial 
assistance even when they considered it ‘not difficult’ to make ends meet. The results would have been 
more conclusive if the probability of a transfer dropped more dramatically and the distinction was 
sharper, yet there is a clear decline in the probability of receiving a transfer. 
 
Figure 6.6 - Probability of Transfer by Subjective Material Circumstances 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010 
A concern with this measure of material circumstances is that it is measured post transfer. That is to say 
that those who received a transfer would be more likely to report themselves as being able to make 
ends meet than those who did not. The question implicitly includes financial assistance from others in 
prompting individuals to assess the extent to which they are able to get by. This is not thought to be a 
problem in this instance because it would bias the results against the hypothesised effect. That is to say 
that the effect would appear flatter. If this effect is indeed occurring then it would imply that 
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The results from model 1 illustrate that the coefficient for the Log value of Household Income is not 
significantly different from 0 but that the quadratic term is. This ambiguity can be addressed by looking 
at the marginal effects which are displayed in Figure 6.7. Here we can see that there is a noticeable 
decline in the probability of receiving a transfer. When the Log of Household Income is 9 which is the 
equivalent to just €8,103 Euro’s per annum, the probability of receiving a transfer is around 3.7%. At 
the other end of the spectrum, a Household with an income of €59,874 per annum (this is 11 when 
logged) has just 0.7% chance of receiving a transfer. Whilst, the likelihood of financial assistance is rare 
in both cases, it is significantly and considerably rarer amongst those with very high income.  
 
Figure 6.7 - The Marginal effect of the Log of Household Income on Probability of 
Receiving a Transfer (Model 1) 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. 95% Confidence Intervals depicted. 
With regards to the significance of the estimates, the 95% confidence intervals are shown and illustrate 
the degree to which we can confidently describe the probability of receiving a transfer as varying. Here 
the limitations of relying on the coefficients are very apparent. The estimate for a household with an 
income of around €8,103 (Log 9) is significantly different from a household with an income of 
€13,359. In contrast, a Household with an income of €162,574 is not significantly different from the 






















9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12
Log of Household Income (Euros)
134 
 
indicate the level of certainty attributable to the claim that it is not zero. Using the marginal effects and 
their accompanying standard errors allows us to see beyond this into the finer ambiguities of the data.   
To test the core hypothesis of this chapter however it is important to try and describe this relationship 
as depicted within the model. To do this it is necessary to convert the log values back into Euros and 
plot these against the estimates obtained from model 1. The results of doing this are displayed below in 
Figure 6.8. This relationship shows quite a definitive demonstration of the ‘Minimum Income Model’. 
The probability of receiving a transfer at very low levels is very high and diminishes rapidly to the 
extent that the probability or receiving a transfer at €20,000 is not strikingly different from the 
estimate for a household with an income of €100,000. In short, the transfers appear to be aimed at the 
very poor only. This is consistent with a ‘minimum income’ description of transfers and not an 
‘aspirational model’ of transfers. It should be stressed however that the shape of the curve is a relic of 
the log transformation and not decreasing returns. The decreasing returns are evidenced by the 
maximum effect observed for this variable in Figure 6.7. 
 
Figure 6.8 - Estimated Probability of receiving a transfer by Household Income (Euros) 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. Note: Authors own calculations  
A limitation of this analysis is that it is a cross-sectional assessment and this will be addressed in section 
6.3.2. Nevertheless the substantive inferences are valuable because of and not in spite of this. The 
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income and under the greatest financial stress, even when controlling for various household 
compositional factors which may cloud this. The financial transfer literature has often speculated that 
financial transfers where a middle class activity resulting in status transmission and tempering social 
mobility (Albertini & Radl, 2012). The results here seem to refute this. Transfers are received by 
households with very low incomes. It may be that transfers are conditional on the wealth of a parent 
but it is apparent that what is also important is the circumstances of the recipient household. 
6.3.2. A Comparative Narrative 
The analysis also offers the opportunity to address question 4 in chapter 3. This seeks to understand the 
extent to which cross national differences remain after controlling for individual level characteristics. 
This analytic strategy was dealt with more comprehensively in chapter 5 and details can be found there. 
This question is given less attention here as the analysis of the parental perspective is capable of being 
far more definitive on this subject. Chapter 5 argued that once individual characteristics are considered, 
the cross-national differences in transfer behaviour disappear. Yet if they fail to disappear when 
analysed using data on the recipient, then it might be due to parental characteristics which are not 
controlled for and that have been identified as key determinants of transfer behaviour. It is therefore 





Figure 6.9 – Fixed Effects for the 24 countries in Model 1 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. Note: The marginal effects are measured at 
the mean values for the pooled sample for all independent variables. 
The marginal effects suggest that the country level differences in transfer behaviour do remain to a 
large extent in spite of controlling for recipient characteristics. Whilst the majority of countries are 
clustered between a 5-10% rate of transfers, there are countries which are still obvious outliers. The 
Netherlands, Norway, Finland and Iceland have a larger number of transfers. The persistence of 
country level differences is likely to be due to heterogeneity at the parental level as evidenced by 
chapter 5. The conclusions are therefore limited. 
It could be argued that those below the average are generally Eastern and Southern European whilst 
those above it are Northern and Western European. This is a pervasive axis within European societies 
as detailed in Chapter 2. It is of religious, cultural, economic, geographical and social origins that 
makes comparative narratives clumsy.  Given that there are a number of striking countries outside this 
delineation, such as Sweden being slightly below average and Hungary slightly above average, there 
seems little basis to offer a macro level comparative assessment of transfer behaviour. Whilst this 
analysis is not definitive in supporting an altruistic interpretation of transfers, it is evidence that should 





























6.3.3. Longitudinal, Random Effects Model 
Caution is necessary with cross-sectional data because of the large degree of unobserved heterogeneity. 
There are a large number of differences between poor and rich households beyond their bank balance 
which may explain why some receive transfers and others do not. Culturally, socially and economically 
households differ in a wide number of ways which could explain the results of section 6.3.1 without 
recourse to inferences about when parents care and when they do not. The main unobserved 
characteristic is the resource capacity of the households support network. In order to demonstrate the 
validity of the ‘Minimum Income Model’ this section uses comparisons within households over time rather 
than the cross-sectional analysis of section 6.3.1. 
In order to make within household comparisons a random intercept model was constructed. This 
model estimates the underlying tendency of a household to receive a transfer. The coefficient estimates 
are then based upon the probability of receiving a transfer given this predisposition. In substantive 
terms this model shifts the focus from comparing between households to comparing within households 
over time. The model is not without its limitations however and the coefficients are not considered to 
be best estimates if there are factors at the household level which are correlated with the dependent 
variable and not included within the model (Hox, 2010). Given this is the underlying assumption for 
using a longitudinal approach, this assumption can be said to be violated. To address this, mean centred 
values of all time-varying covariates were included within the model to account for potential level two 




Figure 6.10 - Estimated Probability of Receiving a Transfer by ‘Making Ends Meet’ 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. Central line is the median. Whiskers 
represent 95% boundary. 
The coefficient for the self-assessed material circumstances remains a strong predictor of receiving a 
financial transfer. Figure 6.10 illustrates this finding through the distribution of estimated probabilities 
of receiving a transfer from model 2 across the categories of the ‘making ends meet’ variable. The 
results clearly show a far larger tendency amongst those who find it very difficult to make ends meet. 
These findings do support the ‘Minimum Income Model’ over the ‘Aspirational Model’. Those who perceive 
themselves as struggling financially are considerably more likely to receive financial help from other 
households. If an ‘Aspirational Model’ were accurate then the likelihood of receiving financial assistance 
would not be so sensitive to the existing material circumstances of the household.  
The results from this model are distinct from model 1 and fail to show a significant effect of income on 
the probability of receiving a transfer. This in itself is indicative of an ‘Aspirational Model’ in that it 
suggests that high income households are as likely to receive transfers as low income households and 
that the determinants of transfers are instead on the supply side of the equation. Figure 6.11 emphasises 
this finding by showing the marginal effects for this model. The results suggest that the pattern 

































Very Difficult Somewhat Difficult Not Difficult
139 
 
The low probability estimates also reflect the finding that the estimated constant term was not normally 
distributed and was highly skewed. This suggests that transfers occur in certain types of families and 
that a large degree of unexplained variance exists at the household level. This suggests that certain 
families are inherently more likely to receive transfers than others. This is most likely a reflection of the 
resource capacity of the households support network and potential cultural factors which promote or 
discourage financial interdependence between households. Given this, the analysis in model 2 does 
appear to support the ‘Minimum Income Model’ in spite of income’s insignificance which is potentially 
attributable to the measurement issues identified in section 6.2.2. 
 
Figure 6.11 - Marginal Effect of Log Household Income in Random Effects Model 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. Notes: 95% Confidence Intervals depicted. 
The Family Effect 
One thing that is striking from the estimates of the marginal effects is the low probability of a transfer. 
For Household Income the predicted probability of receiving a transfer ranged from 0.5% to 0%. That 
is to say that across the full range of household incomes, the model predicts that this is the average 
probability of receiving a transfer. The reason for this exceptionally low figure is because the marginal 
effects use the margins at the means. They take the mean for each independent variable and except 
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transfer for the average household. This includes the random intercept estimated by the random effects 
model. 
A normalised estimate of these random intercepts is given below in a histogram for all households in 
the sample. This shows that the average probability of receiving a transfer for most households is 
practically 0. Only 20.95% of the population have an intercept that is above a 5% probability of 
receiving a transfer. This could be evidence of a poorly specified model but it is more likely that it 
indicates the importance of the parental perspective over the child’s perspective. This is because the 
model identifies a large number of individuals who never receive a transfer and therefore have an 
estimated underlying tendency of close to 0. In fitting the model, the information regarding the child’s 
household was not a good predictor of transfer receipt and so when a household received a transfer it 
was captured by the intercept. From a substantive point of view, what this means is that in order to 
understand whether a transfer will be received the most important factor appears to be this underlying 
propensity to receive. 
 
Figure 6.12 – Histogram of Normalised Random Intercept Estimates from Model 2 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005-2010. Notes: The estimate represents the household 
specific random intercept estimated for each household which is then normalised. This represents the underlying probability that 

















This could be attributable to cultural factors or other time invariant characteristics. Yet given the 
conclusions of chapter 5 it would appear far more likely that issues of parental characteristics and family 
structure are driving these tendencies.  This offers a great deal of context to the other results offered 
here. Despite the effect of material circumstances observed and the assertion of a ‘minimum income 
model’, these are relatively poor predictors of transfer receipt. 
6.3.4. When do Recipients Receive? 
The final model in this chapter attempts to further validate the findings of 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 which 
suggested that poorer households are more likely to receive transfers. To do this a fixed effects logit 
model is employed. Fixed effects include a dummy variable for each household and therefore account 
for any household level unobserved heterogeneity. In other words, any inherent aspect of the 
household that affects the probability of receiving a transfer is accounted for within the fixed effect 
coefficient. This is inclusive of the unobserved resources of any potential support network. The major 
drawback of this model is that it requires some variation in the dependent variable within each unit. 
Only households that make a transfer at least once and fail to make a transfer at least once are included 
in the model (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012). The consequence of this is that the results are only 
generalisable to a group of households inherently predisposed to make transfers. The switch from a 
probit to a logit link is purely an issue of the statistical package used which does not provide a 
computationally efficient probit fixed effects model.  
Nevertheless the model is interesting for the question at hand. If a transfer is made to a household in a 
given period, when is it most likely to be made? These results are incomparable with the results in 
model 1 & 2. They refer to different coefficients and are estimated using a different sample size which 
goes someway to explaining the fall in significance levels. They are also using a different link function 
and subsequently have a different substantive interpretation.  
As with model 2, the coefficients suggest that the self-reported financial circumstances variable is 
strongly significant. A household which is finding it very difficult to make ends meet is estimated to be 
53% more likely to receive a transfer than a household which is not having difficulties. This suggests 
that as households move out of a period of financial hardship, the financial assistance offered by other 
households is withdrawn. This result is strong evidence that amongst those households who are 
receiving financial transfers, around 35% will stop receiving financial assistance. This is a considerable 
drop. If financial assistance is withdrawn after meeting this minimum income condition, it suggests that 
the motives for making such transfers have abated and thus fits the description of the ‘Minimum Income 
Model’. The results also show that the coefficient for Log Household Income is not statistically 
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significant from 0 and thus as with previous models the subjective measure appears to be a better 




Households which identify themselves as financially strained are more likely to receive a financial 
transfer than those who are not. Based on the theoretical outline given in section 6.2.1, this suggests 
that parents are primarily concerned with their children achieving a minimum level of material 
conditions and being financially secure. This suggests that the transfers are not being made as 
investments or an alternative source of finance. If this were the case, households who were richer 
would be receiving transfers almost as often as poorer households. What’s more, if financial transfers 
were a legitimate and feasible alternative to formal financing (i.e. student loans, the mortgage market 
etc.) then the practice would probably be far more common than the 5.3% who reported receiving a 
transfer in this sample.  
This ‘Minimum Income Model’ must be taken in the context of existing research however. A household’s 
probability of receiving a transfer is determined first and foremost by potential source’s ability to 
provide. This was the conclusion of chapter 5 and evidence was found to support this here. The skew in 
the estimates of the constants in Model 2 suggests that certain households are predisposed to receive 
transfers. This indicates that there is considerable unobserved heterogeneity at the household level 
which chapter 5 and 8 imply would be attributable to the parent’s income, wealth and underlying 
predisposition to making transfers. It should therefore be noted that a household’s income only 
increases the probability of receiving a transfer if they belong to a network that is resourced and 
inclined to offer such support. In summary only those in economically constrained circumstances with 
very rich parents receive financial support and this goes some way to explain the residual levels of 
transfer behaviour. 
Finally this analysis has identified the limitations of a purely accounting understanding of financial 
transfers. Using income as a predictor was far less effective than the self-reporting measure. This is not 
to say that self-reporting is a better measure of material circumstances but it is potentially a better 
indicator of what is perceived of as need. The use of income as a measure is problematic and its poor 
performance relative to a self-assessment suggests that the altruistic model is highly relativized from a 
child’s perspective and cannot be monetized to the extent that the parental perspective was in chapter 
5. This in itself underlines the need to understand transfers from a recipient perspective. In so doing, 
the ambiguity of the altruistic model is unfurled through the complex conceptualisation of a parent’s 





As a preliminary exploration of a child’s eye view of transfer behaviour, this chapter contributes a great 
deal to the arguments put forward in this thesis. Primarily, the findings suggest that transfers are driven 
by material circumstances and are not an investment strategy. This in itself is an extension of the 
traditional altruistic model which suggests that extended families provide a residual function with 
regards to welfare support. Existing research was only able to infer motives based on the characteristics 
of parents and a limited description of their children. This chapter fleshes out the pull factors and does 
much to explain the limited rates of financial transfers. It concludes simply that children in 
economically challenging circumstances with rich parents are likely to receive transfers and this is 
exceptionally informative in answering question 2 which was put forward in chapter 3 of this thesis 
(page 46). Chapter 7 seeks to explain whether policies crowd out transfers to potential recipients but 
would be unable to do so without the ground work provided by this analysis. 
In addition to this, the analysis gave an indication of the extent to which transfer receipt is conditional 
upon parent circumstances. This was seen to be quite considerable in Model 2 and Model 3 where the 
random and fixed effects showed a large degree of variance between rather than within households. 
The overall implications of this are that it would appear that parental circumstances and tendencies are 
of primary importance in determining transfers with receipt heavily conditional upon this. In terms of 
the theoretical model put forward in Chapter 3, this chapter has therefore provided evidence that the 
interaction between parental and child circumstances is distinctively one sided. 
The implications of these two findings for the primary concern of this thesis are considerable. This 
thesis looks to assess the extent to which policies affect transfer behaviour. The residual narrative put 
forward by this chapter implies that the extended family mimics a residual welfare state. The analysis 
suggests that the family only seeks to ensure a minimum level of material conditions. This may imply 
that the family will therefore react to minimum income protection policies. Where the welfare state 
effectively ensures a minimum income for households, the family should find little incentive to provide 
financial assistance on the basis of the findings in this chapter. What’s more, the finding that receipt is 
heavily conditional on a latent tendency to receive transfers suggest that policy effects on financial 
transfer behaviour will be amplified through the parent relative to the child. Therefore, as chapter 7 
looks to examine how policies affect the likelihood of receiving financial assistance it should be 
contextualised by the assertion that parental circumstances appear to be more decisive than recipient 





The limitations within this analysis centre on the inability to fully and adequately account for 
unobserved heterogeneity between households. There may exist a spurious effect related to the 
resources of the support network for each household. Households with richer support networks are 
more likely to be rich themselves and therefore it is not income having an effect but the capacity of 
their friends and family to give financial assistance. Nevertheless, the direction of this spurious effect 
runs counter to the ‘Minimum Income Models’ assertion that poorer households will be more likely to 
receive financial assistance. Therefore, a more appropriately designed longitudinal design that allowed 
for measurement of parent and child resources would allow for better estimates but intuition would 
suggest that this would only increase the effect size observed here. 
The distinction between the two models here could also be disputed in terms of the dependent variable 
used. Here only the receipt of a financial transfer was recorded and the amount was ignored. It is 
possible to take the amount into account using a Tobit model but this was not done here. The reason 
for this was the estimation of a random effect Tobit model covering such a large data set is beyond the 
computing capacity available. This approach does have significant benefits and would be a more robust 
test of the theory given that one would expect a ‘Minimum Income Model’ and ‘Aspirational Model’ to 
predict different sized transfers. Minimum income transfers maybe a small transfer that act as a residual 
to existing incomes. Aspirational transfers are likely to centre on investments and large purchases such 
as deposits for housing, education or a car. 
In addition to this, the distinction in effects between self-reported financial circumstances and the 
actual level of income suggests that the concept of a child’s material circumstances is cloudy. Section 
6.2.3 illustrates the relationship between the two concepts as correlated but not concrete. It is possible 
to ‘struggle to make ends meet’ in the upper income quartile whilst over half of those in the lowest 
income quartile report no difficulties in living within their means. This underlines the ambiguity of the 
self-reported status. Given that the findings here are largely based on the relationship between this 
variable and the probability of receiving a transfer, it is important to establish its conceptual meaning. 
Here it is taken as a subjective self-assessment that would be transmitted to the households support 
network and not just the survey. The validity of this claim is however questionable and further 
consideration should be given to how this variable behaves across a variety of indicators. To the 






7. Public & Private Transfers to European Households 
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter 5 examined whether public financial transfers to the parents increases the likelihood that they 
make private financial transfers to their children, a process labelled ‘crowding in’. This chapter 
examines whether receiving public financial transfers decreases the likelihood of receiving a financial 
transfer, a process known as ‘crowding out’. 
This discussion is embedded in a contemporary debate about the way in which the family and state 
interact. The 2008 economic crisis has led to retrenchment of the market and welfare state in many 
areas of Europe. This process evokes a debate that asks whether the expansion of the state meant the 
retrenchment of family and social ties (Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). Given this, to what extent can we 
expect social networks to ‘pick up the slack’ in welfare provision? This chapter examines whether there 
is an identifiable relationship between public and private provision of financial support and therefore 
whether such a crowding out effect can be identified in contemporary Europe. 
There has been considerable research investigating the crowding out principle with mixed evidence 
suggesting that it is highly context dependent (Argimon, Gonzalez-Paramo, & Roldan, 1997; Andreoni 
& Payne, 2011; Reil-Held, 2006). It is also evident that due to a number of factors, the effect is 
particularly hard to isolate and identify from an empirical perspective. Using comparative and 
longitudinal methods in a multilevel design, this chapter looks at the relationship between receipts 
from public and private transfers across 24 European countries between 2005 & 2010. 
Given the significant retrenchment in many welfare states following the financial crisis, understanding 
the capacity and willingness of the family and others to respond in times of hardship is a pertinent and 
substantively interesting question. In addition to this, the analysis looks to consider the extent to which 
public financial assistance is a confounding factor in the effects observed in chapter 6. For example, 
there appears to be a large difference between social classes in their private transfer behaviour 
(Albertini & Radl, 2012). This observed effect could be spurious if public transfer receipts are higher 
amongst some social classes and are also ‘crowding out’ private transfers. That is to say that richer 
parents may only make financial transfers to their adult children because their adult children don’t 
receive assistance through public transfers. 
In order to satisfy these substantive and theoretical concerns, the chapter begins in section 7.2.1 by 
outlining the existing literature and exploring existing evidence of a crowding out effect and the 
limitations of such research. This is supplemented by a consideration of the importance of the crowding 
out hypothesis in the context of private transfer behaviour and the related literature in section 7.2.3. 
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This is followed by a detailed discussion of methodological issues with existing research and potential 
limitations to this chapter in section 7.2.4. Attempts to address these concerns are then considered in 
section 7.2.5. Section 7.3 discusses various results of the analysis before section 7.4 summarises the 
findings, limitations and areas for future research. 
7.2. Context, Model & Methods 
In order to make inferences from the analysis in this chapter, the context of the debate needs to be 
considered. This section does this by first outlining the long running crowding out debate. It then 
progresses to the perspective of intergenerational transfers within this literature, before outlining the 
methodological challenges that the analysis encountered.  
7.2.1. The Genesis of the Debate  
The aim of this thesis is to understand the effect of social policies on intergenerational, financial 
transfers. The effect of policy on societal institutions is not a new area of study. In order to make 
broader inferences from the analysis within this thesis, it is therefore necessary to consider the broader 
debates within which it sits. This was outlined in detail within chapter 2 of this thesis and this section 
seeks to outline the role of this analysis within a debate that is of considerable social significance in 
contemporary Europe. 
The crowding out hypothesis is attributable to a number of scholars examining the extent to which 
contractions and expansions in public sector activity are linked to expansions and contractions in 
private activity (Abrams & Schitz, 1978; Fukuyama, 1999; Buiter, 1977). Quite simply, crowding out 
is when the existence of public sector activity leads to less activity from private actors such as firms, 
families or third sector institutions. Discussions of the crowding out hypothesis tend to deal with each 
of these actors individually, focusing on either market or societal responses to public expansion or 
retrenchment (for an example of market crowding out: Simmons & Emanuele, 2004 & for an example 
of social crowding out: Andreoni, 1993). 
With regards to welfare provision, this chapter primarily deals with the relationship between the family 
and the public sector and is therefore more concerned with ‘social crowding out’. The third of welfare 
provider is the market place. There is a large amount of research concerning the relationship between 
public and market provision of welfare (Ahmed & Miller, 2007; Argimon, Gonzalez-Paramo, & 
Roldan, 1997) but this thesis focuses on family provision rather than market provision. The primary 
concern here is whether households receive more from friends and family when public support is 
reduced and whether they decrease it when public support is increased. Given that chapter 6 argued 
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that private transfers are targeted at those in need, the crowding out hypothesis should logically follow 
if public transfers are effective in reducing need. 
Yet the debate surrounding the crowding out hypothesis regarding family support is sustained by the 
inherent flaws of existing methods and limitations of data. Endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, 
selection effects and a lack of data have starved the debate of empirical foundations on both sides, 
reducing policy effects to dummy variables or de-contextualised coefficients (Kunemund & Rein, 1999; 
Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010; Albertini, Kohli, & Vogel, 2006). 
The financial crisis of 2008 has reenergised this debate. With the market less able to provide 
employment, the hypothesis has begun to re-enter public discourse. Fiscal constraints have led some 
governments to utilise a logic that the state need not do what the family could do instead (Cameron, 
2010). The ideological implications of such a claim imply a change in tide within European Societies 
that have persistently advanced the principles of individualism and de-familisation over the past two 
decades (Lewis, 1992; Saraceno C. , 2000; Sapir, 2003). The question is therefore whether public 
retrenchment has been met with family renewal and whether ‘rolling back the state’ means a 
reinvigoration of family support. 
7.2.2. Previous Findings 
Existing evidence of crowding out can be found in a wide array of subject fields. There has been 
research on the extent to which charitable giving is crowded out by public funding (Andreoni, 1993; 
Andreoni & Payne, 2011; Eckel, Grossman, & Johnston, 2005); whether private investment is 
crowded out by public investment (Argimon, Gonzalez-Paramo, & Roldan, 1997; Ganelli, 2003; 
Ahmed & Miller, 2007); whether volunteering is supplanted by welfare state expansion (Day & Devlin, 
1996; Simmons & Emanuele, 2004); whether families spend less on education when it is made publicly 
available (Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010) and whether families continue to provide care when public 
provision is extended be it for older persons (Costa-Font, 2010) or the young (Long, 1991).  
The findings from this research, and countless other studies not included here, have been mixed but 
predominantly in support of the crowding out hypothesis. But whilst the majority of analyses have 
identified a crowding out effect (Andreoni & Payne, 2011), others have demonstrated no effect (Eckel, 
Grossman, & Johnston, 2005) and a small number allude to a ‘crowding in’ effect by which the family 
is enabled or motivated to increase support in line with public support (Kunemund & Rein, 1999). As 
well as being split in terms of their findings and dependent variables, there is a demarcation in the 
literature between studies using micro analyses and those using macro analyses.  
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Findings using a macro approach are more mixed in their conclusions and are open to criticisms such as 
the ecological fallacy (Goldstein, 2011). There are a large number of omitted variables within these 
studies and they inevitably struggle to describe a micro process using higher level data. Micro analysis 
studies on the other hand tend to be limited by one of two issues. Firstly, much of the individual level 
analysis on crowding out has been conducted in psychological experimental conditions (Andreoni, 
1993; Eckel, Grossman, & Johnston, 2005). Whilst widely considered a gold standard in research, it is 
not clear whether such findings can be observed in circumstances in which the hypothesis has been 
invoked (Cartwright, 2007). This can also be said of a number of other micro studies which focus on 
particular policies or cases that relied on a natural experiment (i.e. policy change) to test the hypothesis 
(Juarez, 2009; Long, 1991; Reil-Held, 2006). It is these studies which have predominantly produced 
confirmations of the crowding out hypothesis. What is missing from this literature is a more holistic 
treatment of the hypothesis in a ‘real world’ setting and this is the gap that this paper intends to fill. 
There has been considerable research on the financial support offered by families across different 
households and this has included the interaction between public and private provision of financial 
assistance. The majority of this research has taken a comparative form in trying to identify a policy 
effect (Schenk, Dykstra, & Maas, 2010; Albertini & Kohli, 2012; Brandt & Deindl, 2013). This 
approach entails identifying cross national differences in behaviour and attributing them to policy 
differences. For example Albertini & Kohli argue that the larger yet less frequent transfers in Southern 
Europe are due to the welfare state being orientated towards the family. In the North of Europe, the 
welfare states focus on supporting individuals mean that transfers are small but pervasive. Similarly, 
Brandt et al (2013) analyse intergenerational exchange dynamics in differing regimes and argue that the 
differing dynamics are brought about by policy environment rather than cultural, demographic or 
environmental factors. The reason for this approach is that the authors are not primarily concerned 
with the direct impact of the transfer but are instead considering a broader understanding of 
intergenerational dynamics. This is grounded in the assumption that macro level factors represent 
distinct typologies and are better captured by the methods that they have employed (Esping Andersen, 
1990).  
By contrast the crowding out hypothesis is based on an individualistic, utility maximising model of 
behaviour and so testing it requires policies to be understood from the individual’s perspective. One 
solution to the question of how to more accurately capture the effect of policy on individual level 
behaviour is to use multilevel methods in order to attain a methodologically sound yet generalisable 
assessment of the interaction between public and private welfare provision from a comparative 
perspective (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012; Hox, 2010). Yet concerns exist with such an approach. 
Firstly, it is unclear to what extent the country level can be considered a random sample of a 
population for which frequentist statistics are appropriate (Maas & Hox, 2005). Secondly, the number 
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of units at the country level often severely limits the analytical power that such an analysis has. 
Therefore to tackle the question of how policy affects individual level behaviour, this analysis 
conceptualises policy at the individual level by measuring welfare receipts for each household, 
mitigating the need for ‘random effects’ at the country level. This subsequently allows the use of fixed 
effects for country specific effects. 
One study was identified that was not reliant on comparative techniques and was able to measure 
policy at the micro level. Björnberg and Latta (2007) used data from Sweden to demonstrate that 
public and private financial assistance filled distinct and complementary roles rather than displacing one 
another. They found that the family often provided assistance for no reason whatsoever and thus 
undermined the assumption that both the welfare state and family should respond to the same forms of 
need. However this study was limited in that it only looked at Sweden which the authors illustrated 
was a society which heavily relied upon the welfare state for financial support. 
7.2.3. Intergenerational Transfers as Welfare Provision 
This analysis will examine the impact of changes in public provision of financial assistance on the 
likelihood of receiving financial assistance from individuals outside of one’s current household. 
Crowding Out has a great deal of significance for debates regarding intergenerational transfers. Much 
of the existing literature has noted inequalities in transfer behaviour (Cox, 1987; Loury, 1981; Gale & 
Scholz, 1994). Some studies have looked to intergenerational transfers as a source of low socio-
economic mobility by exploring class and income differentials (Albertini & Radl, 2012; Zissimopoulos 
& Smith, 2010; Leopold & Schneider, 2010). Others have looked at cultural values and even human 
capital explanations for the differences in private transfer behaviour (Attias-Donfut, Ogg, & Wolff, 
2005; Albertini & Kohli, 2012; Lennartson, 2010). The primary conclusion of such research is that 
class and income status are transmitted through financial support, primarily from parents to their adult 
children because the children of the financially affluent are more likely to receive financial assistance. 
Yet this commentary on private transfer behaviour is complex when considered in the theoretical 
framework of chapter 3. Firstly, in analysing the effect of income or class on the probability of 
receiving a private transfer, they fail to account for the welfare receipts of the individual child which 
may be acting as an intervening variable creating spurious effects. It could be argued, for example, that 
richer people’s children do not receive welfare support and therefore need external financial support 
(Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010).  If true then the effect of parental income, wealth or class maybe over 
stated. This is because a child of a poorer parent may receive financial assistance from the state in lieu 
of assistance from their parents. If this is the case then the assertion that such financial transfers 
perpetuate inequalities does not hold and their substantive impact would be questionable given that 
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children of both the poor and rich would have comparable outcomes. For the poorer child, their 
financial assistance from their family has been simply crowded out and they are not, ceteris paribus, less 
likely to receive financial assistance from family and friends than richer families. 
Given that many welfare systems incorporate family wealth and support within their welfare systems, 
this may indeed be plausible and consideration of the socio-cultural context is necessary. For example, 
in some circumstances individuals can be excluded from public assistance on the basis that the family is 
capable of doing so (Saraceno & Keck, 2009). It could also be expected that the children of the 
educated and higher classes are disinclined to receive welfare support and therefore rely upon the 
family to a greater extent (Taylor-Gooby, 2001). In short, if crowding out exists then it is possible that 
the existing private transfer literature has reached a premature conclusion regarding the effect of 
private transfers on social mobility. The implications of this are considerable for the field given that one 
of the primary conclusions of the literature has been that private financial transfers will have dampened 
social mobility and perpetuated inequalities (Loury, 1981; Kohli, 1999; Kunemund, 2008).  
The second point of consideration in this debate is the extent to which transfers are made based on 
need rather than aspiration. Income or class differentials in transfer behaviour are often considered to 
be aspirational and not need based. This claim has been based on the notion that private transfers are 
made based on kinship rather than need and are subsequently the anti-thesis of the welfare state (Heath, 
1981). Chapter 6 largely contradicted this assertion and argued that it was poorer and more financially 
constrained households that were the targets of transfers. This indicated a ‘minimum income’ motive 
rather than an ‘aspirational’ one. Nevertheless the results also indicated that certain families transferred 
whilst others did not. This, based on the conclusions of chapters 5 & 6, is likely attributable to the 
family structure and financial position of the parental household. That is to say that the likely recipient 
of financial assistance is a household that is in financial difficulty and whose family is predisposed to help 
them.  
The assertion of the ‘minimum income model’ from chapter 6 would therefore be that there should be a 
strong crowding out effect if public financial assistance accurately targets those in financial hardship. If 
public assistance alleviates financial hardship, the likelihood of receiving private financial assistance 
should decrease when a household is in receipt. Examining the interaction between public and private 
financial assistance should therefore help in understanding not only why and when parents provide 
financial assistance but also the extent to which such transfers are substitutes for state welfare or a 
means of transmitting wealth and social status. In short, what emerges are two hypotheses which 
should support each other. The first says that households that are in greater need will receive more 
financial assistance because their parents care about them and will provide such assistance. The second 
says that those who are in receipt of public financial assistance, are less likely to receive private financial 
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assistance because there need will be reduced by the public transfer. Given the interdependence of 
these hypotheses, how can the observation that households are more likely to receive financial 
assistance from other households when they have already received financial assistance from the state be 
reconciled with the understanding of transfer behaviour outlined in chapter 6 which suggested that 
those in the most pressing of economic circumstances are the likeliest recipients of financial assistance? 
This question is explored in this analysis and potential explanations offered in section 7.4.  
7.2.4. Empirical constraints 
This chapter asks whether public transfers crowd out private transfers and make households less likely 
to receive financial support from their family and friends. Or whether this association is due to spurious 
effects or misspecifications in the relationship. Therefore it is necessary to explore the methodological 
issues that cloud the debate on crowding out. 
Endogeneity & Crowding Out the State  
The assertion in the crowding out hypothesis is that it is the welfare state that crowds out the family 
and not the other way around. This is intuitive given the logic that an individual will more readily react 
to public measures than a state will to an individual. However, in many European countries welfare 
state mechanisms can be conditional on family wealth and the capacity of the family to care for its 
members both internal and external of the household (Saraceno & Keck, 2009). On such occasions, it is 
the capacity to give a private transfer that leads the state not to. 
The plausibility of this criticism maybe questioned given the sporadic nature of such instances in which 
this may occur. Yet its effect on the substantive understanding and empirical estimates of the 
relationship between family and state could be meaningful. In the defamilisation literature, the point is 
made that it is precisely these legal and policy institutions that induce a male breadwinner family model 
(Lewis, 1992; Esping-Andersen, 2009). Welfare states provided welfare to a household via the male 
worker in return for contributions to social insurance. In this model a woman does not directly receive 
public, financial, welfare assistance as it is assumed that the husband will be able to provide. It is 
therefore the receipt of a private transfer from the husband to the wife that ensures that there is no 
public transfer. This can be seen as private transfers crowding out the state. It is not an economic 
response on the part of the family but instead a reaction of the state and a question of institutional 





As argued in 2.2, income and class differentials in the likelihood of making a private financial transfer 
are a particular concern in the literature on private transfer behaviour (Albertini & Radl, 2012). 
Cultural factors, the proximity of households to existing welfare institutions and the extent to which 
individuals are familiar with systems of welfare will drive private transfer behaviour and potentially 
cause greater inequality and dampen social mobility (Lennartson, 2010). This has been evidenced by 
those with higher incomes making private transfers more regularly than those on low incomes, thus 
perpetuating existing inequalities across generations (Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010). 
Yet the state may have crowded out private transfer behaviour and therefore private transfers cannot be 
seen as discriminatory. Low income families would make private transfers if not supported by the state. 
It is therefore important to isolate the response of family networks to the receipt of private transfers as 
it affects our understanding of private transfer behaviour in a macro-social context. 
Homogenous Effects for Families  
According to the crowding out hypothesis, the effect will be the same across households and their 
associated family networks. Economic conceptualisations tend to view the family as a means rather than 
an end in the sense that they redistribute resources and maximise the utility of all constituent members. 
Given varying characteristics and contexts of these family units, it should be anticipated that families 
are heterogeneous (Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). In some, the family unit may be one in which 
a large amount of redistribution occurs due to large amounts of specialisation by members, such as in 
traditional nuclear families. In family units with greater homogeneity amongst members, arrangements 
may be less orientated towards redistribution (Puur, Sakkeus, Schenk, & Poldma, 2010). If implicit 
agreements are different between families, it should be anticipated that the effect itself is dependent 
upon a number of household and contextual factors (Attias-Donfut, Ogg, & Wolff, 2005). This 
assertion is supported by the findings of chapters 5 & 6 where the broader family context was shown to 
be a key determinant of transfer behaviour. 
Homogenous Effects for Policies  
The hypothesis also suggests that all public transfers crowd out private transfers. Yet the logics and 
dynamics of individual policy programmes vary. For example it could be anticipated that certain family 
policies such as child benefits may indeed crowd out payments given that they support the 
independence of a particular household (Aassve, Arpino, & Goisis, 2012). Yet simultaneously, welfare 
state payments made to the more affluent members of a family network (i.e. pensioners) could crowd 
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in private transfers as they may induce redistribution as evidenced in chapter 5 (Kunemund & Rein, 
1999; Reil-Held, 2006). 
These considerations place large demands on any insight into the crowding out hypothesis’ validity. 
These issues are deeply embedded within the methods, institutions and conceptualisations of social 
policy research and so to assert that existing approaches can be undermined through the limited analysis 
provided here would be misguided. Instead, what can be offered is an attempt to explore the complex 
relationship between family and state provision of assistance in the context of private financial transfers. 
The findings of chapter 6 in particular suggested that the logic of transfer behaviour was one of financial 
assistance rather than an investment. It may therefore be that certain policies crowd out transfers whilst 
others do not. Benefits that are given in relation to educational support such as subsidised student loans 
or bursaries may not be related to private forms of financial assistance given that they target separate 
needs. If a private transfer is designed to alleviate financial hardship it may be less responsive to such 
‘investment’ policies. In contrast benefits that target social exclusion and low income households may 
well crowd out private financial assistance given that they are fulfilling a similar role. To consider these 
theoretical distinctions in the types of policies, the receipts from public benefits are categorised into 
seven broad groups and analysed separately. 
7.2.5. Data & Methods 
In order to examine this hypothesis, data from the European Union’s Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) will be used to analyse the extent to which public and private transfers occur 
concurrently (Eurostat, 2011). This dataset was chosen for a number of reasons that are discussed more 
fully in chapter 4. Firstly, it is a comparative dataset of the 27 members of the European Union (data 
for Iceland and Norway are also included taking the total number of countries to 29 of which 24 are 
used here8). This allows us to examine the relationship across national boundaries and address the 
comparative question within this thesis. Secondly, the data is a longitudinal rotational panel with 
households followed for four years. This allows us to examine the extent to which public and private 
transfer receipts vary within households over time. This also allows for a large degree of unobserved 
heterogeneity at the household level to be captured and therefore more robust inferences made. 
The third reason for choosing the EU-SILC is the sheer number and quality of measures used within it. 
Data is collected on the receipt of a wide range of social benefits and transfers as well as an indication of 
informal private financial transfers from non-cohabiting private actors. Such data is not often collected 
                                                          
8 Germany was excluded because data was only available for 2006 at the time of analysis. In addition, Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia 
and Ireland did not have data on key variables. 
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and especially not in a longitudinal and comparative perspective. This provides a unique opportunity to 
address a number of issues identified within the previous section. The analysis that is possible with such 
data allows for robust inferences that can help inform our understanding of the relationship between 
family and state support (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012). 
In analysing this data, a multilevel model is adopted which aims to control for family level unobserved 
heterogeneity. This approach nests individual observations within households so that a household 
coefficient can be estimated that is itself determined by time invariant factors in the same way as 
chapter 6. This approach means that a great deal of unobserved heterogeneity can be captured. This is 
because we are comparing households with themselves over time rather than other households. This 
makes comparisons more meaningful as the comparison is between observations that are more 
comparable.  
There are strict assumptions that come with such an approach, the most onerous of which is the 
assumption that all factors at the household level which are correlated with the outcome variable are 
included within the model. This is an ambitious assumption and one that is also difficult to test in these 
circumstances but necessary nevertheless if we are to analyse comparative, longitudinal data regarding 
this issue. To address this, Household means are included within the model in order to control for 
second level endogeneity (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012). In this respect the model represents an 
exact replica of model 2 in chapter 6 with the difference being the segregation of household income 




Table 7.1 - Descriptive Statistics 




Received a Transfer 108,916 6.27% - - - 
Average Age in Household 108,918 44.269 11.609 11 82 
Number of Children in Household 108,918 1.329 1.57 0 14 
Household Size 108,918 3.186 1.535 1 20 
Household Income (PPP) 107,973 € 13,891 17,574 € 0  € 3,679,263  
Household Benefit Receipts (PPP) 108,828 € 12,341 19,482 € 0 € 886,909  
Household includes someone of Ill Health 108,918 37.77% - - - 
Household Struggles to make ends meet 108,739 35.52% - - - 
Household includes someone Unemployed 108,918 37.63% - - - 
Household includes a Student 108,918 12.47% - - - 
            
Maximum Education in Household - Low 107,817 11.26% - - - 
Medium 107,817 44.37% - - - 
High 107,817 42.10% - - - 
            
Household includes a Couple 108,918 82.07% - - - 
            
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005 - 2010 
The unit of analysis for this research is the household, with each household contributing between 1 and 
4 observations to the overall sample. These observations are nested within the relevant household using 
a multilevel random intercept structure as discussed above. 
The dependent variable for the analysis is a dichotomous variable which is constructed using the 
variable HY080G which captures the gross private transfers that the household has received in the last 
full calendar year. This is coded as 1 if they have received at least €1 and 0 if they have not received 
any. As Table 7.1 illustrates, 7.4% of household observations in the sample received a private transfer. 
The financial value variables are calculated using the purchasing power parity weights calculated by 
Eurostat and are all expressed in Euros. All these financial variables are then logged in order to provide 
a normal distribution that is more appropriate for this analysis. Income is constituted by the total 
amount of gross household income. 
The value of the total benefit receipts is the summation of all public transfers made to the household in 
the income reference period which includes the household level transfers such as child benefits, housing 
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benefits and other unclassified social benefits. These are then added to the sum total of individual level 
benefits for each household member including unemployment benefits, old age benefits, survivor 
benefits, sick benefits, disability benefits and educational benefits. 
A potential measurement issue derived from this is the missing variable of in kind payments from the 
public sector such as tax exemptions or relief. Although this analysis only focuses on financial transfers, 
in kind payments are often made as an alternative to financial payments and are therefore correlated 
with the main independent and dependent variable. For example, childcare is often provided directly as 
a service and sometimes it is supported through financial payments such as child benefits. This is largely 
unavoidable within this analysis and lies outside the scope of this research.  
It is nevertheless a threat to the internal validity of this analysis. One potential solution would be to 
generate an indicator of eligibility for in kind help. That is to say, where the receipts are measured on 
an individual level, a proxy could be created which identified the in-kind social assistance that an 
individual or household was eligible for and an indicator used to capture this. Such a task for 29 
countries lies outside of the resources of this project however. 
Household level indicators are also included within the model such as the average household age, 
household size, number of children, maximum education level in the household, unemployed person in 
the household, student in the household and ill person in the household. In addition to this, whether 
the household struggled to make ends meet was used to identify general material circumstances as was 
the case in chapter 6. There it was identified as the primary determinant of receiving financial assistance 
as is therefore afforded greater scrutiny here. The stability and nature of the household was captured 





Section 7.3 of this chapter describes the results of the analysis. Section 7.3.1 starts by discussing the 
effect of total public transfer receipts on the likelihood of receiving a transfer. This is a longitudinal 
model and the discussion centres on whether the crowding out hypothesis is supported. The findings 
suggest a crowding in effect and the validity of this finding are examined. Section 7.3.2 then explores 
whether the finding holds across policies and finds that it does with only a few exceptions. Section 
7.3.3 then examines whether it is robust across a geographical clustering of countries and finds that the 
results are largely consistent. 
7.3.1. Household Level Variations in Europe 
In order to assess whether private transfers are crowded out by public transfers, longitudinal, 
multilevel probit analyses were used and models constructed in a stepwise fashion. The results of this 
can be seen in Table 7.2. The first model analyses the extent to which total public transfers are 
associated with private transfers. The second model then breaks this analysis down into various forms 
of benefits to examine whether there are homogenous effects of public transfers on the likelihood of 
receiving financial assistance. This section discusses the findings of model 1. Counter to the crowding 
out hypothesis, the analysis shows that public transfers are associated with an increase in the probability 
of receiving a private transfer and this is significant at the 99.9% level of confidence.  In the context of 
the effect of income, the size of the coefficient and maximum effect is rather small. The far greater 
determinant of whether a transfer is received is the financial constraints that were identified in chapter 
6. ‘Making Ends Meet’ and ‘Household Income’ are shown to impact the probability far more than the 




Table 7.2 - The effect of Public Transfer Receipts on the likelihood of receiving a Private 
Transfer in the last 12 months using a Probit Model 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Total Benefits (Log, Euros) 0.026 *** 
  (0.003) 
















































 N 106,436  106,436  
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005 – 2010 Notes: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 





Figure 7.1 - Marginal Effects at the Means of Total Benefits on the Predicted probability 
of receiving a transfer in the last 12 months 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005 - 2010 
The results from this model are consistent with those in Chapter 6. All coefficients are in the direction 
broadly hypothesised by theories of altruism except that concerning unemployment (Cox, 1987). This 
coefficient suggests that households that include an individual who is unemployed are less likely to 
receive a private transfer than those which do not. This could be occurring for a number of reasons. 
First, households who experience unemployment are also far less likely to be part of groups which are 
affluent enough to support them during times of unemployment. However this argument does not hold 
in a longitudinal approach given that the comparisons made are within household and therefore such 
issues should not be causing this effect because households are compared with themselves over time. 
Doubt in this explanation is reinforced by no such effect being evident for the dummy variable which 
captures the ability to make ends meet. The same causal relationship should be in evidence here if the 
negative coefficient for unemployment is due to unemployed people having poorer social networks. 
This is because one would anticipate that households struggling to make ends meet also come from 
poorer support networks as is the case with unemployment. 
A further explanation could lie in the unit of analysis used. This effect could be caused by unemployed 
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Wolpin, 1993). Therefore these households would be net transfer givers, something inevitably 
correlated with low transfer receipts. This would explain the negative coefficient yet such an 
explanation is undermined as similar processes are not undermining the coefficient for a student or 
person of ill health in residence. If the finding is taken to be empirically robust then it could be argued 
that individuals who are unemployed are distinguished from other forms of need.  
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Table 7.3 - Covariates of Model 1 & 2 predicting the receipt of a financial transfer in the 
last 12 months. 
  Conservative Scandinavian Southern Eastern 
Child Benefits (Log, Euros) 0.068 *** 0.056 *** 0.016 * 0.040 *** 
 (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.006)  
Social Exclusion Benefits (Log, Euros) -0.005  0.003  0.024 * 0.029 *** 
 (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.008)  
Housing Benefits (Log, Euros) 0.033 * 0.060 *** 0.044 ** 0.023 * 
 (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.010)  
Old Age Benefits (Log, Euros) 0.014  0.015  0.000  0.009  
 (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.006)  
Widow Benefits (Log, Euros) -0.067 * 0.012  -0.028 ** -0.042 *** 
 (0.027)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.007)  
Disability Benefits (Log, Euros) 0.005  0.027 ** 0.005  -0.004  
 (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.006)  
























 Intercept Variance 0.798 *** 0.903 *** 0.743 *** 0.779 ***
  (0.068)  (0.055)  (0.043)  (0.028)     
N  8,333   13,937  25,741   39,264  
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005 – 2010. Notes: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 
0.05. Standard Errors are in Parentheses. Scandinavian: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway. Conservative: Austria, 
Netherlands, Belgium, France, Luxembourg. Southern: Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal. Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech 




Whilst these results do account for between household heterogeneity, they do not fully account 
for within household heterogeneity. They suppose that public transfers increase the likelihood that an 
individual will receive a private transfer independent of the households’ circumstances. If it is assumed 
that public transfers are directed at those in most material need then an external event that triggers 
public transfers would also trigger private transfers and therefore it is not the public transfers 
themselves which caused the private transfer. 
Attempts are made to correct for this by including indicators of whether the household includes 
individuals who are unemployed, students or those in poor health. It also accounts for the number of 
children within the household. The importance of these factors in attracting informal support is 
evidenced by strongly significant and large values. However data restrictions and the limitations of this 
analytic approach mean that changes in circumstances and a full picture of household circumstances 
cannot be fully captured by this analysis. 
In order to more fully address such issues it would be more pertinent to use an instrumental variable 
approach (Heckman, 1991). This approach isolates the effect of public transfers on private transfers by 
using an instrument to mimic the random allocation evident in experimental designs. This was not 
adopted here because an adequate instrument could not be specified that would identify individuals 
who were more likely to receive a public transfer but that had no association with the likelihood that 
they would receive a private transfer. The inability to use such a model here means that issues of within 
household heterogeneity cannot be fully controlled for and the analysis presented here represents the 
most appropriate alternative. 
The final potential issue mentioned in section 7.2 was endogeneity: where the likelihood of receiving a 
private transfer affects the likelihood of a public transfer. This is most likely to operate through the 
capacity of a household support network. For example, a household with wealthy relatives may be less 
likely to be in receipt of public transfers given their alternative means of financial support. However, 
the capacity of support networks are assumed to be largely time invariant and therefore addressed 
through the longitudinal design of the study. 
7.3.2. Different Policies, Different Effects 
Model 2 in Table 7.2 is the same as that in Model 1 except that Public Transfer Receipts have been 
categorised into various types as defined by the EU SILC. The classification system used by Eurostat is 
taken as given but is not beyond reproach. The comparability of welfare benefits is intrinsically difficult 
and this is exacerbated by the varying degree to which various welfare systems utilise cash transfers 
rather than in-kind payments or subsidies (Clasen & Siegel, 2007). To consider whether this maybe 
leading to biased estimates, the analysis was repeated across different welfare regimes. 
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The results of the model are striking in that all but three of the categories are positively associated with 
private transfers. Widow benefits are negatively associated with transfers suggesting a crowding out 
effect. The others have coefficients that are 0. All the household level transfers positively affect the 
likelihood of receiving a private transfer, as well as Educational and Sickness benefits at the individual 
level.   
Of the policies that were shown to be positively associated with the likelihood of receiving a private 
transfer, the usual caveats of causality apply. There is possible endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity that is not captured by this model and the extent to which the results are robust is open 
to doubt. The distinction between household and individual level benefits may indicate a structural or 
methodological issue rather than a crowding in effect. That is to say that the individual level benefits 
may also have an effect on behaviour but given that they are a summation of individual level receipts, 
this effect could have been missed due to the ecological fallacy of attempting to measure a process at 
one level (an individual’s receipt of a transfer) using aggregated data (for all household members). This 
suspicion is re-enforced by the shift in the coefficient for family size from positive to negative and a fall 
in the effect size of the number of children, potentially indicating a structural consideration. To test 
this, the analysis was conducted again using equivalised figures. The results remained the same with the 
significance levels identical between the two models. 
What is of interest is whether the finding that these particular policies ‘crowd in’ private transfers can 
be substantiated by any social theory. Whilst space is limited here to explore such a consideration there 
is a potential thematic distinction between those with significant effects and those without. Those with 
a null or negative effect (disability, widow, old age) tend to be received by households with older 
members. Transfers from parents to children and their correlation with age is well established (Kohli, 
Private and Public Transfers between Generations: Linking the Family and the State, 1999). Yet here 
there is an effect independent of age. It suggests that when households with older residents receive 
public financial assistance, private financial assistance is either crowded out or unresponsive (which 
given that the probability of receiving for such a household is relatively low anyway is approximately 
the same thing). Research on South East Asian societies with less developed pension and care systems 
have suggested that there is an enormous amount private financial and physical support from adult 
children to their parents in lieu of state support (Frankenberg, Lillard, & Willis, 2002). This may 
represent the very edge of this crowding out process. 
In contrast, the policies with an identifiable crowding in effect are policies aimed at supporting younger 
households or those in earlier stages of the life course including child benefit, housing benefit, and 
education benefits. Of those policies with significant and positive effects, child benefit and educational 
benefits have anticipated returns that look beyond the existing material conditions of individual 
165 
 
households. That is to say that the design of these policies is based on future returns on the transfer 
rather than an immediate effect on material circumstances.  
From an economic perspective, this finding makes little sense given that the marginal returns to any 
investment would be lower with each additional Euro the household receives. That is to say that it 
makes little financial sense for extended family to contribute more to educational costs or child related 
costs when the state contribution is high in comparison to when it is low. If the public transfers are 
low, the marginal returns would be greater than if provision was more extensive. In addition chapter 6 
also suggested that the receipt of transfers was primarily due to financial difficulties rather than an 
investment or aspirational drive. If parents are targeting financial assistance at households under the 
most economic pressure, it does not seem to sit with a narrative of cooperative investment between 
public and private financial assistance.  
Whilst the theoretical reasoning remains unclear, in the context of the crowding out debate these 
results do however suggest that if private sources of finance are likely to positively respond to any state 
retrenchment it is likely to be to policies affecting older households. In other words, if there is an 
interest in stimulating private financial transfers retrenchment should be focused on areas such as old 
age benefits rather than social exclusion or social investment policies but that this would be largely 
ineffectual given the estimated effect size. 
Table 7.4 – Model by Regime Clusters 
  Conservative Scandinavian Southern Eastern 
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  Conservative Scandinavian Southern Eastern 
Average Work Experience of Residents -0.007 *** -0.002 
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 var(cons) 1.034 *** 1.01 *** 0.86 *** 0.771 *** 







 N 31,415 20,623 38,018 47,902 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005 – 2010. Notes: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 
0.05. Standard Errors are in Parentheses 
7.3.3. The Comparative Perspective  
If different social policies have different effects it is tempting to suggest that this should be echoed 
through the types of policy that are evident in each regime. Given that there was evidence that child 
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benefit and educational benefits crowded in transfers, it may be argued that households in countries 
where such policies are more prevalent should also be seen to be the largest transfer countries. 
Furthermore if the relationship is age dependent, it is likely that the demographic differences across 
countries may be biasing the estimates. On the other hand, it should also be recognised that the relative 
effect size of these transfer policies was marginal given other determinants such as income, housing 
status and the number of children. Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that policy matters to that 
great an extent and that cultural or socio-economic factors may cloud any policy effects that we might 
expect to see. 
This section explores the singular effect of social transfer receipts (as in Model 1 of Table 7.2) in the 
various welfare regimes that have been common within comparative research literature (Hantrais, 
2004; Puur, Sakkeus, Schenk, & Poldma, 2010; Saraceno & Keck, 2009; Esping Andersen, 1990). 
Unfortunately, the UK and Ireland are the only countries available in the liberal regime and so it has 
been omitted from this analysis for the sake of clarity. What remains are the four regimes most 
commonly identified in the literature; Conservative, Scandinavian, Southern & Eastern.  
The results suggest a large degree of consistency across the various regimes with regards to many of the 
basic dynamics of transfer behaviour. However there is some variation in some coefficients. For 
example, the number of children in the household is positively associated with the receipt of a transfer 
in all but the conservative regimes. Whilst these represent interesting findings, a detailed discussion of 
these differences is not given here for two reasons. Firstly, the focus of this analysis is on the stability of 
the observed crowding in effect across countries and detailed consideration of these coefficients would 
detract from this. Secondly, even if the chapter were focused on an exploratory consideration of 
transfer behaviour and its variation across policy regimes, such an analysis would be limited as the 
variation could be attributable to a considerable number of other methodological or substantive issues. 
 From Table 7.4, it would appear that the finding that public transfers crowd in private transfers is 
robust across regimes. This undermines any suggestion that it is a single country or regime skewing the 
results. From the maximum effects it is evident that the Scandinavian countries do indeed tend to show 
the largest effect size with regards to crowding in. They are followed closely by the Conservative, 
Eastern and Southern countries respectively.  
This could be inferred as being in line with the findings of the previous section which suggested that 
child benefits and educational benefits encourage greater crowding in of informal transfers than policies 
directed at the elderly population. Scandinavian countries and to a lesser extent Conservative Countries 
have been proponents of such policies such as reconciliation policies and intensive investment in 
education. At the other end of the spectrum, social policies in the South and East tend to follow 
traditional labour market arrangements (Taylor-Gooby, 2004).  
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Nevertheless, this comparison of policy regimes serves to show that the effect found in the earlier 
analysis is evident in all four regimes. The analysis does support this in large part but any further 
inferences in support of a difference in effect size may well be beyond the capacity of this analysis. 
What is evident however is that there is no evidence of crowding out from any of the regimes analysed 
here and, given the diversity evident within Europe, this is quite surprising in and of itself. This in turn 
supports the assertion made within chapters 5 & 6 which argued that comparative narratives of transfer 




This chapter set out to test a long standing hypothesis in the social sciences which asserted that the 
presence of public transfers lessens the probability of private transfers. There is reasonable evidence to 
suggest that there is instead a ‘crowding in’ effect. The analysis shows that this effect appears to be 
consistent across policies accept those directed at older persons. A cross regime analysis also 
demonstrated that the effect is consistent across traditional welfare clusterings.  
From an empirical perspective, the aim of this chapter was to consider the potential critique of existing 
analysis. This suggested that the children of richer parents do not receive more transfers because they 
have more money but because they are not eligible for assistance from the welfare state. That is to say, 
only wealthy parents make financial transfers because their children do not receive public financial 
assistance. This critique asserted that it is not possible to understand the role of private transfers as a 
means of redistribution in isolation of social policy given that social policy crowded out informal 
transfers. This analysis suggests this is not the case and in so doing supports the argument that private 
transfers are potential sources of inequality and dilute social mobility. 
Yet Chapter 6 of this thesis argued that the poorest households were the recipients of transfers. 
Coupled with this analysis it could be argued that both the family and the welfare state aim to fill a role 
as welfare provider. Given this assertion one would assume that the crowding out hypothesis must 
hold. Assuming that both public and private transfers target need, statistically the crowding out 
hypothesis should be supported. Yet no evidence was found of this in this analysis. If transfers are made 
to those in financial difficulty and social payments reduce financial difficulty, public financial assistance 
should reduce transfers. There are a number of potential solutions to this paradox.  
The first and most likely of these is that the two types of transfers target (and are therefore correlated 
with) different types of need. For example, chapter 5 identified a clear effect of family size in terms of 
169 
 
resources. The results showed that the more children in a household, the more likely they were to 
receive financial assistance. The majority of social policies have diminishing returns to children 
(Saraceno & Keck, 2009). Families may therefore be identifying a different need to those identified by 
policies. That is to say that social policies identify more children as not requiring further financial 
support where as private sources of financial assistance see it as a strain on the household’s material 
circumstances and therefore provide assistance to offset this.  
The second potential explanation is that a spurious effect exists somewhere within this system. This 
could involve the misspecification of the model in chapter 6 or chapter 7. The methodological 
limitations of these approaches have been discussed in detail and to counter this future research could 
attempt to replicate this analysis with numerous data sets or with differing specifications. The final issue 
could lie in the narrow operationalisation of transfers. No amounts are considered in this analysis. 
When coupled with the finding throughout this thesis that some families are inherently predisposed to 
make transfers, the solution to this puzzle may lie in changes in the amounts given. 
Substantive implications 
The analysis presented here has argued that there is a crowding in effect associated with some public 
transfers. However, certain policy debates within Europe and beyond consistently assert the opposite, 
that public transfers reduce private transfers and weaken social bonds. No evidence is found of this. 
The current financial crisis has seen a large decrease in market activity and a subsequent increase in 
market activity. This has been followed by fiscal contraction in many European countries. In the 
absence of work and support from the state, the evidence presented here suggests that private means of 
support such as friends and family may not be forthcoming for those affected by welfare state 
retrenchment. Instead the loss of public support is compounded by a reduction in the support offered 
through informal channels. The exact reasoning for this is ambiguous but the empirical evidence is 
robust. 
This analysis finds that there is not a negative relationship between public and private transfers. Its 
findings contribute to our understanding of the relationship between households at the micro level and 
policy movements at the macro level. Given the longitudinal and comparative nature of the data, future 
research could look to expand upon this approach to determine how comparative frameworks of social 
policy regimes are reflected in household level behaviour, as this has been previously shown to be a 
fruitful area of research. 
With regards to the broader aims of this thesis, this chapter must be seen in the context of preceding 
chapters. Discussions of ‘crowding out’ or ‘crowding in’ at the recipient level must be seen in the 
context of crowding in at the parental level (Chapter 5). This parental level process appears to be far 
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more robust in estimating the likelihood of receipt. This was supported by the results of Chapter 6 
which showed an underlying unobserved tendency to receive transfers amongst some households which 
would logically be attributable to the capacity of a support network. Chapter 5 argued that the 
crowding in effect comes next and demonstrates the importance of parental resources. Only once these 
factors are determined do the considerations of a child’s circumstances come into account. 
Given this, future research should be tentative in its conclusions regarding recipient perspectives of 
demand driven narratives of transfers. From a statistical point of view, a child’s circumstances explain 
relatively little of the variance observed in transfer receipts to the extent that they often appear as 
random allocations of money. From a substantive perspective this should undermine any attempt to 
describe intergenerational transfer behaviour as needs based. Whilst they target the poor more readily 
than the rich, they are poor in addressing needs and reach a limited number of those in need. They are 
largely determined by birth and are a consequence of circumstance. They are a poor substitute for 
public welfare provision. It is therefore the conclusion of this chapter that whilst evidence exists of a 
crowding in effect at the recipient level, this should not be read as suggesting that public transfers may 
stimulate private transfers. The wider thesis has underlined their random nature and to attempt to 
direct transfer behaviour in such a way would be futile. 
Limitations 
 The analysis was unable to fully take into consideration unobserved heterogeneity in the form of time 
variant factors such as events and circumstantial changes but reflection suggests that this is not driving 
the findings presented. Similarly, it would appear that endogeneity is not a credible explanation for the 
effect. Any such endogeneity has always been hypothesised in the opposite direction necessary to nullify 
the findings as the likelihood of a private transfer would be seen to reduce the likelihood of a public 
transfer. That is to say that if the capacity of potential sources of financial assistance was larger, the 
public sector would be less likely to make a financial transfer. Any confounding factor would therefore 
only be weakening the observed effect. 
The data limited the extent to which the individual level could be placed in the context of the family.  
This hampered policy specific inferences to a great extent as structural household effects could not be 
properly captured. What is more, just one form of policy transfer was considered in the form of 
financial transfers and this is equally true of the dependent variable. The abundance of time use surveys 
and more detailed analysis of support networks would allow for a more rounded picture of the 
interaction between state and non-state actors. This lies outside of the scope of this analysis but the 
necessary data sets exist for such analysis to be conducted.  
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A further limitation lies in the analysis concentrating on receipts and not giving. The original ‘crowding 
in’ hypothesis suggested that excess pensions had a trickledown effect to younger generations and 
therefore it may be of interest to study the effect of policy transfers on giving and thus replicate the 
analysis of chapter 5 with a general survey that did not identify the recipient (Kunemund & Rein, 
1999). Such a diversion lies outside the scope of this analysis but it would certainly help expand on the 
findings here. The EU-SILC operates in a different way to SHARE in that recipients and benefactors are 
not linked within the dataset. Yet the sample is of the whole population and more detailed data is 
provided on the recipients circumstances. To fully analyse the crowding out effect however a 






Annex 1 – Independent Variables (Models 1 & 2) 
Table 7.5 - The Independent Variables from model 1 and model 2 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005 – 2010. Notes: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 
0.05. Standard Errors are in Parentheses. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Household Income (Log, Euros) -0.081 *** -0.103 *** 
(0.007)   (0.007)     
Number of Residents -0.118 *** -0.131 *** 
(0.015)   (0.015)     
Make Ends Meet (Ref# - Very Difficult) - 
Somewhat Difficult 
-0.157 *** -0.14 *** 
(0.016)   (0.016)     
Not Difficult -0.294 *** -0.26 *** 
(0.025)   (0.026)     
A Resident has a Health Problem (Ref - No) 0.109 *** 0.114 *** 
(0.016)   (0.016)     
Household Contains a Couple (Ref - No) -0.549 *** -0.548 *** 
(0.021)   (0.022)     
Average Work Experience of Residents -0.005 *** -0.006 *** 
(0.001)   (0.001)     
Number of Children 0.143 *** 0.108 *** 
(0.013)   (0.014)     
Household Contains a Baby (Ref - No) -0.201 *** -0.195 *** 
(0.035)   (0.035)     
Age -0.026 *** -0.021 *** 
(0.002)   (0.002)     
Maximum Age of Residents 0.01 *** 0.012 *** 
(0.002)   (0.002)     
Education (Ref - Low) - Medium 0.132 *** 0.153 *** 
(0.029)   (0.029)     
High 0.187 *** 0.221 *** 
(0.031)   (0.032)     
Household Contains a Full Time Employee -0.172 *** -0.173 *** 
(0.020)   (0.020)     
Household Contains a Part Time Employee 0.09 *** 0.083 *** 
(0.023)   (0.024)     
Household Contains an Unemployed Resident 0.035   0.023     
(0.026)   (0.026)     
Household Contains a Student 0.251 *** 0.196 *** 
(0.021)   (0.022)     
Household Contains a Retired Resident -0.098 *** -0.03     
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(0.024)   (0.026)     
Household Contains a Disabled Resident -0.144 *** -0.116 **  
(0.035)   (0.038)     
Household Contains a Homemaker 0.006   -0.002     
(0.025)   (0.025)     
var(cons) 0.897 *** 0.89 *** 
  (0.017)   (0.017)     
Log Likelihood -98853.6  -97867.9  
AIC 197797.2  195835.8  





Annex 2 - Multilevel Model (Country Effects) 
Table 7.6 - The fixed effects from model 1 and model 2 
Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005 – 2010. Notes: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 
0.05. Standard Errors are in Parentheses. Austria is the reference category. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Belgium 0.242 *** 0.209 *** 
  (0.055)   (0.055)     
Bulgaria 0.528 *** 0.517 *** 
  (0.063)   (0.063)     
Cyprus 0.355 *** 0.319 *** 
  (0.068)   (0.068)     
Czech Republic 0.216 *** 0.239 *** 
  (0.05)   (0.05)     
Germany 0.355 *** 0.34 *** 
  (0.065)   (0.066)     
Denmark 0.045   -0.022     
  (0.067)   (0.067)     
Estonia -0.207 *** -0.251 *** 
  (0.058)   (0.058)     
Spain -0.134 ** -0.053     
  (0.05)   (0.051)     
Finland 0.251 *** 0.182 *** 
  (0.054)   (0.054)     
France 0.018   -0.021     
  (0.051)   (0.051)     
Greece 0.371 *** 0.415 *** 
  (0.053)   (0.054)     
Hungary 0.52 *** 0.479 *** 
  (0.047)   (0.047)     
Ireland -0.395 *** -0.47 *** 
  (0.077)   (0.078)     
Iceland 0.693 *** 0.675 *** 
  (0.063)   (0.064)     
  Model 1 Model 2 
Italy 0.022   0.05     
  (0.046)   (0.046)     
Lithuania 0.009   -0.009     
  (0.06)   (0.061)     
Luxembourg -0.077   -0.111     
  (0.068)   (0.069)     
Latvia 0.293 *** 0.253 *** 
  (0.055)   (0.055)     
Malta -0.654 *** -0.742 *** 
  (0.18)   (0.184)     
Netherlands 0.016   -0.017     
  (0.055)   (0.055)     
Norway 0.29 *** 0.243 *** 
  (0.06)   (0.06)     
Poland 0.055   0.08     
  (0.046)   (0.046)     
Portugal -0.132   -0.095     
  (0.074)   (0.075)     
Romania 0.04   0.003     
  (0.057)   (0.058)     
Sweden -0.062   -0.157 **  
  (0.058)   (0.06)     
Slovenia -0.202 *** -0.232 *** 
  (0.057)   (0.057)     
Slovakia -0.107   -0.102     
  (0.065)   (0.066)     
UK -0.353 *** -0.417 *** 
  (0.062)   (0.062)     
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8. Does the number of siblings matter?9 
8.1. Introduction 
The intergenerational transfer literature is well developed and sits at an important junction between 
family studies, economics and demographics. Existing research has been rich, fruitful and insightful 
over the past 20 years to the extent that we now know a great deal about the support role played by the 
extended family throughout the life course (Berry, 2008; Cox, Motives for Private Income Transfers, 
1987; Hurd, Smith, & Zissimopoulos, 2007; Attias-Donfut, Ogg, & Wolff, 2005; Altonji, Hayashi, & 
Kotlikoff, 1997; Albertini, Kohli, & Vogel, 2006; Hurd, Smith, & Zissimopoulos, 2007; Albertini & 
Radl, 2012). This literature was discussed in detail in chapter 2 and the findings were supported by the 
analysis in chapters 5 and 6.  
Yet intergenerational transfers are about families and in existing analysis the family size, birth order and 
the interdependence of siblings transfer receipts are largely absent from the empirical and theoretical 
framework. As noted by Szydlik (2008), and the discussion of this thesis’ conceptual framework in 
chapter 3, it is highly likely that such ‘family structures’ determine many of the parameters identified as 
directly affecting transfer behaviour. The aim of this chapter is to explore the this assertion and it 
concludes by suggesting that such issues are of equal if not greater importance than the parental 
resource variables that have thus far garnered the majority of the attention. In doing so it helps establish 
to what extent the altruistic model explains differences in transfer behaviour across Europe as outlined 
in chapter 3 (page 46). This places the analysis of parental and child circumstances in a wider context. 
This chapter begins by exploring why family structure isn’t more prevalent in intergenerational transfer 
research and argues that it is to be found in the econometric roots of the analysis. It goes on to argue 
that this has led to biased estimates and an incomplete theoretical comprehension of transfer behaviour. 
Furthermore, using multilevel techniques to analyse data from the Survey for Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), the chapter attempts to more accurately specify modelling which 
might help identify family size and birth order effects on intergenerational transfers and subsequent 
welfare outcomes.  
Family size and birth order have played a crucial role in other areas of family studies such as investment 
in children and the provision of care for the elderly (Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2005; Voorpostel & 
Blieszner, 2008).  Research on intergenerational transfers has however tended to ignore family size and 
birth order due to a lack of multilevel methods and a focus on economic variables such as parental 
                                                          
9 A version of this chapter was published as: Emery, Thomas. "Intergenerational transfers and European families: Does the 
number of siblings matter?." Demographic Research 29 (2013). 
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income, as  in Chapter 5 of this thesis (Cox, 1987; Altonji, Hayashi, & Kotlikoff, 1997; McGarry, 
1997; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2009).  We now consider whether this tendency is distorting inferences 
regarding social mobility and the interaction between the family and the welfare state which underpin 
Intergenerational Transfers substantive contributions and the primary questions underlying this thesis. 
In order for this thesis to understand the relationship between social policy and intergenerational 
transfer behaviour it is therefore necessary to consider the mediating effect of family size and structure. 
In order to achieve this, this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 8.2 examines existing analysis of the 
role of family size within intergenerational transfer research. It also discusses family size in the context 
of existing theories and offers a strategy for the inclusion of siblings within the altruistic model. Section 
8.2.3 discusses the data to be used and the extent to which the data is capable of representative 
multilevel analysis. It then proceeds to outline the methods to be used in the analysis and the advantage 
of these methods over those previously used which are then applied in section 8.3.  
Section 8.3 analyses intergenerational transfer behaviour by comparing single level Probit and Tobit 
analysis of parent-child dyads with multilevel random coefficient Tobit and Probit models. Having 
established their worth, the multilevel models are examined in more detail and the effect of family size 
and birth order are independently scrutinised with regards to their effect on transfer behaviour. Section 
8.4 offers a discussion of the results and argues that the methodological approach is vindicated and 
previous bias exposed. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of implications for the broader 
thesis, limitations and directions for future research.  
8.2. Transfers in Multi-Child Families 
This section analyses the existing evidence in section 8.2.1. It then proceeds to outline an extension to 
the theoretical model in 8.2.2. This includes a discussion of the distinction between birth order and 
family size that has been prevalent in the family studies literature. This new empirical model is then 
operationalized and an analytical strategy outlined in section 8.2.3. 
8.2.1. Existing Evidence 
The existing empirical findings for intergenerational transfer behaviour as outlined in chapter 2 can be 
separated into two groups; one where the unit of analysis is the parent child dyad and another where 
the unit of analysis is the parent or family. The analysis of parent child dyads provide inferences from 
the perspective of the child and largely converge in their conclusions. In the past decade there have 
been a considerable number of studies, using a large number of datasets, covering more than twenty 
countries and there has been consistent evidence that with each additional sibling, the probability of 
receiving a transfer from parents reduces by around 20-22% (Kohli, 1999; Leopold & Schneider, 2010; 
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McGarry & Schoeni, 1995; Sikora & Peters, 2011; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010). Given these 
estimates, an only child would be twice as likely to receive a transfer as a child in a four child family.  
A number of these studies also estimated the effect on transfer size and noted a limited effect. Sikora 
and Peters (2011) suggest that with each additional sibling a child will receive $100 less in transfers per 
annum. McGarry and Schoeni find very similar results from their analysis of the Asset and Health 
Dynamics Survey of the Oldest Old (AHEAD), finding that the average amount declines by $47 with 
each additional sibling (McGarry & Schoeni, 1995). The linearity of the decline is due to the methods 
used but it does suggest that more siblings lead to less financial support. 
Evidence that uses the family or household as the unit of analysis is less conclusive, tending to show that 
families transfer more with each additional child but that this effect is small and non-linear 
(Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010; Albertini, et al., 2006; McGarry, 1997). The effect size tends to vary 
from 0-10% for the first additional child and decrease thereafter. These results have therefore been 
used to support the altruistic theory of intergenerational transfers which argues that families transfer 
less with each additional child due to decreasing marginal returns to utility and that this is reflected in 
large reductions at a per capita level for the child.  
These findings have been appendices in intergenerational research in the past as the literature has 
focused on more ‘fundamental’ dynamics such as the effect of income and age on behaviour. This has 
meant that the existing analysis has paid little attention to accurately modelling the effect of family size 
and its effect on transfer behaviour. Part of the reason for this has been the difficulty with which 
additional children can be incorporated into the existing theoretical framework borne out of the 
economic literature (Cox, 1987; Altonji, Hayashi, & Kotlikoff, 1997). The next section explores this 
and demonstrates that family size has been ostracised by the theoretical heritage of intergenerational 
transfers. 
8.2.2. Extending the Theoretical Model 
Much of the existing research on Intergenerational Transfers uses an altruistic model like the one 
outlined in chapter 3 (McGarry, 1997; Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010; Altonji, Hayashi, & Kotlikoff, 
1997). This suggests that parents transfer money due to the altruistic feelings towards their children. 
Transfers increase the wellbeing of the child, which in turn increases the wellbeing of the parent.  This 
can be expressed as: 
1) 𝑈𝑝 = 𝑢 �𝐶𝑝, �𝑉(𝐶𝑘)�� 
Where the function is constrained by: 
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2)  𝐶𝑝 =  𝐼𝑝 − 𝑇 
3) 𝐶𝑘 =  𝐼𝑘 + 𝑇𝑘  
In this model Cp is the consumption of the parent, V is the utility of the children and Ck is the 
consumption of the children. The first equation shows that the parent’s utility is determined by their 
own level of consumption and the utility of the children. The children’s utility is in turn determined by 
their own consumption levels.  Equations 2 and 3 are constraints where Ip is the Income of the parent 
and Ik is the Income of the children. T is the level of transfer from the parent to the children. In this 
approach the difference between small families and large families is the increased ‘demand’ for support 
and therefore families transfer more.  
However this approach is limited in its ability to identify the impact of family size at the individual level 
of the child. This is particularly important in order to assess how policy affects transfer behaviour which 
is the primary aim of this thesis. If this is not accounted for, spurious effects could be distorting the 
estimates of vital coefficients and the role of certain factors overplayed in the absence of more 
prominent determinants of transfer behaviour (Szydlik, 2008). Furthermore, given that 
intergenerational transfers represent a study of the family as a welfare providing unit, it is counter 
intuitive to reduce the structural dimensions of the family down to aggregates (Browning, Ciappori, & 
Weiss, 2010).  
In order to adjust the altruistic model to include more than one child it is possible to simply include a 
further child within the utility function previously described: 
1) 𝑈𝑝 = 𝑢 �𝐶𝑝, �𝑉1(𝐶𝑘1),𝑉2(𝐶𝑘2)�� 
Where the function is constrained by: 
2)  𝐶𝑝 =  𝐼𝑝 − (𝑇1 +  𝑇2) 
3) 𝐶𝑘1 =  𝐼𝑘1 + 𝑇𝑘1 
4) 𝐶𝑘2 =  𝐼𝑘2 + 𝑇𝑘2 
Here the suffixes k1 and k2 represents the first and second child respectively. V represents the utility 
function in relation to each individual child from the perspective of the parent but is assumed to be the 
same for all children. The accuracy of this claim will be considered later in this section.  
The main drawback here is that the introduction of additional children erodes the parsimony for which 
the altruistic model is valued and this is worsened further if we relax the assumption that all children 
are the same (Becker G. , 1991; Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). This messiness may explain the 
absence of family size in the majority of the existing literature. One aim of this chapter will be to 
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establish whether such additional complexity is necessary. Such complexity will only be considered 
necessary if the consideration of variance clustering can be seen to affect our estimates of transfer 
behaviour.  
To identify whether this is the case, multilevel models in which parent child dyads are nested within 
families will be compared to the single level models traditionally used. If the coefficients for family size 
are significantly different in the multilevel models it should be concluded that the parsimonious models 
currently in use are insufficient for understanding transfer behaviour. If family size is a key determinant 
of transfer behaviour, it suggests that the existing theoretical framework has obstructed a view of a key 
determinant of transfer behaviour. 
Incorporating the difficult second child 
The main problem with making theoretical comparisons across different sized families without 
aggregation is that the effect of an additional child is dependent upon what characteristics that child has. 
It is difficult to say that a family with one child will transfer more than if they had two children because 
it is instinctively dependent on what characteristics that child has. One way to circumvent these issues 
is to assume that the additional child is the same as the existing child. This is a contentious assumption 
and one that is considered in more detail later. Yet, if this is assumed, then it is clear that transfers 
should increase and that: 
5) ∑ 𝑇𝑗𝑖=𝑗  ≥  ∑ 𝑇𝑗−1𝑖=𝑗−1  
This simply states that the total amount transferred by the family is more with each additional child 
given that a parent has altruistic feelings for each child and a subsequent desire to provide for them. 
Despite this, it should not be expected that transfer behaviour will double when an only child is joined 
by an identical sibling as though there were a fixed sized payment made to children. Instead the rate of 
increase is inversely proportional to the marginal returns to additional consumption for the utility of 
the parent. That is to say as the welfare needs of their children increase with each additional child, a 
parent’s own utility is increasingly impinged upon and negatively effects the extent to which they are 
willing to transfer additional funds to their children. Therefore aggregate transfer behaviour will 
increase at a decreasing marginal rate with additional children. The extent to which it does will reflect 
the elasticity of the parents own utility curve. 
This does not imply that a parent’s affection for their children is diluted with each additional child but 
merely that to proportionally increase the total amount transferred would increasingly impinge upon 
their quality of life. Therefore with each child, ceteris paribus, there is a decreasing marginal increase 
in the family’s total transfer budget (Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). 
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For the original child, who now must share transfers with their sibling, their situation will be worse. 
This can be shown by the fact that the parent’s marginal returns on consumption will be positive and 
the burden of an additional child will not be met with an increase in transfers to the point where each 
child’s utility is the same as it would be if they were an only child. Therefore the altruistic model 
suggests that if the number of children in a family increases then the amount received by a child will 
necessarily be lower than in a family with fewer children, assuming all children are treated equally. 
Child order and the number of siblings 
Existing intergenerational transfers’ research has only considered the role of family structure from a 
limited perspective by controlling for family size within analysis. At a theoretical level the literature has 
not fully incorporated the original framework of family economic theory to the extent that other areas 
of family studies have such as early life and educational investment. This section will draw on this 
literature to consider the role of contrasting role of birth order which is currently absent from the 
analysis of intergenerational transfers. 
The idea that children of differing birth order are treated equally has been shown to be highly 
questionable in research on investment in young children (Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2005). It has 
been demonstrated on numerous occasions that it is birth order and not family size that determines the 
probability that a child will receive financial or emotional investment and that therefore older children 
receive preferential treatment (Booth & Hiao, 2009). The existing literature on transfers gives no room 
to considerations of child order which, given that the aforementioned studies found little effect from 
family size, raises interesting questions about the accuracy of existing research on intergenerational 
transfers. 
Empirically, there are high levels of correlation at the individual level between child order and family 
size because a large family will have more children from further down the birth order. There are a 
number of mechanisms that could lead to less investment in children further down the birth order such 
as; the mother being less engaged in the labour market, earlier children receiving investment prior to 
the birth of siblings and the traditional and cultural legacy of disproportional investment in the first 
born (Åslund & Grönqvist, 2010).  
There is considerable ambiguity as to whether this birth order effect would carry through to later stages 
in life. Nevertheless, it could be that the first child benefits from their siblings having yet to exhibit 
their own demands on the financial resources of the parents (Blake, 1981; Coall, Meier, Hertwig, 
Wanke, & Hopflinger, Grandparental Investment: The influence of Reproductive Timing and Family 
Size, 2009). Conversely it could be argued that children further down the birth order will transition to 
adulthood at a time when the parent’s financial resources are more mature in terms of their labour 
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market and housing position (Barber & East, 2009). There is a need to account for birth order within 
the theoretical and analytical framework given that, if the probability of receiving a transfer does differ 
by birth order, it will necessarily influence the perceived effect of family size. At an empirical level the 
strong correlation between birth order and family size means that specific techniques are needed to 
distil the results. 
8.2.3. Data & Methods 
Hypotheses 
The reformed altruistic model suggests that the total amount transferred by parents will rise with each 
additional child because each additional child represents a potential source of unhappiness that the 
parent maybe exposed to. It is important to note that this increase will not be proportional in that with 
each additional child, provision of transfers will increasingly encroach upon the personal consumption 
of the parent. The function by which this occurs is indicative of the shape of the parent’s indifference 
curve and the extent to which they are willing to adjust transfer behaviour in response to the demand 
placed upon them by their children (Browning, Ciappori, & Weiss, 2010). 
This is in line with traditional ideas of family size and investment capacity and therefore is not very 
controversial. The hypothesis to be tested in this chapter looks at the impact of this behaviour at the 
individual level: 
The probability of any one individual receiving a transfer as well as the size of any subsequent transfer are 
negatively affected by the number of siblings that individual has. 
This logically follows from the assertion above because, if the aggregate transfer amount and frequency 
rise less than proportionally within the family, an individual child’s likelihood of receiving a transfer 
will decline. This is a more complex assertion than it appears, given that the existing literature of 
related fields suggests that the disproportionality is almost entirely carried by children further down the 
birth order and that once you control for birth order, the effect of family size disappears (Booth & 
Hiao, 2009). A positive finding regarding this hypothesis would therefore distinguish intergenerational 
transfers from the existing literature that has been conducted on transfers earlier in the life of the child 
in other areas of family studies and suggest that they operate under differing dynamics. 
If the effect of family size on the individual likelihood of receiving transfers is evidenced and shown to 
be of relative importance in relation to established factors such as family income and wealth, it should 
raise questions about the need to revise and extend the altruistic model and pay closer attention to the 
clustering of variance and nesting of individual dyads within family groups. If the hypothesis is refuted 
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however it would support existing research which tends to regard family size as a marginal variable on 
the fringes of the model and something that ultimately does not greatly affect the design of research on 
intergenerational transfers.  
This analysis will therefore go some way to answering the fourth question posed in chapter 3. In the 
context of the broader thesis, this answer matters for three reasons. Firstly, the accurate modelling of 
family structure could greatly alter the estimates of other factors such as income and policy measures. 
These could be less important than previous research suggested due to an upward bias in the estimation 
methods. The second reason is that the effect size for family structure variables contextualises the effect 
size for these variables. Previous research has focused on the role of income and financial considerations 
but these are rarely contextualised through comparisons with other effects. Finally, this analysis also 
clarifies the conclusion to the second question in chapter 3. This is because the incorporation of family 







Figure 8.1 - The number of children for financial respondents with at least one child  
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 2. Inclusive of step, fostered and adopted children 
The final sample from the second wave of SHARE in 2006 consists of 15,412 households from 14 
European Countries where one of the residents is over 50 and has reported that they have living 
children (SHARE, 2011).  The descriptives of the family level variables reflect the survey format where 
a specific individual has to be identified as the financial respondent and it is the data of this individual 
which is predominantly used in the analysis. Further details of how both the parental and child datasets 
are constructed are provided in chapter 4. The descriptive statistics in Table 8.1 are coherent with 





















Table 8.1 - Family level variables – Variables at the household level for respondents and 
the Individual level variables for the allocated financial respondent 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household 
        
Made a Transfer 23% - - - 
Total Transferred € 803 € 2,795 € 0 € 26,846 
Children 2.52 1.57 1 16 
Children Included in the Survey 2.34 0.96 1 4 
Income (Household) € 42,717 € 73,466 € 0 € 563,758 
Wealth (Household) € 175,326 € 262,893 € 0 € 2,227,247 
Average Age 65.16 17.14 50 104 
Average Years in Education  10.53 4.27 0 25 
Financial Respondent         
Gender (ref: female) 46.52% - - - 
Marital Status 
    
Married 63.95% - - - 
Partnership 1.28% - - - 
Married – Separated 1.86% - - - 
Never Married 1.7% - - - 
Divorced 9.03% - - - 
Widowed 22.17% - - - 
Employment Status 
    
Retired 52.04% - - - 
Employed 27.15%    
Disabled 3.75% - - - 
Unemployed 2.63% - - - 
Homemaker 13.54% - - - 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 2, Observations = 12,104 
Deviations from official statistics on these variables can generally be accounted for by the fact that this 
refers to individuals who have children. So whilst it is true that a great deal more than 1.7% of the over 
50’s never got married, this proportion is true only of those who have had at least one child. Income, 
wealth and transfer statistics reflect the distributions after the exclusion of the top 1% which have been 
shown to bias estimates in previous studies (Zissimopoulos & Smith, 2010).  
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At the family level, all financial variables are in Euros taken at purchasing power parity and these values 
are then logged to approximate a normal distribution. This is inclusive of income, wealth, inheritance 
and transfers receipts. The ‘wealth’ variable refers to both financial and fixed assets held by the family 
as indicated by the assets section of the SHARE questionnaire10. These values only reflect the financial 
circumstances of the respondent and their spouse if they have one.  
In addition to the financial variables, the time variables “Number of Hours Spent Babysitting for this 
child”, “Number of Hours Spent Giving Support for this child” and “Number of Hours Spent Receiving 
Help from this child” were also logged so as to approximate a normal distribution and represent an 
estimated average per weekly amount. These variables are derived from the section of the survey 
relating to support receipt and giving11.  
                                                          
10 This includes variables: as003e, as007e, as011e, as017e, as021e, as030e, as042e, as051e, as042e, as051e, ho027e 
11 [SP003_ – SP006_] 
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Table 8.2 - Individual level variables – Variables for the parent-child dyad for 
respondents 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Transfer Occurrence 14.27% 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Transfer Amount (All children) € 318 1490.69 € 0 € 26,846 
Transfer Amount (Recipients Only) € 2,452 3446.38 € 1 € 26,846 
Birth Order* 2.05 1.27 1 15 
Gender (Ref: Female)* 50.90% - - - 
Number of Children* 1.08 1.24 0 22 
Age* 36.67 11.08 0 87 
Parentage 
        
Child of Respondent Couple 92.17% - - - 
Child of Financial Respondent Only 4.63% - - - 
Child of Respondents Partner Only 2.64% - - - 
Adopted 0.43% - - - 
Fostered 0.001% - - - 
Child’s Education 
     
Education (Low – ISCED 1-2) 17.54% - - - 
Education (Medium – ISCED 3-4) 43.52% - - - 
Education (High – ISCED 5-6) 27.15% - - - 
Child’s Employment Status 
     
Employed 67.99% - - - 
Unemployed 4.49% - - - 
Self Employed 6.42% - - - 
Part Time Employment 6.88% - - - 
In Education 6.42% - - - 
Parental Leave 1.07% - - - 
Retired 1.88% - - - 
Sick or Disabled 1.42% - - - 
Home Maker 4.67% - - - 
Observations = 24,966     
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 2, Observations = 24,966. Variables marked with * 




The descriptives for the parent child dyad are included within Table 8.2. The validation of these values 
is particularly difficult given that the sample is of children of those who are over 50 rather than directly 
from the population itself. Details of the issues surrounding indirect sampling are covered in detail in 
chapter 4 (page 55).  
Birth order and within family sampling 
92.8% of families include 4 children or fewer which is important because the survey only includes 
details about four children. Therefore, the number of individual children which are excluded due to the 
surveys restriction to 4 detailed child responses should not pose a problem regarding wider inference.  
The correlation coefficient between birth order and family size is indeed high (r = 0.63). Yet, contrary 
to expectations, the sampling of the four selected children within large families is fairly evenly 
distributed in spite of the methods employed. For example, the distribution of birth order amongst 
children from a six child family is as follows: 
Birth Position   1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
% of Children   19.25  19.35  17.42  17.53  14.52  11.94 
Here there is a distinct bias toward the older children within this family size but that this bias is not 
excessively large. Figure 8.2 demonstrates this tendency graphically by showing the relative likelihood 
of sampling by birth order for each family size. A value of one reflects the fact that the child is as likely 
as their siblings to be selected. Any value over one suggests that this birth order position is likely to be 
oversampled and values under one reflect the opposite. As one can see, divergences from one are not 
very extreme but do vary by family size and there are some patterns within the data. 
For families with less than 7 children, the picture is relatively clear in that the relative likelihood does 
tail off towards the lower birth orders. This is probably due to birth order representing a tiebreaker in 
SHARE’s child selection process. This pattern is particularly pronounced in families of more than 5 
children. For larger families the sampling appears to be much more erratic with the youngest child 
particularly under sampled regardless of family size  
Nevertheless, the correlation between family size and birth order needs to be held in consideration 
within this model as multi-collinearity between family size and birth order is likely to distort the 
coefficient estimates of individual predictors and thus complicate the hypothesis testing. In order to 
establish the effect of multi-collinearity the models was re-run for individual birth order groups. The 





Figure 8.2 - Relative Probability of Sampling amongst siblings by birth order amongst 
children of respondents 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 2 
Methods 
In order to test the hypotheses, the data was analysed using four separate statistical models. In order to 
capture two dimensions of ‘transfer behaviour’, the models tested both the likelihood that a transfer 
will occur and estimate the size of subsequent transfers. To do this a probit regression model was used 
to assess the likelihood that a transfer takes place and this was then followed by a Tobit analysis which 
was used to estimate the size of subsequent transfers. A tobit model is one which estimates transfer size 
but does so dependent on whether a transfer was made at all. This approach is superior to previous 
analysis which relied on ordinary least square estimates for the estimation of the transfer size. This has 
been shown to systematically produce underestimates of coefficients and affect size given zero inflation 
(Voorpostel & Blieszner, 2008; Hox, 2010; Brandt, Haberkern, & Szydlik, 2009). Other distributions 
such as negative binomial and poisson distributions were considered but these added little to the 
explanatory power of the analysis and as the results demonstrate, this is also true of the tobit analysis. 
The probit model was used to model the likelihood that a transfer will take place. The tobit model was 
























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Birth Order
2 child family 3 child family 4 child family
5 child family 6 child family 7 child family
8 child family 9 child family 10 child family
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stated in the SHARE questionnaire (logged this produces a value of 5.5214) (Albertini & Radl, 2012). 
In constructing the model, a stepwise approach was taken with the exception of the key independent 
variables; number of children and birth order. The completed model was then compared to a model 
that included the number of children and the coefficient estimates as well as model fit statistics were 
used to determine whether the effect was significantly different from zero from a statistical and 
substantive perspective.  
In addition to family level and individual level variables, dummy variables were included to capture 
differences between countries. The country level effects are controls and do not reflect a test of the 
relevant hypothesis. It could be argued that these effects themselves are miss-specified in that they are 
not described as a third level of fixed effects. This would provide a good topic for further research but 
given the complexity of the estimation process involved and the deviation from the question at hand, it 
was not considered necessary for this analysis. Instead the country fixed effects are examined in order 
to examine whether country level variation is reduced by the model including family structure. 
In order to establish whether a multilevel framework was necessary, two random effect multilevel 
models, one Probit and one Tobit, were used (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012).  These were then 
compared with single level versions of these models which are most commonly used in the literature. 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) are used in 
order to compare the models and establish the extent to which the clustering of observations by family 
improved the model fit. It should be noted that the AIC and BIC cannot be compared across Probit and 
Tobit models. 
The main hypothesis was examined by looking at three aspects of the analysis. The first is the 
coefficients standard error and the statistical significance of the estimate. The second was the effect size 
of the ‘family size’ variable and how this compares with other variables. Particular attention was also 
given to the comparison with the effect of birth order. These two effects operate at two levels of 
analysis, yet this model design will allow for comparisons across these levels and will thus provide 
superior estimates and interpretations to previous research. Thirdly, the maximum effects of family 
size will be assessed and compared to important variables of a differing metric such as Income. This will 





8.3.1. Is a multilevel model necessary? 
Table 8.3 – Model fit Statitstics for Single and Multilevel Tobit and Logit Models 








Log Likelihood -10242   -8836   -14959   -13707 
 
AIC 20583.5   17773.9   30019.6   27518.2 
 
BIC 20994.5   18193   30438.7   27945.6 
 
Number of Groups -  12,014  -  12,014  
Observations  24,966    24,966    24,966    24,966 
 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 2; Note: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 0.05. Standard 
Errors are in Parentheses. 
 
Table 8.4 - Estimates of  Child Level Coefficients for Single and Multilevel Tobit and 
Logit Models 
 








Child Level         






(0.014)   (0.037)  
(0.032) 
 




(0.021)   (0.053)  
(0.046) 
 
Number of Children 0.013 
 




(0.011)   (0.028)  
(0.027) 
 
Childs Lineage, (#Ref: Child of 
Both) 
Financial Respondents Child 
-0.13 ** -0.134 ** -0.298 ** -0.249 * 
(0.041) 
 
(0.049)   (0.113)  
(0.120) 
 




(0.061)   (0.144)  
(0.144) 
 
















(0.126)   (0.273)  
(0.281) 
 
















Marital Status, (#Ref: Married) 
Divorced or Separated 
0.202 *** 0.193 *** 0.536 *** 0.586 *** 
(0.035) 
 


















(0.113)   (0.289)  
(0.264) 
 
Employment Status, (#Ref: Full 
Time) – Unemployed 
0.24 *** 0.23 *** 0.547 *** 0.554 *** 
(0.040) 
 
(0.044)   (0.112)  
(0.101) 
 
Self Employed 0.014 
 







(0.040)   (0.099)  
(0.091) 
 
Part Time 0.043 
 



















































































 Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 2; Note: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 0.05. Standard 
Errors are in Parentheses. 
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Table 8.5 - Estimates of  Parent Level Coefficients for Single and Multilevel Tobit and 
Logit Models 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 






Age of the Parents (Average) 0.001 
 












Parents Income (Log, Euro) 0.074 *** 0.016 
 
0.234 *** 0.239 *** 








Parents Wealth (Log, Euro) 0.076 *** 0.058 *** 0.272 *** 0.281 *** 








Employment Status, (#Ref: 
Retired) - Employed or Self-
employed 
0.122 *** -0.016 
 























Permanently Sick or Disabled -0.053 
 












Homemaker -0.158 *** -0.227 *** -0.463 *** -0.44 *** 








Years in Education (Average) 0.03 *** 0.028 *** 0.079 *** 0.085 *** 


























Parents Household, (#Ref: 
Couple) – Single 












Number of residents other 
than respondent or spouse 









Transfers Received (Log, 
Euro) 
0.065 *** 0.061 *** 0.152 *** 0.156 *** 








Inheritance Received (Log, 
Euro) 
0.029 *** 0.03 *** 0.085 *** 0.087 *** 
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 

























Number of Hours Spent 
Babysitting for this child’s 
children(log) 









Number of Hours Spent 
Giving Support for this 
child(log) 









Number of Hours Spent 
Receiving Help from this 
child(log) 









Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 2; Note: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 0.05. Standard 
Errors are in Parentheses.  
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Table 8.4 shows the traditional model used in the analysis in that it adopts a probit model of transfer 
behaviour to predict whether or not a transfer has occurred. Many of the variables used in this analysis 
are widely used in the literature and the estimates are broadly, though not statistically, comparable. 
The likelihood statistics in Table 8.3 demonstrate a significant and dramatic improvement in the model 
fit between this model and model 2, the random effects model. This is strong evidence that the 
multilevel approach is an improvement on the analysis of intergenerational transfers and allows for 
more appropriate between family comparisons that are the focus of the majority of intergenerational 
transfers. This finding is supported by the comparison of model 3 and model 4 which are a single level 




8.3.2. Transfer occurrence on the parent child dyad 
 
Figure 8.3 - Probability of receiving a transfer by number of children as estimated by 
model 2 at mean values 
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 2 
The parent-child dyad random effects models offer an opportunity to place results in the context of the 
child. Model 2 in table 8.5 demonstrates that the size of the family someone is in has a significant and 
large effect on the probability of receiving a transfer. The coefficient implies that individuals who are an 
only child are more than 5 times as likely to receive a transfer as those in a family of four (5.42 times as 
likely). This would seem to indicate that the size of an individual’s family plays a large role in 
determining whether or not an individual receives financial assistance from their family. When we 
place this in the context of family income, the size of this effect becomes apparent. Someone from a 
family with an income in the top 10% is not even twice as likely to receive a transfer as an individual in 
the bottom 10% (1.85 times as likely). This suggests that the maximum effect of family size is larger 
than that of income and that family size has thus been underestimated in its impact. Both coefficients 
are strongly significant at more than the 99.9% level. 
Underestimates of family size have been in part due to no control for birth order. It also has a large and 
significant effect on the likelihood of receiving a transfer. The results suggest that within a family of 




























This suggests that there are in fact birth order effects on transfer behaviour and these will have biased 
previous findings regarding the effect of family size on transfer behaviour.  
8.3.3. Transfer amount on the parent child dyad 
The multilevel tobit model also shows a significant effect of family size on the amount an individual 
receives, adding further evidence to the notion that children in larger families are disadvantaged in 
terms of transfers. Similarly they show that there is a separate and independent effect of birth order 
that has been missing in previous analysis.  
These results indicate that when we consider the size of transfers in the context of the likelihood of a 
transfer, larger families make transfers of a substantially greater size. The coefficient in table 8.5 
suggests that with each additional child the size of a transfer decreases by 32.95%, so that an only child 
will on average receive nearly 5 times that of someone in a four child family (4.95). 
We can place this in the context of the effect of parental income. In table 8.5 we can see that the 
estimated amount received by a child from a family in the tenth percentile of income will be just 
66.72% larger than the amount estimated for a child from a family in the first percentile. If we take 
these to be reasonable maximum effects, then the impact of family size appears to be approximately 3 
times that of parental income (4.95/1.67 = 2.96). 
With regards to birth order, the model in table 8.4 suggests that the estimated size of a transfer to the 
oldest child in a four child family is 36.68% more than that of the youngest child. This suggests that the 
effect of birth order, whilst considerable, is less than that of family size and it is also only significant at 
the 95% level. This implies that unlike with early life investments, there is a distinct effect from family 




8.3.4. Country Level Variation  
Table 8.6 - Estimates of  Country Level Coefficients for Single and Multilevel Tobit and 
Logit Models 
  -1 -2 -3 -4 
  Probit Multi-Level Probit Tobit 
Multi-Level 
Tobit 
Country (#Ref: Austria)                 
- Germany -0.049   -0.144 * -0.083   -0.101     
  (0.054)   (0.068)   (0.145)   (0.191)     
Sweden 0.029   -0.062   -0.125   -0.31     
  (0.049)   (0.064)   (0.135)   (0.180)     
Netherlands -0.19 *** -0.298 *** -0.502 *** -0.756 *** 
  (0.053)   (0.067)   (0.144)   (0.192)     
Spain -0.473 *** -0.593 *** -1.486 *** -1.822 *** 
  (0.069)   (0.085)   (0.197)   (0.261)     
Italy -0.113 * -0.199 ** -0.334 * -0.471 *   
  (0.054)   (0.068)   (0.147)   (0.192)     
France -0.29 *** -0.429 *** -0.932 *** -1.144 *** 
  (0.053)   (0.067)   (0.147)   (0.194)     
Denmark -0.152 ** -0.227 *** -0.378 ** -0.534 **  
  (0.052)   (0.067)   (0.141)   (0.188)     
Greece -0.048   -0.2 ** -0.09   -0.161     
  (0.055)   (0.070)   (0.151)   (0.197)     
Switzerland -0.404 *** -0.489 *** -0.973 *** -1.165 *** 
  (0.063)   (0.080)   (0.171)   (0.226)     
Belgium -0.294 *** -0.418 *** -1.006 *** -1.262 *** 
  (0.052)   (0.066)   (0.145)   (0.192)     
Czechia 0.03   -0.211 ** -1.096 *** -1.235 *** 
  (0.057)   (0.070)   (0.169)   (0.218)     
Poland 0.005   -0.254 *** -0.639 *** -0.79 *** 
  (0.059)   (0.072)   (0.175)   (0.227)     
Ireland -0.303 *** -0.385 *** -0.892 *** -1.011 *** 
  (0.069)   (0.089)   (0.189)   (0.256)     
Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 2; Note: *** p < 0 .001 ** < 0.01 * < 0.05. Standard 





Source: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Wave 2 
The marginal effects estimated for each country indicate very little in the way of regime patterning as 
described in some areas of the literature (Albertini & Kohli, 2012). There are differences between 
countries but these do not conform to traditional typologies. Amongst those with below average levels 
of transfers are a southern country (Spain), a liberal country (Ireland), and three ‘central’ countries 
(Switzerland, France and Belgium). Italy and Greece are indistinguishable from Eastern Europe (Poland 
and Czech Republic) as well as Denmark & Sweden in Scandinavia. Any comparative narrative 
operating at the macro level would be risking data fitting. Such a narrative would offer little extra 
explanation to the micro considerations discussed here. Typological, regime based approaches have 
been widely used in the comparative social sciences and particularly in social policy due to their 
capacity to concisely summarise systematic differences and describe the differing dynamics in a variety 
of countries. However, as the effect of parental and child resources identified in earlier chapters, the 
dynamics of intergenerational transfers do not differ systematically across countries, rendering such an 

























































































The results of the parent child dyad models demonstrate that children in larger families get less 
financial assistance. This is supported by existing evidence and theory (Sikora & Peters, 2011; Leopold 
& Schneider, 2010; McGarry & Schoeni, 1995). What is surprising is the relative size of this effect 
which previous studies had consistently estimated as being around 20-22% less for each additional 
child. The results from this analysis suggest that the effect on the likelihood of a transfer could be at 
least twice as much as that. 
In terms of maximum effect, previous estimates from the literature suggested that an only child is 
almost three times as likely to receive a transfer as a child in a four child family. This analysis concludes 
that they are more than five times as likely. This discrepancy may be due to the ability to fully and 
adequately control for family size within a multilevel structure in this analysis. That is to say that family 
size is at a different analytical level to parent child dyad variables. The resulting models are therefore 
more accurately specified to account for this, as well as the confounding effect of birth order. 
This bias is also likely to explain larger coefficient estimates for the multilevel tobit analysis where it 
was shown that the maximum effect of family size was 3 times that of parental income. In addition to 
the downward bias generated by the use of single level models in previous studies, there is also likely to 
be a significant downward bias with regards to the use of ordinary least square models. Due to this 
underestimation, existing theories and evidence have tended to over emphasise the effect of income 
and downplay the role of family size. The findings here go some way to correcting this and revealing 
the effect of family size on transfer behaviour. 
Together the results of these models do suggest that accounting for the nesting of parent child dyads 
within families is of great importance. They highlight the need for appropriate techniques and analytical 
approaches in assessing transfers from the recipient’s perspective. The inclusion of birth order, the 
nesting of dyads within family contexts and the use of appropriate estimating techniques uncover a 
miss-direction within existing research on transfer behaviour. The substantive implications of this field 
lie largely in assessing behaviour at the level of the parent child dyad. Adequately modelling this is 
therefore essential in distilling the substantive issues relating to intergenerational transfers. 
The analysis provided here is limited by the data currently available. Multiple waves of data will allow 
for three level models with more clinical distinctions between parent-child and family effects. This will 
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also allow for a full and adequate testing of the role of events such as child births, graduations, 
marriages and divorces in the cause of financial transfers. Only when this longitudinal element of 
transfers is considered will a full and substantively useful picture emerge. Yet this research does suggest 
that such behaviour will further dilute the fixation on income effects. 
Theoretical Implications 
This chapter has demonstrated that the altruistic model not only ignores an important determinant of 
transfer behaviour but also leads to bias and misleading empirical analysis. It demonstrates that the size 
of an individual’s family does affect their transfer receipts and, more significantly, that correctly 
specifying and modelling the nature and structure of the family is a prerequisite to understanding 
transfer behaviour more generally. 
Existing research has modelled data on transfers at a single level, regardless of whether the parent child 
dyad or parental household has been the unit of analysis. This has led to significant distortions in the 
estimates produced. Given the high degree of variance between families evident within the data, it is 
likely that this would have led to misleading findings both empirically and theoretically. In addition to 
this, the modelling of transfer size using ordinary least square estimates has also persistently led to bias 
estimates. The use of tobits has corrected for this here by estimating transfer size conditionally on the 
occurrence of a transfer and thus negating the impact of zero inflation.  
In conclusion, this analysis suggests that theories of intergenerational transfers need to incorporate the 
context of transfer behaviour in a more compelling and meaningful way. This chapter included 
attempts to incorporate multiple children into the altruistic model. Other theories should be similarly 
mindful of the need to incorporate family structure within their description of transfer behaviour. With 
regards to the wider thesis, this chapter illustrates that the conceptual framework in chapter 3 should 
be viewed as one in which ‘family structures’ are seen as a meaningful and prominent sculptor of 
transfer behaviour. Once nested within families, the coefficients for parental income and wealth that 
have been the focus of research here and elsewhere are seen to be secondary. 
Chapter 5 concluded that the effect of policies in crowding in transfers was less than that of income 
generally. This implied that the role of policy in stimulating transfers was secondary to that of income. 
This chapter relegates the crowding in effect of policy further. If policy is to be more meaningfully 
understood in the context of intergenerational transfers, it would therefore be advisable to consider the 
interaction between family structures and policy. This lies outside of the scope of this analysis but 




As an abstract topic of questionable importance, the analysis of intergenerational transfers should aim 
to make a substantive contribution. The topic lends itself to discussions of social mobility, youth 
transitions and many other outcomes of the recipient. The analysis offered here looks to support that. 
In doing so there are few topics of greater substantive importance to policy makers than social mobility 
(European Commision, 2011). If intergenerational transfers can offer a genuine contribution to this 
literature and illuminate underlying processes, then it will have vindicated the academic attention it has 
attracted. Much of the research in this area has focused on the direct transmission of wealth through 
transfers and ignored the role of family size and other between family differences. This analysis 
represents a small step towards incorporating such effects.  
Demographic arguments in development have often argued that lower fertility rates encourage 
investment in children and subsequent productivity growth (Szreter, 1996; Becker & Tomes, 1976). 
Many of these arguments have suggested that fertility declines have led to large productivity gains and 
industrial revolutions. Others have suggested that they preserve existing social strata. They all argue 
that family size is correlated with the child’s outcomes in terms of social and economic advancement. 
This analysis has begun to argue the same using intergenerational transfers as its point of departure. The 
evidence offered here suggests a great deal of heterogeneity in transfer behaviour that could imply a 
great deal of heterogeneity in the access to sources of welfare.  
Future Research 
Existing social policy designs rarely account for the presence of an extended family and the 
heterogeneity of the strength of such a network. What’s more, the extent to which extended family 
members are able to assist an individual has been seen to be determined by the amount of money a 
family has. This is often based on research similar to that seen in chapter 5 & 6. However, the results of 
this analysis indicate that this is only half the story and that a predictor of equal and often greater 
validity is the size of that extended family. 
The impact of transfers upon outcomes for individuals will therefore be dependent not just upon the 
financial position of the family but also its size and the relative position of the individual within it. The 
policy implications of this are vast. In modern welfare states children of all ages are targeted due to 
their family’s financial background. This analysis supports the idea that this should only be one trigger 
of welfare. By incorporating family size into such targeting practices, welfare states will become more 
effective in reaching those who need additional support and welfare provision. 
In addition to this, the differentials due to family size and birth order are indicative of whether an 
individual receives financial support. It is therefore possible that processes supporting meritocratic 
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social mobility could be developed out of a better understanding of family support dynamics such as 
those evidenced within this chapter. 
This model can also be stretched further and is capable of exploring many of the dynamics involving 
multi-child families such as; how the welfare of siblings affects the likelihood that someone will receive 
financial support, the role of step-families within family dynamics, the effects of birth spacing and 
prolonged cohabitation and sandwich generation effects. These are topics that are of great importance 
in family economics and sociology and carry practical policy implications. Yet they were not the focus 
of this analysis which instead merely focused on how family size should be considered within the 




9.1. Empirical Findings 
This research project set out with the primary aim of understanding whether policy affected the 
intergenerational transfers of families in Europe. The analysis in the preceding four chapters 
demonstrated that there is strong evidence to suggest that policies do affect transfer behaviour. Chapter 
5 demonstrated that higher public pensions lead to parents giving more to their adult children. Whilst 
this is a narrow conception of social policies, public pensions are by far the biggest component of public 
transfers form the working to the non-working population and are at the centre of debates of 
intergenerational justice. This finding therefore implies that these public transfers are ‘overshooting’ 
and that in some families this is then passed onto younger generations. 
The findings of chapter 7 also indicated an effect of policy in that those in receipt of public benefits 
were also the most likely to be receiving private financial transfers. This goes against the crowding out 
hypothesis in that one would expect that those who receive more from the state get less from the 
family. The crowding in effect that was found was reasonably robust across a number of different policy 
groupings including child benefit, education benefits and housing benefits as well as across various 
welfare regimes within Europe. Again this measure of policy was constrained to financial receipts 
rather than including access to services or rights based policy indicators. Nevertheless, from a financial 
perspective it would appear that downward, private financial transfers are associated with the receipt of 
public financial assistance. 
These results should however be held in a full empirical context. This can be achieved by first 
considering how important these factors are in determining transfers. This was achieved in chapters 6 & 
8 of this thesis. In chapter 6 it was illustrated that the household’s material needs played a considerable 
role in determining whether a household received transfers or not. Yet this effect was itself secondary 
to the underlying tendency that a household would receive a transfer. This underlying tendency 
suggests that there are those who receive transfers and there are those that do not and that the 
recipient’s circumstances have little to do with it. This points to parental circumstances being more 
important than a child’s circumstances in determining whether a transfer is made. In order to test this 
it would be necessary to simultaneously measure parental and child income which is notoriously 
difficult (Kalmijn & Liefbroer, 2010). 
In addition to parental circumstances, chapter 8 indicated that there were also other factors which were 
constant over time that could explain the underlying tendency of some households to receive transfers. 
Family size and birth order were shown to affect the probability of receiving a transfer far more than 
parental income which has dominated the literature to date. These factors appear to dictate who 
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receives financial assistance more than the particular circumstances of either the parent or child. The 
results of chapter 7 therefore put the effect of policy in context. The significant effect that was 
observed was far smaller in magnitude than the material circumstances of the household and certainly 
less than the underlying tendency of the household to receive a transfer. In short, the crowding in effect 
may have been observed but with regards to predicting who receives financial assistance, it is of 
relatively little importance. The maximum effects of policy were never large or indicative of a full 
crowding in or out effect where one euro increase in public transfers lead to a one euro increase in 
private transfers.  
In addition to only observing a small policy affect at the individual level, the analysis within these four 
chapters also consistently demonstrated large reductions in the country level variations. The estimated 
marginal effects at the country level changed considerably once the parent and child’s circumstances 
had been included within the model. This suggests that the cross national differences observed are 
primarily due to compositional effects rather than an underlying tendency for the Swedish or Germans 
to make more transfers than the Italians or Spanish. In contrast the fixed effects were not sensitive to 
the inclusion or exclusion of the policy indicators used in this analysis. Once again it should be stressed 
that the indicators used here in no way represent a comprehensive list and other policies may have a 
larger effect. Nevertheless this research did include what would be widely considered the prime 
suspects. The empirical evidence from this thesis regarding country level fixed effects is therefore 
limited and at best points to exceptions such as Spain rather than an observable regime typology.  
Therefore the observed policy effects identified within this thesis should be qualified with the 
conclusion that policies, at least in financial terms are not the primary direct determinant of transfers 
despite the literature’s focus on this aspect of intergenerational relations.   
9.2. Theoretical Interpretations 
Chapter 3 outlined a theoretical framework which guided the analysis and is now to be used to place 
the empirical findings in a wider context. This was a model based on the notion of altruism. This agent 
based modelling of transfers assumes rational actors who give financial assistance to others given that 
there well-being is dependent on the welfare of others. In analysing the results there was mixed 
evidence supporting this theoretical position. As with previous research, factors such as the child’s well 
-being and the parents resources where found to correlate with transfers in the manner depicted by the 
theory of altruism. Richer parents made transfers and poorer children received them.  
This theoretical approach was extended to incorporate multi-child families and reveal the important 
role that family structure plays in determining who receives financial transfers. Children in larger 
families receive fewer and smaller financial transfers from their parents. Furthermore, children lower 
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down the birth order also receive fewer and smaller transfers. This was possible due to the dexterity of 
the altruistic theory and can help explain unexplained variance on the parental-child dyad in terms of 
transfer receipt. This dexterity is a necessity for further theoretical developments to be made as there is 
still a considerable amount of empirical variation that is unexplained by any of the theories concerning 
financial transfers. Existing theories of altruism, exchange or of the life course have all failed to fully 
explain transfer behaviour. Empirically this is reflected in a focus on the significance levels and effect 
size and not on the predictive power of models. Such models in the literature and here, are poor 
predictors of transfers.  
In chapter 6, 7 and 8 it was shown that there remained a large ‘family effect’. This has been described 
here as a ‘tendency’ for households to receive transfers but to be precise it reflects a part of family 
behaviour that is unexplained. Chapter 8 went some way to explaining some of this but there remains a 
great deal to be explored. Altruistic theory is a sound theory in this respect given that it is a flexible 
theory that enables more complex dynamics of intergenerational dependencies to be explored. 
Exchange based theories are not widely applicable in that they primarily refer to the financially rich 
who are constrained in some other way. Life course theories are also inadequate as they are unable to 
describe empirical results in the detail that altruism has been shown to here. Yet altruism must be 
developed further if the question of ‘who receives financial transfers?’ is to be fully answered. 
The final theoretical consideration of this thesis was the contrast between the universalism of altruism 
and the socio-cultural contextual factors that have most commonly referred to policy variations. This 
literature has described how the varying assumptions of welfare states and the distinct logics of the 
resulting systems lead to cross country variations in transfer behaviour. Such a theoretical approach is 
considerably more complex than the altruistic theory advanced here as each typology requires its own 
logic to be extrapolated. Empirically there was little evidence to support such a theory. Most of the 
cross national differences dissipated after compositional factors were considered, thus subsuming a 
cross national narrative to an altruistic one. 
It was argued in this thesis that the policy effects that cross country differences in transfer behaviour 
were attributed to could be measured at the individual level and thus more robustly test policy theories 
and negate ecological fallacies. This effect was shown to exist but at a very small level with little effect 
on the estimated country fixed effects. This suggests that even if empirical evidence is identified 
regarding cross country variations in transfer behaviour, such as with Spain in this thesis, the primary 
consideration in this regard should not be policy. Furthermore, micro level theories of any form should 
not be advanced to explain such variation unless they can be empirically supported at the micro level.  
Comparative theory is predisposed to theory at the macro level and this has been justified empirically 
by an absence of micro data and an abundance of macro data. Yet comparative theory should adequately 
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describe the micro processes and measure them at a micro level. This thesis attempted this by 
measuring policy at the individual level and describing it using an individual level model of altruism. 
This allowed policy effects to be contextualised, compositional effects to be given due attention and 
alternative explanations of cross country variation considered (i.e. family size).  
From a theoretical perspective the main conclusion is therefore that theory should detach itself from 
fixed effects, whether they are at the family or country level. Empirically they are only unit specific 
residuals aggregated over a group and therefore the best way to describe them is as unexplained 
variance. This thesis has attempted to explain such variance but the theory of altruism needs to be 
developed further before more can be accounted for. 
9.3. Substantive Implications 
It may appear to the reader that this thesis has come to the conclusion that policy does not matter. This 
is not the case. Intergenerational transfers tend not to respond to marginal changes in the level of 
financial assistance provided for in public transfers. The first substantive conclusion must therefore be 
that arguments of crowding out have little empirical foundation in this respect. This is an important 
point to be made at a time of economic crisis. Arguments of crowding out have often been made to 
stem the development of the welfare state, now they are advanced to support its retrenchment. This 
logic suggests that the state need not do what the family can do instead. However the empirical 
evidence from this analysis indicates that the withdrawal of financial assistance to financially vulnerable 
households will not be met with additional assistance from their support network.  
Yet the conclusions go further still. In the discourse on the relationship between public and private 
provision of support, the two welfare providers of the state and the family are often depicted as equal 
forces. When one moves, the other moves in mirror image given that they are of equal mass and size, 
filling the same role. This is the underlying mechanics of crowding out. With regards to financial 
transfers however, this notion is wholly misleading. The financial support of the state is incomparable 
to that provided by the extended family. In Germany 57% of those over 50 receive a public pension, 
the average size of which is €10,000 a year. In comparison 20% of the children of these individuals 
received a financial transfer of an average of just €477.  
Even at the recipient end, public assistance dwarfs private assistance. In the European Union, the 
average amount received per year in private financial assistance by a household is just €221. The 
average amount received in public transfers is €12,341. Therefore the metaphor that would be more 
accurate would be that of a dinghy in the wake of an oil tanker.  Private transfers are small and behave 
erratically and unpredictably despite the best effort to model them as the result of rational behaviour. 
The aggregated effect of public transfers on private transfers is very small but this is most likely due to 
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private transfers being a rarely used means of support to begin with. Public and other sources of 
financial support are far more likely to be utilised. 
Contemporary European societies are ones in which social policies are the primary means of 
redistribution and tool for alleviating poverty. They are very effective at doing so when compared to 
private financial transfers. Like a tanker they are big and clearly directed. In contrast, this analysis 
identified the receipt of intergenerational transfers as being predominantly determined by an 
underlying tendency within a particular family. In substantive terms this means that it is effectively the 
luck of the draw. Chapter 8 also noted how family size affects how much someone will receive and 
chapter 5 noted the importance of their parent’s income. These are not desirable factors to determine 
who receives financial assistance. Given that private transfers are so small and distributed along such 
lines, it is not surprising that public transfers do not affect private transfers.  
Therefore it is public transfers and social policy that is important and not private transfers. In our 
ageing societies there is an ongoing discourse regarding intergenerational relationships in terms of 
solidarity and justice. In this respect, the conclusion of this thesis is that the most prominent and 
binding intergenerational relationship is that through the welfare state. Even though this thesis only 
looked at financial transfers, the reasoning behind this conclusion can be extended to other areas of 
intergenerational support. For example grandparental childcare and care provision for older members 
of a family are far rarer, more intermittent, less effective and sporadic than their public equivalents. 
Societal ageing is one of the key challenges in contemporary society, it requires a public solution as this 
thesis has illustrated that private provision is poorly targeted, small and irrelevant in comparison to 
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